Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

Sun, 11 Mar 2018 14:17:13 -0700

Jon, List,
I agree and try to correct myself. A sign has to do with truth. Your post seems to me as a generalization of Karl Otto Apel´s "Letztbegründung der Diskursethik" (Final foundation of discourse ethics?) from human discourse towards communications, signs, in general. But with this point and the way you put it, each and every sign is connected to truth somehow, and there cannot be a distinction between perfect and imperfect signs. If truth is being looked for by every sign, but achieved by none, who could justifiedly assign a perfection value to a sign, or define a perfection scale for signs?
 
One more complication: If the sign is a lie, then the final interpretant is a lie too, not the truth. Except one might say: It is the truth that this lie is put up, or: It is the truth that people believe in this sign or are influenced by it. But you hardly can say, that the sign is perfect or true. Maybe in his time, Karl Otto Apel could not foresee how bold and unscrupulous people today design alternative facts and forge signs of them. But these signs are rid of (regulative) hope, thank you for this term, and I think it is justified to hope, that in a false sign the absence of regulative hope is easily detectable.
Best, Helmut
 
 10. März 2018 um 22:50 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
 
Helmut, Edwina, List:
 
HR:  I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.
 
And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of one and the same Universe of being, the 'Truth' ... All these characters are elements of the 'Truth.'  Every sign signifies the 'Truth' ... The 'Truth,' the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign" (EP 2:304).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered Signs and Sign-theory as having everything to do with truth.
 
ET:  I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
 
And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "We may adopt the word [entelechy] to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304); and he later drafted a lengthy definition of "a perfect sign" (EP 2:545n25).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered the very idea of perfection (i.e., Entelechy; cf. NEM 4:292-300) to be an essential aspect of Peircean semiosis.
 
ET:  That is - there is no Final State of Perfection ... There can be no necessitarian perfection or 'final state'.
 
Who has stated or implied otherwise?  As Gary R. just pointed out, the text that I quoted clearly treats perfection as an ideal, a regulative hope.  It is much like Peirce's notion of "the final opinion," which will never actually be achieved, either.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
 
On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:

List -

 I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.

The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent such a linear and closed path.

That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty, spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again, provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection, but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes - but its very individuality precludes perfection.

And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or 'final state'.

Edwina

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 1:08 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
List,
I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth (aka perfection, nonquasiness, geninunity...). It has to do with force, need, or volition, depending on the utterer-interpreter-weldedness, whether it/she/he/they is/are nonorganic, organic, or nervous. Truth is a concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think. Best, Helmut
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