Edwina, list, Thanks for your good wishes for my eye surgery recovery (I have another coming up soon). How strange to have an entire biological lens replaced with a plastic one!
Your wrote: "I hadn't wanted to get into the Lowell debate since I disagree with much of Gary F's interpretations, but I do want to comment on what I view as the rather bizarre interpretation that 'immediate objects should be limited to symbolic propositions'." I, on the other hand, have tended to agree with much of Gary f's interpretation of the 1903 Lowell lectures (although not all of it), but clearly agree with you that the notion that 'immediate objects should be limited to symbolic propositions' is a peculiar one. However, I don't believe this is necessarily Gary f's interpretation, but Bellucci's which Gary was, I think, merely asking about. I do not agree with you that limiting a discussion to the human science of logic as semeiotics constitutes a "disservice to Peircean semiotics" nor that it denies other kinds of semiotic analysis, for example, as is done in biosemiotics. But in cenoscopic philosophy, I see no problem and, really, the importance of at least initially restricting the analysis to the human use of signs in the *normative* science of Logic as Semeiotic. As to the specific question being addressed, I would say that there is a different immediate object for every individual semiosis 'determined' by some specific 'external object'. It is that dynamic object which remains the same (e.g. the bird sound), while each immediate object so determined will be specific to some individual (person or animal). Best, Gary R . [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 2:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary R - I hope that your recovery from eye surgery goes well. Don't > strain yourself and take it slowly. > > I hadn't wanted to get into the Lowell debate since I disagree with much > of Gary F's interpretations, but I do want to comment on what I view as the > rather bizarre interpretation that 'immediate objects should be limited to > symbolic propositions'. > > That denies the reality of the differentiation of our experience into the > external and internal realms. As Peirce wrote, - there are these two > worlds, the internal and the external [1.321]. Since we cannot directly > experience the external Dynamic Object - and he also wrote that the > objective world exists 'in itself' quite indifferently to what we think of > it. Therefore our experience of the external world is only within the > process of semiosis. This process requires the internalized data from that > external Dynamic Object - that is - the Immediate Object. > > We would be totally unable to experience anything if we didn't also > experience this Immediate Object! And that goes for the biological realm as > well. I think that confining semiosis to human conceptualization [which is > what Bellucci seems to do] is a disservice to the nature of Peircean > semiosis . Again - since we can't directly experience the external world - > we do so only via our own internal capacities; namely, via the Immediate > Object. [see also 8.354 where Peirce specifically refers to the IO as > internal]. > > An example would be that I hear a sound. I internalize that sound within > my capacities to hear it. But, a dog or a cat or a bird has different > hearing capacities for that very same sound from that same External Dynamic > Object. For each one of us - that particular internal experience is the > Immediate Object - each different. But the external Dynamic object is the > same for all of us - even though our internal Immediate Object is > different. And - it is not a symbolic interaction for any of us. > > > > Edwina > > > > > > On Fri 19/01/18 1:44 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: > > Gary f, John, list, > > I'm recovering from eye surgery so haven't been able to read much in the > last week or so, so I've only read portions of the article by Bellucci (2.1 > and the his conclusion) and haven't yet found his argument compelling (but > I'll have to read the entire piece when my sight's better). > > On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, [email protected] wrote: > >> I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have >> immediate objects. > > > I don't see why immediate objects should be limited to symbolic > propositions. It seems to me that rhemes (e.g. common nouns), for example, > will have immediate objects as these are--as least as I understand the > immediate object--abstractions of qualities and characters originally known > through collateral observation. So the word 'fire' uttered, for example, > would seem to me to have an immediate object in any semiosis in which it > was involved. Gary f has also also suggested as another example the > Dicisign which is not a symbol. > > But why limit it to even these? In Peirce's 10-fold Classification of > Signs every sign has an 'object' component, and this object must, it would > seem to me, be an immediate object. Am I completely missing something here? > Can someone summarize for discussion Bellucci's argument for limiting the > immediate object to symbolic propositions? > > 1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an > Instrument for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s) > > …every sign has two objects. It has that object which it represents > itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being than that of > being represented to be, a mere Representative Being. . . (emphasis added) ( > Commens) > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Blocked image] > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> > > On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 7:31 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> John, >> >> >> >> It’s a 2015 article, “Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar: The >> immediate object of a sign” , >> >> http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02/152. >> >> I haven’t seen Bellucci’s book yet. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: 17-Jan-18 02:21 >> To: [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12 >> >> >> >> On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, [email protected] wrote: >> >> > I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have >> >> > immediate objects. >> >> >> >> I was searching Bellucci's book. He makes many comments about >> propositions, but i couldn't find one that says exactly that. >> >> >> >> Could you quote a passage in which he says or implies that. >> >> >> >> John >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > >
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