BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List -
I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the
perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system
that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity -
and Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth
and developing complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That
is - there is no Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth
and complexity prevent such a linear and closed path.
That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of
novelty, spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a
deviation from any stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions
both to constantly reduce diversity, mould commonality and generality
- and this too would again, provide a method of deviation from any
stable format [of perfection]. The mode of Secondness, with its focus
on the particular and the linear, is frankly the only mode that would
be available for a path-to-perfection, but not only does it not exist
alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes - but its very individuality
precludes perfection.
And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection
or 'final state'.
Edwina
On Sat 10/03/18 2:59 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
Stephen, Jon S, list,
Stephen wrote:
SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of
matters Peirce himself did not see as important.
I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and
unproductive complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see
as important." In fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of
Peirce's late semeiotic which several members of this forum find of
considerable interest, while it is certainly deepening my
understanding of these topics. I see no reason whatsoever to support
your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this as an important
inquiry and quite the contrary.
SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is
used in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over
1000 references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect.
Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your
stats hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the
frequency of certain terms and expressions in all the published work
(including, for example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but
others as well; and never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has
not yet been published) one might come up with a very different
frequency rate.
Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing
about it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce
introduced a great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic
researches, only a fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been
published. Take any number of terms and expressions from that late
work and you will find few instances of these terms, some of which
are considered of great importance to a number of established
semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years, say. . .
SR: I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not
fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended
treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
What I think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the
road of inquiry" because one doesn't find it of personal interest or
personal value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this
late move by Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even
less how further research into it will or will not "somehow advance"
our understanding of the topics under consideration.
SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's
own lexicon
First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in
"Peirce's own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP,
hardly likely to give an accurate account of what was important for
Peirce and which may warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who
seem likely to contribute to it.
Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce
beyond the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John
Sowa recently noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet
been published, and this is particularly so, I believe, as regards
his late work, especially his late work in semeiotics, his letters,
marginalia, contributions to dictionaries, etc.
Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in
order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be
satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one
corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of
the city of philosophy:
Do not block the way of inquiry.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690
On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of
matters Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect
sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of
contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to
signs but none is preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits
philosophy itself to regard a term not fundamental to an author's
understanding as somehow worth extended treatment as something that
will somehow advance u thinking. Perhaps we should rate subjects by
their prominence in Peirce's own lexicon.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [2]
On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
List:
Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind,
we can now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by
"perfect sign" in EP 2:545n25. Here is a summary of what that text
tells us about it.
*It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that
its occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of
no other Sign except those that are its ingredients.
*It is not in a statical condition, because it is an
existent that acts; and whatever acts, changes.
*Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action
upon the Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing
down, and its outlines are becoming more indefinite.
*It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving
from it the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy
and kindle the energy that it already had, but which had lain
dormant.
*It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not
happen by its will, but are phenomena of growth.
*It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of
Existential Graphs.
The Perfect Sign involves the present existence (2ns) of only those
Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it
continues receiving accretions of new Signs (3ns) from its Object and
undergoing spontaneous changes (1ns). After further contemplation, I
now believe that Peirce was describing the same thing here as in the
passage about "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously,
which he wrote a couple of years earlier.
CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe
itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being
joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to
determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the
absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language)
would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of
perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We
may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign
which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as
a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very
form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then,
the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign,
the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but
complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304; 1904)
Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is not synonymous
with "Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds
to the Universe. As such, it also satisfies the last bullet above,
since the Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is not only a
Quasi-mind, but also "a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest
Universe of Reality" (CP 4.553; 1906). Of course, this does not at
all entail that a Quasi-mind and the Universe are the same thing.
CSP: … one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two
different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that to which
it testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as
testifying to in the other capacity. For example, the Entire
Existential Graph of a Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram
of the logical Universe, as it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but
it must not, on that account, be considered as testifying to the
identity of those two. It is like a telescope eye piece which at one
focus exhibits a star at which the instrument is pointed, and at
another exhibits all the faults of the objective lens. (NEM 4:324;
1906)
Any comments? I am guessing that these topics must simply not be of
much interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I find
it hard to believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been
posting. :-)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5]
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
[email protected] [6] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] [7] with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce [8]-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
[email protected] [9] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] [10] with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/ [11]peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[5] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[6]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[7]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[8] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
[9]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[10]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[11] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
