Jerry C., List: I am having a hard time following your thought process here, but I suspect that you may be confusing *dualism* with *dichotomy*; Peirce rejected the former, but not the latter. *Dualism *is the view that there are two different kinds of substances in the universe, usually identified (at least roughly) as mind and matter. It has nothing to do with the *dichotomy *of positive and negative charge in atoms.
Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 1:00 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List: > > On Mar 2, 2017, at 7:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry C., LIst: > > Peirce makes it very clear elsewhere (and repeatedly) that a *true *continuum > does not contain *any *points or other definite, indivisible parts. He > defines it as that which has *indefinite *parts, all of which have parts > of the same kind, such that it is *undivided* yet infinitely > *divisible--*e.g., > into infinitesimal lines rather than points. Does that help at all? > > Jon: You are right in that this is CSP's view of continuity (which is > nicely framed in the book by Moore.) > > At the same time, this is exactly the origin of problem. > Each chemical atom is an independent physical object such that the sum of > the microscopic property of mass gives rise to a mass that we can > experience as a unique form or type. > > At the same time, each chemical element is a microscopic object that is > physically independent of all other chemical elements in that its physical > properties (attributes, signs, qualisign) are unique to its identity. > > At the same time, the table of chemical elements is complete and each > element is independent of all other elements, YET the TABLE of ELEMENTS is > ordered by the integers, the atomic numbers. > > My question > > Is it possible that a “regulatory principle of logic” is a continuity in >> the sense of excluding Boscovichian points? >> > is related directly to the notion of synechism which CSP defines: > > EP 2:1 The word *synechism* is the English form of the Greek > {synechismos}, from {synechés}, continuous. For two centuries we have been > affixing *-ist* and *-ism* to words, in order to note sects which exalt > the importance of those elements which the stem-words signify. Thus, > *materialism* is the doctrine that matter is everything, *idealism* the > doctrine that ideas are everything, *dualism* the philosophy which splits > everything in two. In like manner, I have proposed to make *synechism* mean > the tendency to regard everything as continuous. > > (EP 2 2:3) There is a famous saying of Parmenides {esti gar einai, méden > d’ ouk einai}, “being is, and not-being is nothing.” This sounds plausible; > yet synechism flatly denies it, declaring that being is a matter of more or > less, so as to merge insensibly into nothing. [—] > > Synechism, even in its less stalwart forms, can never abide dualism, > properly so called. [—] > > At the same time, the realism of physics demonstrates the dualism and > equi-numeracity of positive and negative charges of all chemical atoms. > > Is it conceivable that anyone can propose a resolution of these conundrums? > > How does Ben’s notion of singularities fit into this picture? > How do Jeff’s questions fit into this picture? > > From the perspective of the philosophy of mathematics, how do these > conundrums relate to the simplicity of set theory (and the nonsense?) of > the “Laws of Form”? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 5:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> List, Ben: >> >> Your recent posts contribute to a rather curious insight into CSP’s >> beliefs about the relationships between mathematics, chemistry and logic of >> scientific hypotheses. >> >> On Mar 2, 2017, at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in Sandra B. Rosenthal's 1994 book _Charles >> Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism_: >> >> An Occurrence, which Thought analyzes into Things and Happenings, is >> necessarily Real; but it can never be known or even imagined in all its >> infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand[,] is so much of the real >> Universe as can be represented in a Proposition, and instead of being, like >> an Occurrence, a slice of the Universe, it is rather to be compared to a >> chemical principle extracted therefrom by the power of Thought; and though >> it is, or may be Real, yet, in its Real existence it is inseparably >> combined with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the >> Fact itself. It is impossible to thread our way through the Logical >> intricacies of being unless we keep these two things, the Occurrence and >> the Real Fact, sharply separate in our Thoughts. [Peirce, MS 647 (1910)] >> >> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can >> even be imagined. >> >> In MS 647, he compares a fact with "a chemical principle extracted >> therefrom by the power of Thought;” That is, the notion of a fact is in >> the past tense. It is completed and has an identity. It is no longer is >> question about the nature of what happened during the occurrence. Thus the >> separation from: "in its Real existence it is inseparably combined with >> an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the Fact itself. >> ” >> >> Now, compare this logical view of a chemical principle with the >> mathematical relation with the realism of matter in the synechism (EP1, >> 312-333.): >> >> The things of this world, that seem so transitory to philosophers, are >> not continuous. They are composed of discrete atoms, no doubt >> *Boscovichian* <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Joseph_Boscovich>* points >> (my emphasis)*. The really continuous things, Space, and Time, and Law, >> are eternal.” >> >> Do you believe that CSP is asseerting that there exist two clear and >> distinctly different notions of mathematical points? >> That is, the Boscovichian points of discrete atoms as contrasted with the >> points of ”really continuous things, space, time and Law"? >> >> What would be an alternative hypothesis? That true continuity does not >> contain points? >> Would it be necessary for a legi-sign be something other than space and >> time because they would not be points?? >> >> Any ideas on the ontological status of Boscovichian points from your >> perspective of singularities? >> >> More precisely, what is the meaning of >> >> Synechism … it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing what >> sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined.?? >> >> Is it possible that a “regulatory principle of logic” is a continuity in >> the sense of excluding Boscovichian points? >> >> Very confusing, to say the least. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >
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