BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
Jon, list: I disagree.
The person/dog/cat/bird are, themselves, Signs and as well are the
means-of-processing all other Signs around them. You and many others
reduce the Sign to the 'sign', i.e., only the mediate process -
whereas I consider the whole organism to be a Sign, constantly 'at
work' processing other Signs.As I've said before, a protoplasm is a
Sign, an atom is a Sign, an insect is a Sign...as a whole..and is
made up of Signs..constantly processing other Signs.
We have a different view of semiosis; I consider the Sign to be an
irreducible triad - and the Basic irreducible triad of 'Immediate
Object/Representamen and Immediate Interpretant - nevertheless
couldn't exist without the relation with the external Dynamic Object
- which expands the Basic irreducible triad by denying, essentially,
isolation. That is, the Sign, that triad, via its Immediate Object
MUST have a relation with the external world, the Dynamic Object, in
order for both the Immediate Object [and the triadic Sign] to even
exist!!
And - this Immediate Object, as the internal sensate data of that
external Dynamic Object, DOES vary according to the sensate
capacities of the recipient and the mediative capacities of their
Representamen. The Immediate Object, i.e., the input sensate data as
experienced by the dog or the bird - of that same external Dynamic
Object, is naturally different and will result in a different set of
Interpretants. That's vital for the diversity of the biological
realm!
Edwina
On Fri 19/01/18 3:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, List:
My understanding of Peirce is that the Immediate Object is internal
to the Sign itself, not to the person/dog/cat/bird/etc. receiving it
as you seem to be suggesting. If there are two different Immediate
Objects, then there are two different Signs. It is only the
Interpretant--specifically, the Dynamic Interpretant--that can change
from one recipient to the other for the same Sign.
This goes back to our discussion several months ago about treating
the Sign as the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and
Immediate Interpretant, where the latter is the range of possible
effects that the Sign may have. The Sign in this sense is then
networked with its invariant Dynamic Object and its various Dynamic
Interpretants, which are all of the actual effects that the Sign does
have.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 1:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary R - I hope that your recovery from eye surgery goes well. Don't
strain yourself and take it slowly.
I hadn't wanted to get into the Lowell debate since I disagree with
much of Gary F's interpretations, but I do want to comment on what I
view as the rather bizarre interpretation that 'immediate objects
should be limited to symbolic propositions'.
That denies the reality of the differentiation of our experience
into the external and internal realms. As Peirce wrote, - there are
these two worlds, the internal and the external [1.321]. Since we
cannot directly experience the external Dynamic Object - and he also
wrote that the objective world exists 'in itself' quite indifferently
to what we think of it. Therefore our experience of the external world
is only within the process of semiosis. This process requires the
internalized data from that external Dynamic Object - that is - the
Immediate Object.
We would be totally unable to experience anything if we didn't also
experience this Immediate Object! And that goes for the biological
realm as well. I think that confining semiosis to human
conceptualization [which is what Bellucci seems to do] is a
disservice to the nature of Peircean semiosis . Again - since we
can't directly experience the external world - we do so only via our
own internal capacities; namely, via the Immediate Object. [see also
8.354 where Peirce specifically refers to the IO as internal].
An example would be that I hear a sound. I internalize that sound
within my capacities to hear it. But, a dog or a cat or a bird has
different hearing capacities for that very same sound from that same
External Dynamic Object. For each one of us - that particular
internal experience is the Immediate Object - each different. But the
external Dynamic object is the same for all of us - even though our
internal Immediate Object is different. And - it is not a symbolic
interaction for any of us.
Edwina
On Fri 19/01/18 1:44 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
Gary f, John, list,
I'm recovering from eye surgery so haven't been able to read much in
the last week or so, so I've only read portions of the article by
Bellucci (2.1 and the his conclusion) and haven't yet found his
argument compelling (but I'll have to read the entire piece when my
sight's better).
On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, [email protected] wrote:
I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions
have immediate objects. I don't see why immediate objects should be
limited to symbolic propositions. It seems to me that rhemes (e.g.
common nouns), for example, will have immediate objects as these
are--as least as I understand the immediate object--abstractions of
qualities and characters originally known through collateral
observation. So the word 'fire' uttered, for example, would seem to
me to have an immediate object in any semiosis in which it was
involved. Gary f has also also suggested as another example the
Dicisign which is not a symbol.
But why limit it to even these? In Peirce's 10-fold Classification
of Signs every sign has an 'object' component, and this object must,
it would seem to me, be an immediate object. Am I completely missing
something here? Can someone summarize for discussion Bellucci's
argument for limiting the immediate object to symbolic propositions?
1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an
Instrument for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s)
…every sign has two objects. It has that object which it
represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other
being than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative
Being. . . (emphasis added) (Commens )
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical Thinking Communication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [4]
On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 7:31 AM, wrote:
John,
It’s a 2015 article, “Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar:
The immediate object of a sign” ,
http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02/152
[5].
I haven’t seen Bellucci’s book yet.
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 17-Jan-18 02:21
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12
On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions
have
> immediate objects.
I was searching Bellucci's book. He makes many comments about
propositions, but i couldn't find one that says exactly that.
Could you quote a passage in which he says or implies that.
John
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(718)%20482-5690
[5]
http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02/152
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
