Edwina, list, ET: Ah, so you are having cataract surgery. I had one eye done about 6 months ago - and the other one will be done in about two years [odd, but that's the way it is]. Yes, we are becoming 'bionic men' with various replacements.
Yes, in a few hundred years or so maybe they'll be able to replace our brains. As for the cataract surgery, retinal issues are complicating my surgeries, but they are needed and, probably overdue. ET: I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis, since my reading of Peirce is that his focus was on the whole world as a semiosic activity - and yes, as a logical activity in the biological world. I won't repeat my constant reference to 4.551. I will again have to disagree with you since one quasi-necessarily (I mean *necessarily*) restricts ones investigations whatever they may be. I do not see that doing this either "limits" semiotic (or, for that matter, other scientific) inquiries, while inquiries in theoretical grammar/critic/methodeutic in "logic as semiotic" were certainly areas Peirce did voluminous work in; he found that 'restriction' to "theoretical (formal) logic" essential to his advances in logic as semeiotic as the third and final normative science. He couldn't have been doing a "disservice" to himself, could he have? For example, biosemiosis was a mere suggestion of Peirce's, while the field itself is a recent development. But, yes, the whole world is perfused with signs and semiotic activity. But Peirce didn't take his ideas regarding semiosis in the biological and other realms than the human very far at all, which is one of the reasons, I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have (there are a very few other suggestions scattered through his work, but none of them are much developed). ET: I totally agree with you that there is a different Immediate Object for every individual semiosis 'determined' by some Dynamic Object - which does indeed, remain the same, oblivious, perhaps to our Interpretant experience of it. BUT - I do sometimes think that the Dynamic Objects must be affected by Interpretants;; ;they can't be isolate, since they too, as semiosic 'things' [Signs] must interact with what is external to them. ET: So- if one plant, as a Dynamic Object, is Interpreted by an other plant...then, I'd bet that this Other Plant is a Dynamic Object for that first Dynamic Object..They must affect each other This is a very interesting topic. It reminded that a while back Charles Pyle pointed to this book which, I think, would tend to support your comment above. Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3792036/Do-tre es-brains.html#ixzz4KQQRYXsO ----------------------------------------------------- The Hidden Life of Trees: What They Feel, How They Communicate—Discoveries from a Secret World Are trees social beings? In this international bestseller, forester and author Peter Wohlleben convincingly makes the case that, yes, the forest is a social network. He draws on groundbreaking scientific discoveries to describe how trees are like human families: tree parents live together with their children, communicate with them, support them as they grow, share nutrients with those who are sick or struggling, and even warn each other of impending dangers. Wohlleben also shares his deep love of woods and forests, explaining the amazing processes of life, death, and regeneration he has observed in his woodland. https://www.amazon.com/Hidden-Life-Trees-Communicate%C2%97Di scoveries-Secret/dp/1771642483/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=147403 2405&sr=8-1&keywords=hidden+lives+of+trees In response to Charles' post, Gene Halton wrote (in part): EH: Myecologist Paul Stamets describes ways trees and other plants have communication through fungal networks. They provide something like a neural net would for a brain. . . . Here is a video on fungi where Stamets reports some of his work: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAw_Zzge49c Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R - Ah, so you are having cataract surgery. I had one eye done about > 6 months ago - and the other one will be done in about two years [odd, but > that's the way it is]. Yes, we are becoming 'bionic men' with various > replacements. > > I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual realm > is a disservice to Peircean semiosis, since my reading of Peirce is that > his focus was on the whole world as a semiosic activity - and yes, as a > logical activity in the biological world. I won't repeat my constant > reference to 4.551. > > I totally agree with you that there is a different Immediate Object for > every individual semiosis 'determined' by some Dynamic Object - which does > indeed, remain the same, oblivious, perhaps to our Interpretant experience > of it. BUT - I do sometimes think that the Dynamic Objects must be affected > by Interpretants;; ;they can't be isolate, since they too, as semiosic > 'things' [Signs] must interact with what is external to them. > > So- if one plant, as a Dynamic Object, is Interpreted by an other > plant...then, I'd bet that this Other Plant is a Dynamic Object for that > first Dynamic Object..They must affect each other. > > Edwina > > > > > > > On Fri 19/01/18 4:02 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, list, > > Thanks for your good wishes for my eye surgery recovery (I have another > coming up soon). How strange to have an entire biological lens replaced > with a plastic one! > > Your wrote: "I hadn't wanted to get into the Lowell debate since I > disagree with much of Gary F's interpretations, but I do want to comment on > what I view as the rather bizarre interpretation that 'immediate objects > should be limited to symbolic propositions'." > > I, on the other hand, have tended to agree with much of Gary f's > interpretation of the 1903 Lowell lectures (although not all of it), but > clearly agree with you that the notion that 'immediate objects should be > limited to symbolic propositions' is a peculiar one. However, I don't > believe this is necessarily Gary f's interpretation, but Bellucci's which > Gary was, I think, merely asking about. > > I do not