Dear list members,
I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.: Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads to false conclusions.
To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same?
If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think, that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim.
I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done now to some extent?
On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of epigenetic mechanisms.
When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier convinced  to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl molecules.
But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), transmitted, and so on.
Best,
Helmut
 
 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr
"John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
 

I am not sure that these “dogmas” are not merely working hypotheses that have served well.

 

But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the world’s experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither by genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, but thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees (not Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn’t looked hard enough for a selectionist explanation.

 

John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

 

John S, list,

 

John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that nothing ought to be a dogma.

 

And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy," materialism, necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in "Reply to the Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to  the nothing-but-ism of actions/reactions of 2ns, etc.

 

Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an ideal of scientific, but I do not agree you in that it seems to me that any number of scientists in Peirce's day and in ours as well yet hold them, whether they would say they do, or think they do, or not. 

 

Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the Additaments) by writing that even "approximate acceptance of the Pragmaticist principle" has helped those who do accept it:

 

". . . to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths that other philosophers have seen but through a mist, and most of them not at all. Among such truths -- all of them old, of course, yet acknowledged by few -- I reckon their denial of necessitarianism; their rejection of any "consciousness" different from a visceral or other external sensation; their acknowledgment that there are, in a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits (which Really would produce effects, under circumstances that may not happen to get actualized, and are thus Real generals); and their insistence upon interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they would or might (not actually will) come to in the concrete. . . . " 

(CP 6.485).

 

It seems to me that Peirce is clear--and while here he seems to be addressing philosophers in particular, elsewhere and frequently he argues this for science more generally--that many thinkers (philosophers and scientists alike) do indeed hold such dogmas as "necessitarianism" and "mechanism" (==Sheldrake's slide for dogma #1 "Everything is essentially mechanical). That Peirce's views were far from dogmatic follows for me from his theory of inquiry including his pragmaticism.

 

Again, I don't necessarily agree with Sheldrake's list of putatie dogmas, and I would certainly fully agree with you if by "nothing is a dogma of science" you mean that this should be an essential maxim of the ethics of science. But just as Peirce argued that every scientist has a metaphysics--even as certain scientists argue against metaphysics altogether, that everyone of them ought take pains at discovering what are her perhaps hidden metaphysical presuppositions--I think that even those who claim that "nothing is a dogma of science" (but, I must quickly add, certainly not you, John) still many yet hold certain dogmatic views, and that these can enter into even whole 'schools' in certain fields of scientific endeavor.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 

 

 

 

Gary Richmond

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

 

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 2:34 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science.


As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree,
nothing is a dogma of science.

John



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