John C, list, John wrote: "I am not sure that these “dogmas” are not merely working hypotheses that have served well."
I would tend to agree with you. I recall Peirce saying something to the effect that even hypotheses which were later found not to be supported by evidence did yet move the research forward, or as you put it, they were "working hypotheses that have served well." I'm hoping I can find that passage in Peirce since, besides what I've just written, I recall being somewhat shocked by his giving an example which I thought at the time was scientifically beyond the pale. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:55 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > I am not sure that these “dogmas” are not merely working hypotheses that > have served well. > > > > But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be > dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the > world’s experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application noting > that he had found variation that could be explained neither by genetics nor > by environment, and he wanted to explore self-organization during > development. This is a commonplace now, but thirty years ago he failed to > get the grant because his referees (not Douglas fir experts) said that he > just hadn’t looked hard enough for a selectionist explanation. > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED > Talk > > > > John S, list, > > > > John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists > agree, nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that > nothing *ought *to be a dogma. > > > > And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy," materialism, > necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in "Reply to the > Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to the nothing-but-ism of > actions/reactions of 2ns, etc. > > > > Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an *ideal* of scientific, but I > do not agree you in that it seems to me that any number of scientists in > Peirce's day and in ours as well yet hold them, whether they would say they > do, or think they do, or not. > > > > Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the Additaments) by > writing that even "approximate acceptance of the Pragmaticist principle" > has helped those who do accept it: > > > > ". . . to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths that > other philosophers have seen but through a mist, and most of them not at > all. Among such truths -- all of them old, of course, yet acknowledged by > few -- I reckon their denial of necessitarianism; their rejection of any > "consciousness" different from a visceral or other external sensation; > their acknowledgment that there are, in a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits > (which Really would produce effects, under circumstances that may not > happen to get actualized, and are thus Real generals); and their insistence > upon interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they would > or might (not actually will) come to in the concrete. . . . " > > (CP 6.485). > > > > It seems to me that Peirce is clear--and while here he seems to be > addressing philosophers in particular, elsewhere and frequently he argues > this for science more generally--that many thinkers (philosophers and > scientists alike) do indeed hold such dogmas as "necessitarianism" and > "mechanism" (==Sheldrake's slide for dogma #1 "*Everything is essentially > mechanical*). That Peirce's views were far from dogmatic follows for me > from his theory of inquiry including his pragmaticism. > > > > Again, I don't necessarily agree with Sheldrake's list of putatie dogmas, > and I would certainly fully agree with you if by "nothing is a dogma of > science" you mean that this should be an essential maxim of the ethics of > science. But just as Peirce argued that every scientist has a > metaphysics--even as certain scientists argue against metaphysics > altogether, that everyone of them ought take pains at discovering what are > her perhaps hidden metaphysical presuppositions--I think that even those > who claim that "nothing is a dogma of science" (but, I must quickly add, > certainly not you, John) still many yet hold certain dogmatic views, and > that these can enter into even whole 'schools' in certain fields of > scientific endeavor. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > > > On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 2:34 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science. > > > As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, > nothing is a dogma of science. > > John > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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