John, list,
I agree with much of what you’ve said here, and my book deals with biosemiotics from Chapter 3 on, so I won’t repeat any of that here. But I’m surprised that no one in this thread has cited Lowell 3.13, as it’s possibly Peirce’s clearest statement of the possibility of genuine Thirdness and representation going beyond human thought and language. In the Peirce texts I’ve quoted in the past week, he established that representamen is a more general term than sign, signs being the kind of representamens that “convey notions to human minds” (emphasis Peirce’s), and that “Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs.” But “representamen” was defined in the first place by starting with signs, as “such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us,” and making “the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to.” This way he could use the term “sign” to refer strictly to human uses of them, because he now had a different word for the genuine Thirdness and triadicity of relatedness which is “essential” to signs apart from the “accidental human element." As I explained in the Lowell 3.13 thread, a couple of years later Peirce decided that he might as well use the word “sign” itself, instead of “representamen,” for “what is essential to a sign” (though for awhile he used the words as synonyms). And it was around this time that Peirce began using the terms “sem[e]iotic” and “semiosis” much more than he had before. So Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign” which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures may represent his first clear move in that direction. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: 20-Jan-18 11:20 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 Edwina and Gary R, I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living things. Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby: CSP, MS 463 (1908) > I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, > called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which > effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately > determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop to > Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception > understood. I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say more. His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the human mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all living things anywhere in the universe. But if he had said that, he would have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy, psychology, science, religion, and politics. Edwina > I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual > realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repeat my > constant reference to 4.551. Gary > I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have (there > are a very few other suggestions scattered through his work, but none > of them are much developed). The reason why there are so few is that Peirce felt a need to throw a "sop to Cerberus" in order to get people to take his ideas seriously. I'm sure that he would gladly have written much more if they were ready to listen. For a very important and carefully worded quotation, see CP 2.227: > all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by an > intelligence capable of learning by experience. That comment certainly includes all large animals. In addition to explicit statements about signs, it's important to note his anecdotes about dogs and parrots. He observed some remarkable performances, which implied "scientific intelligence". Although he didn't say so explicitly, he wouldn't have made the effort to write those anecdotes if he didn't think so. Since Peirce talked about "crystals and bees" in CP 4.551, he must have been thinking about the continuity to zoosemiosis, and from that to the intermediate stages of phytosemiosis, biosemiosis by microbes, crystal formation, and eventually to all of chemistry and physics. He would have been delighted to learn about the signs called DNA and the semiosis that interprets those signs in all aspects of life. Many people have observed strong similarities with Whitehead's process philosophy. ANW also had a continuity of mind-like things from the lowest levels to something he called God. He wrote most of his philosophical books at Harvard, and he also wrote some sympathetic words about Peirce. He admitted that he hadn't read much of Peirce's work, but Clarence Irving Lewis, the chairman of the philosophy dept. at that time, had studied Peirce's MSS in great detail. And Whitehead was also the thesis advisor for the two graduate students, Hartshorne and Weiss, who edited the CP. ANW must have absorbed much more than he cited in his references. We should also remember that there are thousands of pages of MSS that have not yet been transcribed and studied. Nobody knows how much more might be discovered about all these issues. But the fragments that do exist show that he had intended much more. John
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