Jerry R.: You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not. You offer it as a candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not. You want us to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*, and CP 5.189 is your creed. I already gave my reasons; please re-read them at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
Thanks, The Other Jon On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, list: > > > > You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not. > > > > What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to > look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others? > For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread > pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is > apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason > that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an > accusation that applies to both of us. These are claims that must be > decided by the rights of the question. > > > > In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset. > What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For > example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that > acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from > explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones > that we can utter out loud, etc… > > > > What do you offer as reasons? If you refuse to give reasons but simply > more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer. You are not agreeing to > the expectations of an inquiry at the outset. For if you give your > reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together. I > anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case > of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it > is nothing but the logic of abduction. Can you make such claims for the > lessers? For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was > valued by Peirce? > > > > I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is > practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even > indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person, > while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what > [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what > shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental > characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward > manifestations*. > > > > That is, > > What is C? > > What is A? > > What is B? > > > > Best, > > Jerry R > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > >> Jerry, List, >> >> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush >> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us >> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need >> to Compute Better Answers. >> >> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence >> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from >> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just >> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim >> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to >> which they point. >> >> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument. >> A well-developed formal system will have: (1) Primitives, >> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place >> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions, >> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives, >> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of >> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain >> (4) Inference Rules. >> >> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts >> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb >> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical >> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim >> in question come into play. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: >> >>> Jon, list: >>> >>> Thank you for that earnest answer. >>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument? >>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing >>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is >>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms? >>> >>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us >>> vegetables? For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best >>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods >>> at >>> our disposal. >>> >>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of >>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out? >>> >>> Thank you for your comments, >>> Jerry R >>> >>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: >>> >>> Jerry, List, >>>> >>>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms, >>>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation >>>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math. >>>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives >>>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful >>>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely. >>>> >>>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have >>>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon, list: >>>>> >>>>> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad? >>>>> >>>>> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad." >>>>> >>>>> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief >>>>> >>>> >>>> | that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt >>>>> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But >>>>> when >>>>> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure >>>>> of >>>>> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical >>>>> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego." >>>>> | ~ Peirce >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Jerry R >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Peircers, >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim >>>>>> that I collected a number of years ago, along with >>>>>> some commentary of my own as I last left it. As I >>>>>> understand them, they all say essentially the same >>>>>> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view, >>>>>> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience >>>>>> or occasion. >>>>>> >>>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon >>>>>> >>>>>> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> List: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion >>>>>>> to a new thread topic. I would appreciate it if others >>>>>>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing >>>>>>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects >>>>>>> besides Peirce's cosmology. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim," >>>>>>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple >>>>>>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," >>>>>>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can >>>>>>> tell. >>>>>>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* >>>>>>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best* >>>>>>> pragmatic maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in >>>>>>> another >>>>>>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus >>>>>>> falls under logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently >>>>>>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to >>>>>>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting >>>>>>> those that are not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which* >>>>>>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, >>>>>>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to >>>>>>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, >>>>>>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as >>>>>>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all* >>>>>>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, >>>>>>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is >>>>>>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology. >>>>>>> | (CP 5.196; 1903) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have >>>>>>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second >>>>>>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other >>>>>>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our >>>>>>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >> > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey >> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ >> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ >> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA >> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >> >
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