Jeff, List: That is helpful, thank you. I will try to take a closer look at CP 2.79-118 and see if it prompts any further thoughts to discuss.
Peirce wrote something similar to what you cited from "A Neglected Argument" in R 842; I quoted and commented on it in the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," so I will not do so again here. My impression from both passages is that he did not believe that he had adequately spelled out his complete "theory of thinking" in anything that he had written previously. In fact, just this morning I was looking through some manuscripts from 1911 (R 846-856)--thanks again to SPIN ( http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16)--in which Peirce made several attempts to start writing a "logical criticism" or "logical critique" of "the Christian creed" or "articles of religious faith." All of them begin by laying out his theory of thinking, and none of them manage to complete that task, let alone progress beyond it. Regards, Jon On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 2:13 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hello Jon S, List, > > You have found some of what I've said to be inscrutable. Let me try to be > clearer about what I was trying to say in the last message: > > 1. In my own work, I am finding that a closer reading of the first > chapter of the Minute Logic is quite helpful in my ongoing efforts to > interpret the lines of inquiry and arguments in "A Neglected Argument". > > 2. Peirce explicitly says this about the essay: "There is my poor sketch > of the Neglected Argument, greatly cut down to bring it within the limits > assigned to this article. Next should come the discussion of its > logicality; but nothing readable at a sitting could possibly bring home to > readers my full proof of the principal points of such an examination. I can > only hope to make the residue of this paper a sort of table of contents, > from which some may possibly guess what I have to say; or to lay down a > series of plausible points through which the reader will have to construct > the continuous line of reasoning for himself. In my own mind the proof is > elaborated, and I am exerting my energies to getting it submitted to public > censure." (CP, 6.468) > > 3. As such, I'm interested in seeing how the "table of contents" in "A > Neglected Argument" might be pointing to arguments and inquiries in other > works. There are a number of essays that we might consider, but this part > of the Minute Logic has captured my attention. As such, I wanted to see if > others might be interested in taking a look for the sake of comparing the > lines of argument and inquiries in the two pieces. > > 4. There are a number of points that are of particular interest, > including his explanation of how we should, in general, make the transition > from a normative theory of semiotics to an objective logic. He raises the > question of "whether there be a life in Signs, so that--the requisite > vehicle being present--they will go through a certain order of development, > and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that the > same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be > the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive > order, there be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished > with a vehicle of life goes through, and what is the nature of it." (CP, > 2.111) > > 5. The explanation of the proof that is offered in support of his > hypothesis concerning the life of great symbols is something that caught my > eye. I also think his remarks about the logic of Pooh-Pooh arguments might > be interesting for those who think there is no real observational support > for his hypothesis concerning the reality of God. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 11:42 AM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics > > Jeff, List: > > I must confess that although I continue to find your posts > thought-provoking, they also tend to be somewhat inscrutable to me. I am > not sure exactly what bearing you are suggesting that CP 2.79-110 and CP > 2.118 should have on our understanding of Peirce's theory of thinking in > relation to the hypothesis of God's Reality. > > JD: So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so > connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so > is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? > > I basically posed this same question at the very beginning of the earlier > thread. My own answer, after much discussion and consideration, is based > on this passage from the first manuscript draft of "A Neglected Argument" > in R 842. > > CSP: Thus, I am to outline two arguments, one supporting the other. The > latter, which I will designate as the humble argument, although every mind > can feel its force, rests on far too many premisses to be stated in full. > Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a certain > theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism > that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever > acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion. > > The major premiss, "a certain theory of logic," is that every process of > thought that produces a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason is > logical. The minor premiss, "a general description of" the humble > argument, is that it is a process of thought that produces a spontaneous > conjecture of instinctive reason. The conclusion that follows is "that the > humble argument is logical." Notice the modesty of this claim; rather than > demonstrating the Reality of God, Peirce sought merely to show that anyone > who embraces his theory of logic, and recognizes that the humble argument > is consistent with it, "need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion." > > As for what it would mean to "prove" the major premiss--Peirce indicated > in "A Neglected Argument" that its primary experiential consequence is > that, if it is correct, humanity's instinctive reason should exhibit a > remarkable tendency to generate spontaneous conjectures that successfully > withstand further deductive and inductive scrutiny. He then contended that > this is exactly what we find to be the case, attributing it to what Galileo > had called "il lume naturale" and advocating "that it is the simpler > Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that > instinct suggests, that must be preferred" (CP 6.477, EP 2:444-445). He > also explictly rejected the alternative explanation. > > CSP: But may they not have come fortuitously, or by some such > modification of chance as the Darwinian supposes? I answer that three or > four independent methods of computation show that it would be ridiculous to > suppose our science to have so come to pass … There is a reason, an > interpretation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance, and this > indisputably proves to him who has perceptions of rational, or significant, > relations, that man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in > order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bed-rock of > logical truth. (CP 6.476, EP 2:444) > > Peirce included some specific calculations in the manuscripts that > substantiate his claim here. In R 842, he invoked "the game of twenty > questions," in which even the best player usually requires the full > allotment--which means sifting through 2^20 (roughly a million) facts, such > that on average it would take about half that many guesses to get to the > right one purely by chance, whereas the history of science shows that it > rarely requires more than a few. In R 843, he equated the total number of > "logically simple hypotheses that might be proposed to explain any given > hypothesis" to the total number of corpuscles in the visible universe, > which is 10^64; and since "the number of seconds in three million years" is > 10^14, "the odds would be 10^50 to 1,--which means 'utterly > overwhelming,'--against the right explanation of any given fact having ever > yet entered into the mind of man by chance; to say nothing of the labor of > testing each hypothesis." > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: > > Jon S, List, > > You say: " In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed > what Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected > Argument for the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his > "theory of the nature of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's > Reality (CP 6.491). I eventually proposed that he was referring to the > notion that every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is > logical." > > You then suggest that the interpretation you are recommending fits nicely > with the objection that he considers in the next paragraph. I am wondering > if we might gain some clarity about the claim that "proving his 'theory of > the nature of thinking' would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality' > if we were to read it in light of his earlier work in the Minute Logic on > Originality, Obsistence and Transuasion. In particular, I think that the > discussion of the role of the CenoPythagorean Categories in the development > of the theories of speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative > rhetoric is really quite clear and to the point when it comes to > interpreting this remark. (CP, 2.79-2.110) I have a hunch that the movement > from the Normative Semiotic to a doctrine of signs that corresponds to an > objective logic provides some ideas that might help in the interpretation > of the more puzzling moves that Peirce seems to be making in "The Neglected > Argument". > > The remarks at 2.118 stand out in my mind. He says: "We now begin to see > the sense of talking of modes of being. They are elements of cooperation > toward the summum bonum. The categories now come in to aid us materially, > and we clearly make out three modes or factors of being, which we proceed > to make clear to ourselves. Arrived at this point, we can construct a > Weltanschauung. From this platform, ethics acquires a new significance, as > will be shown. Logic, too, shines forth with all is native nobility." > > So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so > connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so > is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> >
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