Dear Claudio, list: You said: and if the fact is "surprising", then, you don't have the slightest idea about it...
But if A were true, then C would be a matter of course,... Best, jerry r ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Claudio Guerri <[email protected]> Date: Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 1:04 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term To: Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> Dear All, I agree with you too Jerry the fact is 'only' a human observation so it it not the FACT anymore... and if the fact is "surprising", then, you don't have the slightest idea about it... All the best CL Jerry Rhee escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 14:19: Dear all, The *surprising* *fact*, (object) C, is observed (by a human);... Best, Jerry R On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are > different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us > 'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means that > our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have knowledge' means > that we, with that capacity for reasoning and analysis, can think about > that dynamic object; can think about our immediate object - and, the three > interpretants. > > Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other than > mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic > object or our interactions with it. > > Edwina Taborsky > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Sun 26/03/17 10:22 AM , Claudio Guerri [email protected] sent: > > List, > forgive me for jumping in only very shortly > but... > I agree that that there can not be "alternative facts" > but for sure, there are only alternative interpretations. > And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear > explanation of that difference that makes as just humans... > All the best > Claudio > > Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05: > > List, > In common language the word "truth" is used for two different things: The > fact and it´s representation (the truth independent of observation, and the > truth as represented- correct representatrion). In philosophy it mostly is > only used for the representation, and means a correct representation of a > fact. > With one exception: Having looked at Wikipedia: "Truth": I would say, that > the redundancy theory uses the term for the fact, otherwise "truth" would > not be redundant (tautology, ok.). > I would say, that "truth" in the sense of the fact is semantically > redundant, because a fact is one of the things of which there can only be > one. I think, there is only one person in the world who claims that there > may be "alternative facts". > > Examples: > > "It is the truth, that Alice and Bob have married": "Truth" means the > fact, and is redundant as a term, because you might as well just say: > "Alice and Bob have married". > > "Paul told the truth when he said that Alice and Bob had married": Fact, > redundant, because to tell means to speak about. "About" is the bridge > between representation and fact, adresses the fact. The sentence can be > said like: "Alice and Bob have married, and Paul has told that". > Though the redundancy is not complete regarding the connotations: The > first version of the statement implies the suggestion, that Paul does not > always adress facts correctly (tell the truth), which the second version > does not imply. > > "Paul spoke the truth when he said that Alice and Bob had married": > representation, not redundant. The truth here is not the fact, but what > Paul spoke. > > Anyway, I guess it is very dangerous, that there are two completely > different things which may so easily be conflated and confused, because > they share the same term. Eg. the said person who claims alternative facts > is a danger. > > I guess, that language in general is somewhat blurry about the distinction > between representation and the represented. But in the case of the term > "truth" it is a major problem, leading to confusion and misconceptions, > even ideologies: Ideologies work with forged "facts", and are only able to > do so, because the term "truth" is not clear. If there were two words for > the two things (representation and represented), then it would be much more > difficult to establish myths and conspiracy theories, which both are > necessary for ideologies. > > I had thought about proposing to call the two types of "truth" dynamical > and immediate truth, but this is confusing, I guess, because a dynamical > object may be an immediate truth. Or "trueness" and "truth"? I dont know. > > Best, > helmut > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- *Prof. Dr. Arq. Claudio F. Guerri* Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo Universidad de Buenos Aires Domicilio particular: Gral. Lemos 270 1427 BUENOS AIRES Telefax: (011) 4553-7976/4895 Celular: (011) 15-6289-8123 E-mail: [email protected] <[email protected]>
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