> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > Clark- but isn't the reality of the biological realm, which introduces the > non-isolation of a system and self-organization and thus, works against > entropy - a natural action? After all, the basic mode of action of semiosis > is its non-isolation - and the transformation of energy from one to another > mode. > > Is the universe growing more reasonable according to Peirce? Or more complex? > I don't see how the universe is growing more ordered IF that same universe > maintains its three categories: Firstness rejects order. Secondness fights > against similarities. Thirdness inserts order. > > Again- I might be missing something in your outline > >
Let me start by saying not all biologists accept physicalism, materialism or other range of views which I think most assume it ought take. If we take biology to be in some sense reducible to physics, then the fact biology isn’t isolated (and can’t be) then local entropy decrease doesn’t matter. Put simply the earth isn’t a closed system so there is no global second law for that system. This is important since of course Creationists often bring up the second law relative to biology but that’s simply because they don’t understand how it works. As for the universe, more or less you’re just rejecting Peirce’s view there. Which again is fine. The reason Peirce saw the universe as getting more complex is precisely because he saw chance both enabling habit and varying from habit. So how you are using firstness and chance is just not the same as Peirce, although it may well make perfect sense in the particular arena you’re applying it.
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