Jon, Jerry, List,
Jon, I concur with your assessment.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Jerry R.:
>
> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not. You offer it as a
> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not. You want us
> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
> and CP 5.189 is your creed. I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>
> Thanks,
>
> The Other Jon
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>>
>>
>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>
>>
>>
>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
>> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>> accusation that applies to both of us. These are claims that must be
>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>
>>
>>
>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>
>>
>>
>> What do you offer as reasons? If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer. You are not agreeing to
>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset. For if you give your
>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together. I
>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>> is nothing but the logic of abduction. Can you make such claims for the
>> lessers? For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>> valued by Peirce?
>>
>>
>>
>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
>> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
>> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
>> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
>> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
>> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
>> manifestations*.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is,
>>
>> What is C?
>>
>> What is A?
>>
>> What is B?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry, List,
>>>
>>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>>
>>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>>> which they point.
>>>
>>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>>> A well-developed formal system will have: (1) Primitives,
>>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>>
>>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>>> in question come into play.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, list:
>>>>
>>>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>>>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>>>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
>>>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
>>>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>>>>
>>>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
>>>> vegetables? For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
>>>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the
>>>> methods at
>>>> our disposal.
>>>>
>>>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
>>>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>>>>
>>>> Thank you for your comments,
>>>> Jerry R
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Jerry, List,
>>>>>
>>>>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
>>>>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
>>>>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
>>>>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
>>>>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
>>>>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>>>>>
>>>>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
>>>>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon, list:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> | that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt
>>>>>> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But
>>>>>> when
>>>>>> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a
>>>>>> metaphysical
>>>>>> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
>>>>>> | ~ Peirce
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>> Jerry R
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Peircers,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>>>>>>> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
>>>>>>> some commentary of my own as I last left it. As I
>>>>>>> understand them, they all say essentially the same
>>>>>>> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
>>>>>>> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
>>>>>>> or occasion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jon
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> List:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
>>>>>>>> to a new thread topic. I would appreciate it if others
>>>>>>>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
>>>>>>>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
>>>>>>>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
>>>>>>>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
>>>>>>>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
>>>>>>>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can
>>>>>>>> tell.
>>>>>>>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
>>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
>>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in
>>>>>>>> another
>>>>>>>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
>>>>>>>> falls under logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
>>>>>>>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
>>>>>>>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>>>>>>>> those that are not.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
>>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
>>>>>>>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
>>>>>>>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
>>>>>>>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
>>>>>>>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
>>>>>>>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
>>>>>>>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>>>>>>>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
>>>>>>>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
>>>>>>>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
>>>>>>>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
>>>>>>>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
>>>>>>>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>
>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>>>
>>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>>
>>
>
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