Jeff, List: I must confess that although I continue to find your posts thought-provoking, they also tend to be somewhat inscrutable to me. I am not sure exactly what bearing you are suggesting that CP 2.79-110 and CP 2.118 should have on our understanding of Peirce's theory of thinking in relation to the hypothesis of God's Reality.
JD: So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? I basically posed this same question at the very beginning of the earlier thread. My own answer, after much discussion and consideration, is based on this passage from the first manuscript draft of "A Neglected Argument" in R 842. CSP: Thus, I am to outline two arguments, one supporting the other. The latter, which I will designate as the humble argument, although every mind can feel its force, rests on far too many premisses to be stated in full. Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion. The major premiss, "a certain theory of logic," is that every process of thought that produces a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason is logical. The minor premiss, "a general description of" the humble argument, is that it is a process of thought that produces a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason. The conclusion that follows is "that the humble argument is logical." Notice the modesty of this claim; rather than *demonstrating *the Reality of God, Peirce sought merely to show that anyone who embraces his theory of logic, and recognizes that the humble argument is consistent with it, "need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion." As for what it would mean to "prove" the major premiss--Peirce indicated in "A Neglected Argument" that its primary experiential consequence is that, if it is correct, humanity's instinctive reason should exhibit a remarkable tendency to generate spontaneous conjectures that successfully withstand further deductive and inductive scrutiny. He then contended that this is exactly what we find to be the case, attributing it to what Galileo had called "*il lume naturale*" and advocating "that it is the simpler Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred" (CP 6.477, EP 2:444-445). He also explictly rejected the alternative explanation. CSP: But may they not have come fortuitously, or by some such modification of chance as the Darwinian supposes? I answer that three or four independent methods of computation show that it would be ridiculous to suppose our science to have so come to pass … There is a reason, an interpretation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance, and this indisputably proves to him who has perceptions of rational, or significant, relations, that man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bed-rock of logical truth. (CP 6.476, EP 2:444) Peirce included some specific calculations in the manuscripts that substantiate his claim here. In R 842, he invoked "the game of twenty questions," in which even the best player usually requires the full allotment--which means sifting through 2^20 (roughly a million) facts, such that on average it would take about half that many guesses to get to the right one purely by chance, whereas the history of science shows that it rarely requires more than a few. In R 843, he equated the total number of "logically simple hypotheses that might be proposed to explain any given hypothesis" to the total number of corpuscles in the visible universe, which is 10^64; and since "the number of seconds in three million years" is 10^14, "the odds would be 10^50 to 1,--which means 'utterly overwhelming,'--against the right explanation of any given fact having ever yet entered into the mind of man by chance; to say nothing of the labor of testing each hypothesis." Regards, Jon On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Jon S, List, > > You say: " In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed > what Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected > Argument for the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his > "theory of the nature of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's > Reality (CP 6.491). I eventually proposed that he was referring to the > notion that every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is > logical." > > You then suggest that the interpretation you are recommending fits nicely > with the objection that he considers in the next paragraph. I am wondering > if we might gain some clarity about the claim that "proving his 'theory > of the nature of thinking' would also prove the hypothesis of God's > Reality' if we were to read it in light of his earlier work in the Minute > Logic on Originality, Obsistence and Transuasion. In particular, I think > that the discussion of the role of the CenoPythagorean Categories in the > development of the theories of speculative grammar, critical logic and > speculative rhetoric is really quite clear and to the point when it comes > to interpreting this remark. (CP, 2.79-2.110) I have a hunch that the > movement from the Normative Semiotic to a doctrine of signs that > corresponds to an objective logic provides some ideas that might help in > the interpretation of the more puzzling moves that Peirce seems to > be making in "The Neglected Argument". > > The remarks at 2.118 stand out in my mind. He says: "We now begin to see > the sense of talking of modes of being. They are elements of cooperation > toward the *summum bonum*. The categories now come in to aid us > materially, and we clearly make out three modes or factors of being, which > we proceed to make clear to ourselves. Arrived at this point, we can > construct a *Weltanschauung*. From this platform, ethics acquires a new > significance, as will be shown. Logic, too, shines forth with all is native > nobility." > > So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so > connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so > is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Monday, October 31, 2016 1:37 PM > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics > > List: > > In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce > might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the > Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature > of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). > I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This > interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an > "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. > > CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of > guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have > noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural > selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the > preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that > man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the > fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in > respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot > adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption > is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and > Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history > of science supports this view. > > > The editors of the *Collected Papers* must have deemed it necessary to > provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this > point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a > decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an > unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript > where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve > precisely that purpose. > > CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted > much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of > divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection > could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My > reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or > disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt > or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and > further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief > in the *Ens necessarium* would according as it were true or false, fit or > disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural > selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this > belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it > acts in respect to ordinary morality. > > > Since Peirce mentioned the "pragmaticistic interpretation" of "the belief > in *Ens necessarium*" here, and provided some "hints" regarding "the > pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium*" in CP 6.490, perhaps our > subsequent discussions in the threads on Peirce's Cosmology and related > topics can shed light on this reply. If my understanding of that > cosmology--and thus my analysis of CP 6.490--is correct, then there is no > *discontinuity > *between the natural competence of humanity's instinctive reason and > matters of metaphysics; or at least, matters pertaining to the Reality of > God. After all, it posits that God is not completely independent of the > third Universe of Experience, which includes Mind and continuity itself; > and according to Peirce, our disposition to generate true hypotheses is > especially well-suited to that Category. > > CSP: It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the > logical situation--the freest from all questionable admixture--is to say > that man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than > wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than > right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. (CP 5.173, EP > 2:217; 1903) > > > Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was > *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime > importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens > necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of > Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of > connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and > connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, > EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and > connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, > nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive > conjectures. Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, phaneroscopy, > and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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