Edwina, list, Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."
Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis" does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not being "made up" by Jon. They have, I'd argue, semeiotic specific (not vernacular) meanings. ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent such a linear and closed path. See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's use of 'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality') which are used by him *not* to deny growth and evolution, but rather to suggest that there is a tendency *exactly towards evolutionary growth,* but that it is asymptotic and will--can--never be reached (for one thing, the sun will eventually die out and all Earthly activity, including evolution, will cease--but that is neither her nor there). In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how Peirce is using the terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic inquiries. Take for example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant. 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:496-7 …there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which *would *finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. Notice the *would* in *would* finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could argue in a similar manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate opinion" in the snippet quoted above. These are *general tendencies* considered in futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909 letter Peirce writes: ". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way" (CSP). ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty, spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again, provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection, but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes - but its very individuality precludes perfection. This might be the case were the world to go on forever, grow and evolve as if stars and planets didn't also grow old and die. (There is a theological notion which I assume I'm not the only one to hold it--although I can't recall where I got it--that none of *this *world's growth and evolution is lost in the Mind of God, or just Mind if you prefer; however, this is surely not the thread to get into *that* idea.) ET: And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or 'final state' There is no "necessitarianism" in *Peirce's notion* of the 'perfect Sign', etc. Take, for example, Peirce's understanding of "Final Causation": 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Prelogical Notions. Section I. Classification of the Sciences (Logic II) | EP 2:120; CP 1.211 Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain *general characte**r**. *(emphasis added by me) In my view, the 'general character' of the evolution of the Cosmos through, shall we say, infinite semiosis, is what Peirce means when he uses such terminology as that involving 'final' and 'perfect' and 'Truth'. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > List - > > I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of > 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect > sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis. > > The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that is > innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce > himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing > complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no > Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent > such a linear and closed path. > > That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty, > spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any > stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce > diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again, > provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The > mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is > frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection, > but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes - > but its very individuality precludes perfection. > > And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that > transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly > interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and > complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or > 'final state'. > > Edwina > > > > > > On Sat 10/03/18 2:59 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: > > Stephen, Jon S, list, > > Stephen wrote: > > SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of > matters Peirce himself did not see as important. > > > I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive > complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important." In > fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of Peirce's late semeiotic > which several members of this forum find of considerable interest, while it > is certainly deepening my understanding of these topics. I see no reason > whatsoever to support your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this > as an important inquiry and quite the contrary. > > SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used > in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000 > references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect. > > > Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your > stats hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the frequency of > certain terms and expressions in all the published work (including, for > example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but others as well; and > never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has not yet been published) one > might come up with a very different frequency rate. > > Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing about > it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce introduced a > great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic researches, only a > fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been published. Take any number of > terms and expressions from that late work and you will find few instances > of these terms, some of which are considered of great importance to a > number of established semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years, > say. . . > > SR: I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not > fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended > treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking. > > > What I think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the road of > inquiry" because one doesn't find it of personal interest or personal > value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this late move by > Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even less how further > research into it will or will not "somehow advance" our understanding of > the topics under consideration. > > SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own > lexicon > > > First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in "Peirce's > own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP, hardly likely to > give an accurate account of what was important for Peirce and which may > warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who seem likely to contribute > to it. > > Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce beyond > the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John Sowa recently > noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet been published, and > this is particularly so, I believe, as regards his late work, especially > his late work in semeiotics, his letters, marginalia, contributions to > dictionaries, etc. > > Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order > to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with > what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself > deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy: > > Do not block the way of inquiry. > > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> > > On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters >> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not >> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less >> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is >> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to >> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth >> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking. >> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own >> lexicon. >> >> amazon.com/author/stephenrose >> >> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> List: >>> >>> >>> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we >>> can now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" >>> in EP 2:545n25. Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it. >>> >>> - It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its >>> occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no >>> other >>> Sign except those that are its ingredients. >>> - It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that >>> acts; and whatever acts, changes. >>> - Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the >>> Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its >>> outlines are becoming more indefinite. >>> - It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from >>> it the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the >>> energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. >>> - It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by >>> its will, but are phenomena of growth. >>> - It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential >>> Graphs. >>> >>> >>> >>> The Perfect Sign involves the present existence (2ns) of only those >>> Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues >>> receiving accretions of new Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing >>> spontaneous changes (1ns). After further contemplation, I now believe >>> that Peirce was describing the same thing here as in the passage about >>> "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple >>> of years earlier. >>> >>> >>> CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a >>> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. >>> The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with >>> other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an >>> interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and >>> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. >>> Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he >>> never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very >>> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so >>> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter >>> denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the >>> Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe >>> in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that >>> is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. >>> (EP 2:304; 1904) >>> >>> >>> >>> Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is not synonymous >>> with "Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the >>> Universe. As such, it also satisfies the last bullet above, since the >>> Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is not only a Quasi-mind, but also "a >>> Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality" (CP >>> 4.553; 1906). Of course, this does not at all entail that a Quasi-mind and >>> the Universe are the same thing. >>> >>> >>> >>> CSP: … one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two >>> different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that to which it >>> testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as testifying to >>> in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential Graph of a >>> Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical Universe, as >>> it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on that account, >>> be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is like a >>> telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the >>> instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the >>> objective lens. (NEM 4:324; 1906) >>> >>> Any comments? I am guessing that these topics must simply not be of >>> much interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I find it >>> hard to believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been posting. >>> :-) >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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