Stephen, Jon S, list, Stephen wrote:
SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important. I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important." In fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of Peirce's late semeiotic which several members of this forum find of considerable interest, while it is certainly deepening my understanding of these topics. I see no reason whatsoever to support your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this as an important inquiry and quite the contrary. SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect. Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your stats hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the frequency of certain terms and expressions in all the published work (including, for example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but others as well; and never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has not yet been published) one might come up with a *very* different frequency rate. Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing about it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce introduced a great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic researches, only a fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been published. Take any number of terms and expressions from that late work and you will find few instances of these terms, some of which are considered of great importance to a number of established semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years, say. . . SR: I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking. What *I* think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the road of inquiry" because one doesn't find it of personal interest or personal value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this late move by Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even less how further research into it will or will not "somehow advance" our understanding of the topics under consideration. SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own lexicon First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in "Peirce's own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP, hardly likely to give an accurate account of what was important for Peirce and which may warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who seem likely to contribute to it. Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce beyond the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John Sowa recently noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet been published, and this is particularly so, I believe, as regards his late work, especially his late work in semeiotics, his letters, marginalia, contributions to dictionaries, etc. Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy: Do not block the way of inquiry. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters > Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not > appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less > than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is > preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to > regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth > extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking. > Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own > lexicon. > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List: >> >> >> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can >> now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in >> EP 2:545n25. Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it. >> >> - It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its >> occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other >> Sign except those that are its ingredients. >> - It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that >> acts; and whatever acts, changes. >> - Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the >> Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its >> outlines are becoming more indefinite. >> - It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from it >> the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the >> energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. >> - It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by >> its will, but are phenomena of growth. >> - It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs. >> >> >> >> The Perfect Sign involves the *present *existence (2ns) of *only* those >> Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues >> receiving accretions of *new *Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing >> *spontaneous *changes (1ns). After further contemplation, I now believe >> that Peirce was describing *the same thing* here as in the passage about >> "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple >> of years earlier. >> >> >> CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a >> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. >> The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with >> other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an >> interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and >> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. >> Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which >> he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the >> very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so >> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter >> denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the >> Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe >> in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that >> is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. >> (EP 2:304; 1904) >> >> >> >> Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is *not* synonymous >> with "Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the >> Universe. As such, it also satisfies the last bullet above, since the >> Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is not only a Quasi-mind, but also "a >> Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality" (CP >> 4.553; 1906). Of course, this does not at all entail that a Quasi-mind >> and the Universe are the same thing. >> >> >> >> CSP: … one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two >> different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that to which it >> testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as testifying to >> in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential Graph of a >> Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical Universe, as >> it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that* >> account, be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is >> like a telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the >> instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the >> objective lens. (NEM 4:324; 1906) >> >> Any comments? I am guessing that these topics must simply not be of much >> interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I find it hard to >> believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been posting. :-) >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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