Supplement:
Now I guess, that any dynamical object is a fact. But this view brings some problems: First: The dynamical object is said to be independent from the sign. But it may change, even due to the sign. How can that be? I would say, at the time of the sign, the dynamical object does not change due to the sign. Only when the sign is over, and it´s interpretant becomes a representamen in a new sign, it may change due to (be not independent from) the first sign.
If a common concept is a fact, can we still say that facts are unique (never alternative)?
I would say, yes, at a given time, facts/dynamical objects are unique. Though a constructivist might say, that there is not one common concept, but there are as many different concepts as there are observers. But from a Peircean view, every sign has a dynamical object, so there is an existing fact, which is unique, about every concept, common or not, at a given time.
"Alternative", I think, means that there are two kinds of something at the same time. So I think, the statement of "no alternative facts" and the uniqueness of the dynamical object can be kept up. Or, can you think of an example, in which that is not so?
Best,
Helmut
Claudio, Edwina, List,
I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the common concept exists and is like it is.
The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.
So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is changing all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical objects that donot change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or deductions that have these axioms for premisses.
That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by (perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard hunting a leaping frog.
Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a third kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or something that has been in a certain state in the past.
I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by endless inquiry, because there might be information missing due to non-complete documentation.
So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely applies to metaphysical facts.
Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or when the documentation is complete...
Best,
Helmut
The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us 'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means that our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have knowledge' means that we, with that capacity for reasoning and analysis, can think about that dynamic object; can think about our immediate object - and, the three interpretants.
Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other than mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object or our interactions with it.
Edwina Taborsky
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On Sun 26/03/17 10:22 AM , Claudio Guerri [email protected] sent:
List,
forgive me for jumping in only very shortly
but...
I agree that that there can not be "alternative facts"
but for sure, there are only alternative interpretations.
And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:List,In common language the word "truth" is used for two different things: The fact and it´s representation (the truth independent of observation, and the truth as represented- correct representatrion). In philosophy it mostly is only used for the representation, and means a correct representation of a fact.With one exception: Having looked at Wikipedia: "Truth": I would say, that the redundancy theory uses the term for the fact, otherwise "truth" would not be redundant (tautology, ok.).I would say, that "truth" in the sense of the fact is semantically redundant, because a fact is one of the things of which there can only be one. I think, there is only one person in the world who claims that there may be "alternative facts".Examples:"It is the truth, that Alice and Bob have married": "Truth" means the fact, and is redundant as a term, because you might as well just say: "Alice and Bob have married"."Paul told the truth when he said that Alice and Bob had married": Fact, redundant, because to tell means to speak about. "About" is the bridge between representation and fact, adresses the fact. The sentence can be said like: "Alice and Bob have married, and Paul has told that".Though the redundancy is not complete regarding the connotations: The first version of the statement implies the suggestion, that Paul does not always adress facts correctly (tell the truth), which the second version does not imply."Paul spoke the truth when he said that Alice and Bob had married": representation, not redundant. The truth here is not the fact, but what Paul spoke.Anyway, I guess it is very dangerous, that there are two completely different things which may so easily be conflated and confused, because they share the same term. Eg. the said person who claims alternative facts is a danger.I guess, that language in general is somewhat blurry about the distinction between representation and the represented. But in the case of the term "truth" it is a major problem, leading to confusion and misconceptions, even ideologies: Ideologies work with forged "facts", and are only able to do so, because the term "truth" is not clear. If there were two words for the two things (representation and represented), then it would be much more difficult to establish myths and conspiracy theories, which both are necessary for ideologies.I had thought about proposing to call the two types of "truth" dynamical and immediate truth, but this is confusing, I guess, because a dynamical object may be an immediate truth. Or "trueness" and "truth"? I dont know.Best,helmut
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