Jon S, List,
You say: " In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical." You then suggest that the interpretation you are recommending fits nicely with the objection that he considers in the next paragraph. I am wondering if we might gain some clarity about the claim that "proving his 'theory of the nature of thinking' would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality' if we were to read it in light of his earlier work in the Minute Logic on Originality, Obsistence and Transuasion. In particular, I think that the discussion of the role of the CenoPythagorean Categories in the development of the theories of speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric is really quite clear and to the point when it comes to interpreting this remark. (CP, 2.79-2.110) I have a hunch that the movement from the Normative Semiotic to a doctrine of signs that corresponds to an objective logic provides some ideas that might help in the interpretation of the more puzzling moves that Peirce seems to be making in "The Neglected Argument". The remarks at 2.118 stand out in my mind. He says: "We now begin to see the sense of talking of modes of being. They are elements of cooperation toward the summum bonum. The categories now come in to aid us materially, and we clearly make out three modes or factors of being, which we proceed to make clear to ourselves. Arrived at this point, we can construct a Weltanschauung. From this platform, ethics acquires a new significance, as will be shown. Logic, too, shines forth with all is native nobility." So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 1:37 PM To: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics List: In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history of science supports this view. The editors of the Collected Papers must have deemed it necessary to provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve precisely that purpose. CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief in the Ens necessarium would according as it were true or false, fit or disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it acts in respect to ordinary morality. Since Peirce mentioned the "pragmaticistic interpretation" of "the belief in Ens necessarium" here, and provided some "hints" regarding "the pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium" in CP 6.490, perhaps our subsequent discussions in the threads on Peirce's Cosmology and related topics can shed light on this reply. If my understanding of that cosmology--and thus my analysis of CP 6.490--is correct, then there is no discontinuity between the natural competence of humanity's instinctive reason and matters of metaphysics; or at least, matters pertaining to the Reality of God. After all, it posits that God is not completely independent of the third Universe of Experience, which includes Mind and continuity itself; and according to Peirce, our disposition to generate true hypotheses is especially well-suited to that Category. CSP: It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the logical situation--the freest from all questionable admixture--is to say that man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. (CP 5.173, EP 2:217; 1903) Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was synechism, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as Ens necessarium explains not only the origin of the three Universes of Experience, but also their order (cosmos)--the "homogeneities of connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive conjectures. Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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