Jon, other Jon, Gary, list:
Thank you for your support of other Jon. This would mean that you think CP
5.189 is not a pragmatic maxim also, because it belongs to what you both
classify as "logical critic”, the definition of which I suspect is clear to
you both. For in that definition, “logical critic” would somehow exclude
pragmatic maxim by way of law of non-contradiction. They cannot both be
one thing because each are exclusionary things.
Peirce said many things and I’ve noticed that we are just as free to pick
and choose the different things he said to support our arguments, as if we
believers are the only existing persons. For instance, he said that “logic
is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad.” And of course,
you consider my reasoning as bad for a reason; CP 5.189 is not *even* a
pragmatic maxim because “logical critic”.
Yet again, we are free to pick and choose what we like from the vast bed of
Peirce’s writings. Here is another:
“Man is essentially a social animal: but to be social is one thing, to be
gregarious is another: I decline to serve as bellwether.
My book is meant for people who *want to find out; *and people who want
philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere. There are philosophical
soup shops at every corner, thank God!”
__________
I would ask you, social animal, to find out the depths of CP 5.189 and why
it is that I say understanding this object over any other is the best.
For “*whatever is fittingly related to its proper operation is said to be
virtuous and good**… And that which is most perfect in this operation is
the ultimate end, particularly in the case of operations that are not
ordered to any products, such as the acts of understanding and sensing.
Now, since operations of this type are specified by their objects, through
which they are known also, any one of these operations must be more perfect
when its object is more perfect.*”~Aquinas
CP 5.189 is the only pragmatic maxim that is fittingly related to its
proper operation; one that claims to be perfect like no other because it
even contributes to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for
solicitous care.
With best wishes,
Jerry Rhee
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:45 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Jon, Jerry, List,
>
> Jon, I concur with your assessment.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> > wrote:
>
>> Jerry R.:
>>
>> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not. You offer it as a
>> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not. You want us
>> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
>> and CP 5.189 is your creed. I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
>> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> The Other Jon
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought
>>> to look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>>> accusation that applies to both of us. These are claims that must be
>>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you offer as reasons? If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer. You are not agreeing to
>>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset. For if you give your
>>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together. I
>>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>>> is nothing but the logic of abduction. Can you make such claims for the
>>> lessers? For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>>> valued by Peirce?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>>> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
>>> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
>>> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
>>> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
>>> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
>>> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
>>> manifestations*.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is,
>>>
>>> What is C?
>>>
>>> What is A?
>>>
>>> What is B?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jerry, List,
>>>>
>>>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>>>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>>>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>>>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>>>
>>>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>>>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>>>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>>>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>>>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>>>> which they point.
>>>>
>>>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>>>> A well-developed formal system will have: (1) Primitives,
>>>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>>>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>>>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>>>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>>>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>>>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>>>
>>>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>>>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>>>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>>>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>>>> in question come into play.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon, list:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>>>>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>>>>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
>>>>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that
>>>>> is
>>>>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>>>>>
>>>>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
>>>>> vegetables? For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
>>>>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the
>>>>> methods at
>>>>> our disposal.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
>>>>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you for your comments,
>>>>> Jerry R
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Jerry, List,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
>>>>>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
>>>>>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
>>>>>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
>>>>>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
>>>>>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
>>>>>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jon, list:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> | that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to
>>>>>>> adopt
>>>>>>> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But
>>>>>>> when
>>>>>>> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as
>>>>>>> sure of
>>>>>>> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a
>>>>>>> metaphysical
>>>>>>> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
>>>>>>> | ~ Peirce
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>> Jerry R
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Peircers,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>>>>>>>> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
>>>>>>>> some commentary of my own as I last left it. As I
>>>>>>>> understand them, they all say essentially the same
>>>>>>>> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
>>>>>>>> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
>>>>>>>> or occasion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jon
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> List:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
>>>>>>>>> to a new thread topic. I would appreciate it if others
>>>>>>>>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
>>>>>>>>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
>>>>>>>>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
>>>>>>>>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
>>>>>>>>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic
>>>>>>>>> maxim,"
>>>>>>>>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can
>>>>>>>>> tell.
>>>>>>>>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
>>>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the
>>>>>>>>> best*
>>>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in
>>>>>>>>> another
>>>>>>>>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
>>>>>>>>> falls under logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
>>>>>>>>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
>>>>>>>>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>>>>>>>>> those that are not.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
>>>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
>>>>>>>>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
>>>>>>>>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
>>>>>>>>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
>>>>>>>>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
>>>>>>>>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
>>>>>>>>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>>>>>>>>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
>>>>>>>>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
>>>>>>>>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
>>>>>>>>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
>>>>>>>>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
>>>>>>>>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>
>>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>>>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>>>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>>>>
>>>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>>>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>>>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>>>
>>>
>>
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