agree with you that limiting a discussion to the human science of > logic as semeiotics constitutes a "disservice to Peircean semiotics" nor > that it denies other kinds of semiotic analysis, for example, as is done in > biosemiotics. But in cenoscopic philosophy, I see no problem and, really, > the importance of at least initially restricting the analysis to the human > use of signs in the normative science of Logic as Semeiotic. > > As to the specific question being addressed, I would say that there is a > different immediate object for every individual semiosis 'determined' by > some specific 'external object'. It is that dynamic object which remains > the same (e.g. the bird sound), while each immediate object so determined > will be specific to some individual (person or animal). > > Best, > > Gary R > > . > > [image: Blocked image] > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> > > On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 2:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> Gary R - I hope that your recovery from eye surgery goes well. Don't >> strain yourself and take it slowly. >> >> I hadn't wanted to get into the Lowell debate since I disagree with much >> of Gary F's interpretations, but I do want to comment on what I view as the >> rather bizarre interpretation that 'immediate objects should be limited to >> symbolic propositions'. >> >> That denies the reality of the differentiation of our experience into the >> external and internal realms. As Peirce wrote, - there are these two >> worlds, the internal and the external [1.321]. Since we cannot directly >> experience the external Dynamic Object - and he also wrote that the >> objective world exists 'in itself' quite indifferently to what we think of >> it. Therefore our experience of the external world is only within the >> process of semiosis. This process requires the internalized data from that >> external Dynamic Object - that is - the Immediate Object. >> >> We would be totally unable to experience anything if we didn't also >> experience this Immediate Object! And that goes for the biological realm as >> well. I think that confining semiosis to human conceptualization [which is >> what Bellucci seems to do] is a disservice to the nature of Peircean >> semiosis . Again - since we can't directly experience the external world - >> we do so only via our own internal capacities; namely, via the Immediate >> Object. [see also 8.354 where Peirce specifically refers to the IO as >> internal]. >> >> An example would be that I hear a sound. I internalize that sound within >> my capacities to hear it. But, a dog or a cat or a bird has different >> hearing capacities for that very same sound from that same External Dynamic >> Object. For each one of us - that particular internal experience is the >> Immediate Object - each different. But the external Dynamic object is the >> same for all of us - even though our internal Immediate Object is >> different. And - it is not a symbolic interaction for any of us. >> >> >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri 19/01/18 1:44 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: >> >> Gary f, John, list, >> >> I'm recovering from eye surgery so haven't been able to read much in the >> last week or so, so I've only read portions of the article by Bellucci (2.1 >> and the his conclusion) and haven't yet found his argument compelling (but >> I'll have to read the entire piece when my sight's better). >> >> On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, [email protected] wrote: >> >>> I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have >>> immediate objects. >> >> >> I don't see why immediate objects should be limited to symbolic >> propositions. It seems to me that rhemes (e.g. common nouns), for example, >> will have immediate objects as these are--as least as I understand the >> immediate object--abstractions of qualities and characters originally known >> through collateral observation. So the word 'fire' uttered, for example, >> would seem to me to have an immediate object in any semiosis in which it >> was involved. Gary f has also also suggested as another example the >> Dicisign which is not a symbol. >> >> But why limit it to even these? In Peirce's 10-fold Classification of >> Signs every sign has an 'object' component, and this object must, it would >> seem to me, be an immediate object. Am I completely missing something here? >> Can someone summarize for discussion Bellucci's argument for limiting the >> immediate object to symbolic propositions? >> >> 1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an >> Instrument for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s) >> >> …every sign has two objects. It has that object which it represents >> itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being than that of >> being represented to be, a mere Representative Being. . . (emphasis added) ( >> Commens ) >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Blocked image] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >> >> On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 7:31 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> John, >>> >>> >>> >>> It’s a 2015 article, “Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar: The >>> immediate object of a sign” , >>> >>> http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02/152. >>> >>> I haven’t seen Bellucci’s book yet. >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]] >>> Sent: 17-Jan-18 02:21 >>> To: [email protected] >>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12 >>> >>> >>> >>> On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> > I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have >>> >>> > immediate objects. >>> >>> >>> >>> I was searching Bellucci's book. He makes many comments about >>> propositions, but i couldn't find one that says exactly that. >>> >>> >>> >>> Could you quote a passage in which he says or implies that. >>> >>> >>> >>> John >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >>> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > >
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