Clark, list
My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong.
Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts?
I don't have 6.612 in my collection. Those few pages are missing!
And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or whatever
term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The categories, as I
understand them, are basic modes of organization of Matter-Mind and do so -
within the semiosic triad.
Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state of
'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of the
womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the
principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of
habit there would have been a second flash....
Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or 'was
real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original chaos,
therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere
indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411.
The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have nothing
to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy. And Firstness cannot be
defined as 'indeterminacy'.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 7:05 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with
Secondness (actualities, facts). In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore
not a Platonist. On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.
I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot
depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the
disagreement. (see below)
On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the
particular.
Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would
necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in
both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived of
intellectual objects.
Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
non-embedded reality.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to
something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with instead
of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call the triadic
sign as being ‘matter’ as it were.
...they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic
Sign. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign]. And, I agree
that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real',
i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean
that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as
embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a
mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.
I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong
parallels.
My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic
here so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to
earlier in 1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in which
firstness “occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you see the
firstness there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious as I think
the texts could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to reread them
again before giving a firm opinion)
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