Gary, list:
I think this answers your question but it’s a little mysterious. I will leave it at that but do want to emphasize choice of the word retroduction over abduction, that is, choices that are adopted after the fact and not at the outset. “Further, just as in arguments about mathematics *objections that involve first principles do not affect the mathematician* — and the other sciences are in similar case — so, too, objections involving the point that we have just raised *do not affect the physicist*: for it is a fundamental assumption with him that motion is ultimately referable to nature herself.” ~*Physics*, Aristotle Best, Jerry R On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 4:05 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon S. List, > > Jon cloncluded his post by writing: > > Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was > *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime > importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens > necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of > Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of > connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and > connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, > EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and > connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, > nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive > conjectures. *Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, > phaneroscopy, and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? *(emphasis > added). > > Why indeed. I see no reason to deny it, but would be very interested in > hearing the reasoning of others who do. It seems to me that there has been > a tendency in much Peirce scholarship to warmly embrace this in much of > Peirce's mathematics, trichotomic phenomenology, logic as semeiotic, and > special science, while ignoring or downright pooh-poohing it in his > metaphysics. Good question, Jon! > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 4:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> List: >> >> In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce >> might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the >> Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature >> of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). >> I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every >> retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This >> interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an >> "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. >> >> CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of >> guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have >> noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural >> selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the >> preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that >> man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the >> fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in >> respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot >> adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption >> is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and >> Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history >> of science supports this view. >> >> >> The editors of the *Collected Papers* must have deemed it necessary to >> provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this >> point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a >> decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an >> unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript >> where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve >> precisely that purpose. >> >> CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted >> much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of >> divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection >> could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My >> reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or >> disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt >> or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and >> further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief >> in the *Ens necessarium* would according as it were true or false, fit >> or disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural >> selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this >> belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it >> acts in respect to ordinary morality. >> >> >> Since Peirce mentioned the "pragmaticistic interpretation" of "the belief >> in *Ens necessarium*" here, and provided some "hints" regarding "the >> pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium*" in CP 6.490, perhaps our >> subsequent discussions in the threads on Peirce's Cosmology and related >> topics can shed light on this reply. If my understanding of that >> cosmology--and thus my analysis of CP 6.490--is correct, then there is no >> *discontinuity >> *between the natural competence of humanity's instinctive reason and >> matters of metaphysics; or at least, matters pertaining to the Reality of >> God. After all, it posits that God is not completely independent of the >> third Universe of Experience, which includes Mind and continuity itself; >> and according to Peirce, our disposition to generate true hypotheses is >> especially well-suited to that Category. >> >> CSP: It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the >> logical situation--the freest from all questionable admixture--is to say >> that man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than >> wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than >> right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. (CP 5.173, EP >> 2:217; 1903) >> >> >> Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was >> *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime >> importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens >> necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of >> Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of >> connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and >> connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, >> EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and >> connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, >> nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive >> conjectures. Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, phaneroscopy, >> and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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