Helmut, Edwina, List:

HR:  I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a
concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.


And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently
complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of one and the
same Universe of being, the 'Truth' ... All these characters are elements
of the 'Truth.'  Every sign signifies the 'Truth' ... The 'Truth,' the fact
that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every
sign" (EP 2:304).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered Signs and
Sign-theory as having *everything *to do with truth.

ET:  I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign', etc,
is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.


And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "We may adopt the word [entelechy] to
mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect,
and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very
matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304); and
he later drafted a lengthy definition of "a *perfect *sign" (EP 2:545n25).
It seems to me that Peirce himself considered the very idea of perfection
(i.e., Entelechy; cf. NEM 4:292-300) to be an *essential aspect* of
Peircean semiosis.

ET:  That is - there is no Final State of Perfection ... There can be no
necessitarian perfection or 'final state'.


Who has stated or implied otherwise?  As Gary R. just pointed out, the text
that I quoted clearly treats perfection as an ideal, a *regulative hope*.
It is much like Peirce's notion of "the final opinion," which will
never *actually
*be achieved, either.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:

> List -
>
>  I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
> 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
> sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>
> The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that is
> innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce
> himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing
> complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no
> Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent
> such a linear and closed path.
>
> That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
> spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
> stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
> diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
> provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
> mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
> frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
> but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
> but its very individuality precludes perfection.
>
> And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
> transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
> interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
> complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or
> 'final state'.
>
> Edwina
>
On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 1:08 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:

> List,
> I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth (aka perfection,
> nonquasiness, geninunity...). It has to do with force, need, or volition,
> depending on the utterer-interpreter-weldedness, whether it/she/he/they
> is/are nonorganic, organic, or nervous. Truth is a concept of
> transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think. Best, Helmut
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to