Thanks, Gary, Kirsti, I haven't been able to do more than randomly sample the doings on the Peirce List for the last half year, being deeply immersed in other Peirce work that I hope to report on eventually, but Jon Alan's remarks on the Pragmatic Maxim drew me back in for a bit. He recited one of the places where Peirce declares the role of the Pragmatic Maxim in giving a rule to abduction, a point often missed by many of the most careful commentators. There are aspects of the Pragmatic Maxim that come more naturally to engineers, workers in the applied sciences and helping professions, and other practical categories than they do to the most speculative of philosophizers. But I have lost track of that direction for the moment. No doubt the occasion will arise again ...
Regards, Jon On 11/2/2016 12:49 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Thanks, Jon A., I remember reading these on your blog years ago. Very helpful, including your comments. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690*
On 11/5/2016 5:29 PM, Kirsti Määttänen wrote: > Jon, > > I could not agree more. Excellent, to my mind. > > Best regards, > > Kirsti Määttänen > > Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 4.11.2016 15:51: >> Jerry, List, >> >> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush >> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us >> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need >> to Compute Better Answers. >> >> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence >> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from >> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just >> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim >> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to >> which they point. >> >> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument. >> A well-developed formal system will have: (1) Primitives, >> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place >> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions, >> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives, >> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of >> the theorems that can be derived from them by means of >> certain (4) Inference Rules. >> >> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts >> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb >> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical >> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim >> in question come into play. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: >>> Jon, list: >>> >>> Thank you for that earnest answer. >>> >>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument? >>> That is, an argument that is the best given >>> the number of existing possibilities that are >>> presented explicitly; a choice among them that >>> is based on our valuation for likeness between >>> terms? >>> >>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, >>> does that not make us vegetables? For that >>> would be to deny that it is at least in our >>> best interest to view clearly on what we place >>> our valuations and the methods at our disposal. >>> >>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, >>> the community of investigators who are devoured >>> by a desire to find things out? >>> >>> Thank you for your comments, >>> Jerry R >>> >>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >>> >>>> Jerry, List, >>>> >>>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms, >>>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation >>>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math. >>>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives >>>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful >>>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely. >>>> >>>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have >>>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: >>>>> Jon, list: >>>>> >>>>> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad? >>>>> >>>>> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad." >>>>> >>>>> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief >>>>> | that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt >>>>> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when >>>>> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of >>>>> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical >>>>> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego." >>>>> | ~ Peirce >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Jerry R >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Peircers, >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim >>>>>> that I collected a number of years ago, along with >>>>>> some commentary of my own as I last left it. As I >>>>>> understand them, they all say essentially the same >>>>>> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view, >>>>>> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience >>>>>> or occasion. >>>>>> >>>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon >>>>>> >>>>>> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> List: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion >>>>>>> to a new thread topic. I would appreciate it if others >>>>>>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing >>>>>>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects >>>>>>> besides Peirce's cosmology. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim," >>>>>>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple >>>>>>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," >>>>>>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell. >>>>>>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* >>>>>>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best* >>>>>>> pragmatic maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in another >>>>>>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus >>>>>>> falls under logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently >>>>>>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to >>>>>>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting >>>>>>> those that are not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which* >>>>>>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, >>>>>>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to >>>>>>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, >>>>>>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as >>>>>>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all* >>>>>>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, >>>>>>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is >>>>>>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology. >>>>>>> | (CP 5.196; 1903) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have >>>>>>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second >>>>>>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other >>>>>>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our >>>>>>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
