Jon S. List, Jon cloncluded his post by writing:
Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive conjectures. *Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? *(emphasis added). Why indeed. I see no reason to deny it, but would be very interested in hearing the reasoning of others who do. It seems to me that there has been a tendency in much Peirce scholarship to warmly embrace this in much of Peirce's mathematics, trichotomic phenomenology, logic as semeiotic, and special science, while ignoring or downright pooh-poohing it in his metaphysics. Good question, Jon! Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 4:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce > might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the > Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature > of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). > I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This > interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an > "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. > > CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of > guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have > noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural > selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the > preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that > man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the > fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in > respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot > adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption > is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and > Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history > of science supports this view. > > > The editors of the *Collected Papers* must have deemed it necessary to > provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this > point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a > decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an > unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript > where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve > precisely that purpose. > > CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted > much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of > divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection > could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My > reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or > disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt > or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and > further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief > in the *Ens necessarium* would according as it were true or false, fit or > disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural > selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this > belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it > acts in respect to ordinary morality. > > > Since Peirce mentioned the "pragmaticistic interpretation" of "the belief > in *Ens necessarium*" here, and provided some "hints" regarding "the > pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium*" in CP 6.490, perhaps our > subsequent discussions in the threads on Peirce's Cosmology and related > topics can shed light on this reply. If my understanding of that > cosmology--and thus my analysis of CP 6.490--is correct, then there is no > *discontinuity > *between the natural competence of humanity's instinctive reason and > matters of metaphysics; or at least, matters pertaining to the Reality of > God. After all, it posits that God is not completely independent of the > third Universe of Experience, which includes Mind and continuity itself; > and according to Peirce, our disposition to generate true hypotheses is > especially well-suited to that Category. > > CSP: It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the > logical situation--the freest from all questionable admixture--is to say > that man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than > wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than > right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. (CP 5.173, EP > 2:217; 1903) > > > Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was > *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime > importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens > necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of > Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of > connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and > connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, > EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and > connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, > nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive > conjectures. Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, phaneroscopy, > and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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