Clark, Edwina, List: CG: I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot depends upon what we mean by the terms.
Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality of possibilities until about 1896. ET: And Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy'. But that is precisely one of Peirce's definitions--just a few paragraphs before CP 1.412! CSP: Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness, and hæcceity, or pure secondness, are facts not calling for and not capable of explanation. (CP 1.405, EP 2.475; 1887-1888) Elsewhere he noted that both Firstness and Thirdness are forms of indeterminacy, because only Secondness is fully determinate. Firstness is vague, and thus not subject to the law of contradiction; while Thirdness is general, and thus not subject to the law of excluded middle (CP 5.505). Secondness, by contrast, is subject to both. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Clark, list > My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong. > > Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within > matter/concepts? > > I don't have 6.612 in my collection. Those few pages are missing! > > And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or > whatever term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The > categories, as I understand them, are basic modes of organization of > Matter-Mind and do so - within the semiosic triad. > > Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state > of 'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of > the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come > something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then > by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash.... > > Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or > 'was real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original > chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of > mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411. > > The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have > nothing to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy. And > Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy'. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 7:05 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism > > On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My > understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that > she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and > Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation > with Secondness (actualities, facts). In fact, her usual blanket > rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an > Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist. On the other hand, I agree > with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at > least after about 1896. > > I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot > depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the > disagreement. (see below) > > On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be > a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. > The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded > within the particular. > > Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would > necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in > both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived > of intellectual objects. > > Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have > non-embedded reality. > > I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to > something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with > instead of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call > the triadic sign as being ‘matter’ as it were. > > ...they do not function outside of their being embedded *within a triadic > Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*]. And, > I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals > are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that > doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and > operational only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a > triadic sign totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic > format that is vital. > > I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong > parallels. > > My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic > here so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to > earlier in 1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in > which firstness “occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you > see the firstness there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious > as I think the texts could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to > reread them again before giving a firm opinion) > >
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