List, Jon:

The notion of “two-ness” has many forms.

Cheers

jerry


> On Mar 3, 2017, at 1:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> I am having a hard time following your thought process here, but I suspect 
> that you may be confusing dualism with dichotomy; Peirce rejected the former, 
> but not the latter.  Dualism is the view that there are two different kinds 
> of substances in the universe, usually identified (at least roughly) as mind 
> and matter.  It has nothing to do with the dichotomy of positive and negative 
> charge in atoms.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 1:00 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Jon, List: 
>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 7:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] 
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry C., LIst:
>> 
>> Peirce makes it very clear elsewhere (and repeatedly) that a true continuum 
>> does not contain any points or other definite, indivisible parts.  He 
>> defines it as that which has indefinite parts, all of which have parts of 
>> the same kind, such that it is undivided yet infinitely divisible--e.g., 
>> into infinitesimal lines rather than points.  Does that help at all?
> Jon: You are right in that this is CSP's view of continuity (which is nicely 
> framed in the book by Moore.)
> 
> At the same time, this is exactly the origin of problem.
> Each chemical atom is an independent physical object such that the sum of the 
> microscopic property of mass gives rise to a mass that we can experience as a 
> unique form or type.
> 
> At the same time, each chemical element is a microscopic object that is 
> physically independent of all other chemical elements in that its physical 
> properties (attributes, signs, qualisign) are unique to its identity.
> 
> At the same time, the table of chemical elements is complete and each element 
> is independent of all other elements, YET the TABLE of ELEMENTS is ordered by 
> the integers, the atomic numbers. 
> 
> My question 
>> Is it possible that a “regulatory principle of logic” is a continuity in the 
>> sense of excluding Boscovichian points?
> 
> is related directly to the notion of synechism which CSP defines:
> 
> EP 2:1 The word synechism is the English form of the Greek {synechismos}, 
> from {synechés}, continuous. For two centuries we have been affixing -ist and 
> -ism to words, in order to note sects which exalt the importance of those 
> elements which the stem-words signify. Thus, materialism is the doctrine that 
> matter is everything, idealism the doctrine that ideas are everything, 
> dualism the philosophy which splits everything in two. In like manner, I have 
> proposed to make synechism mean the tendency to regard everything as 
> continuous.
> 
> (EP 2 2:3) There is a famous saying of Parmenides {esti gar einai, méden d’ 
> ouk einai}, “being is, and not-being is nothing.” This sounds plausible; yet 
> synechism flatly denies it, declaring that being is a matter of more or less, 
> so as to merge insensibly into nothing. [—]
> Synechism, even in its less stalwart forms, can never abide dualism, properly 
> so called. [—] 
> 
> At the same time, the realism of physics demonstrates the dualism and 
> equi-numeracity of positive and negative charges of all chemical atoms. 
> 
> Is it conceivable that anyone can propose a resolution of these conundrums?
> 
> How does Ben’s notion of singularities fit into this picture?
> How do Jeff’s questions fit into this picture?
> 
> From the perspective of the philosophy of mathematics, how do these 
> conundrums relate to the simplicity of set theory (and the nonsense?) of the 
> “Laws of Form”?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>> On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 5:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> List, Ben:  
>> 
>> Your recent posts contribute to a rather curious insight into CSP’s beliefs 
>> about the relationships between mathematics, chemistry and logic of 
>> scientific hypotheses.
>>> On Mar 2, 2017, at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in Sandra B. Rosenthal's 1994 book 
>>> _Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism_:
>>> 
>>> An Occurrence, which Thought analyzes into Things and Happenings, is 
>>> necessarily Real; but it can never be known or even imagined in all its 
>>> infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand[,] is so much of the real 
>>> Universe as can be represented in a Proposition, and instead of being, like 
>>> an Occurrence, a slice of the Universe, it is rather to be compared to a 
>>> chemical principle extracted therefrom by the power of Thought; and though 
>>> it is, or may be Real, yet, in its Real existence it is inseparably 
>>> combined with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the 
>>> Fact itself. It is impossible to thread our way through the Logical 
>>> intricacies of being unless we keep these two things, the Occurrence and 
>>> the Real Fact, sharply separate in our Thoughts. [Peirce, MS 647 (1910)]
>>> 
>>> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can 
>>> even be imagined.
>>> 
>> In MS 647, he compares a fact with "a chemical principle extracted therefrom 
>> by the power of Thought;”   That is, the notion of a fact is in the  past 
>> tense.  It is completed and has an identity.  It is no longer is question 
>> about the nature of what happened during the occurrence. Thus the separation 
>> from:  "in its Real existence it is inseparably combined with an infinite 
>> swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the Fact itself.”
>> 
>> Now, compare this logical view of a chemical principle with the mathematical 
>> relation with the realism of matter in the synechism (EP1, 312-333.):
>> 
>> The things of this world, that seem so transitory to philosophers, are not 
>> continuous. They are composed of discrete atoms, no doubt Boscovichian 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Joseph_Boscovich> points (my emphasis). 
>> The really continuous things, Space, and Time, and Law, are eternal.”
>> 
>> Do you believe that CSP is asseerting that there exist two clear and 
>> distinctly different notions of mathematical points?
>> That is, the Boscovichian points of discrete atoms as contrasted with the 
>> points of ”really continuous things, space, time and Law"?
>> 
>> What would be an alternative hypothesis? That true continuity does not 
>> contain points?
>> Would it be necessary for a legi-sign be something other than space and time 
>> because they would not be points?? 
>> 
>> Any ideas on the ontological status of Boscovichian points from your 
>> perspective of singularities?
>> 
>> More precisely, what is the meaning of
>> 
>> Synechism …  it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing what sort of 
>> hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined.??
>> 
>> Is it possible that a “regulatory principle of logic” is a continuity in the 
>> sense of excluding Boscovichian points?
>> 
>> Very confusing, to say the least. 
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry
> 
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