Clark, list My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong.
Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts? I don't have 6.612 in my collection. Those few pages are missing! And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or whatever term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The categories, as I understand them, are basic modes of organization of Matter-Mind and do so - within the semiosic triad. Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state of 'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash.... Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or 'was real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411. The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have nothing to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy. And Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy'. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 7:05 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with Secondness (actualities, facts). In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist. On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896. I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the disagreement. (see below) On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the particular. Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived of intellectual objects. Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality. I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with instead of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call the triadic sign as being ‘matter’ as it were. ...they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic Sign. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign]. And, I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital. I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong parallels. My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic here so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to earlier in 1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in which firstness “occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you see the firstness there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious as I think the texts could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to reread them again before giving a firm opinion) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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