Jeff, Helmut, Edwina, list, Jeff wrote:
Consider an example. When the wind blows across the lake, the ripples on the water are an index of the direction of the wind. The ripples on the water are an indexical sinsign even if these particular ripples have not yet really been so interpreted--such as by the animals (e.g., birds, deer and humans) who might later be on the shore looking across the surface of the water. A ll that is required is that such a sign be *capable* of interpretation in order to be a sign. Prior to being really so interpreted, I think the relation of determination between the wind and the ripples can be classified as an existential dyadic relation of diversity that is both materially and formally ordered. What is more, it would appear to be a relation that is productive because the wind creates the ripples. Such dyadic relations are the paradigm of a cause and effect relation, because the wind is acting as the causal agent and the ripples are the patient. But your second paragraph saying that prior to being interpreted that the wind/ripples ought be "classified as an existential dyadic relation" seems to contradict your comment in your first paragraph that " all that is required is that such a sign be *capable* of interpretation in order to be a sign." I agree that signs need only have potential interpretants. Say I'd installed a camera on the banks of the lake (many naturalists do this). Months later I watch the video and say, "The wind was blowing NNW on Jan 14, 2018." How is that any different from someone, say, discovering a book that had been written in the 15th century but which was buried underground and never until now read? Both *were* potential, now actual signs. Edwina's pansemiotic approach to this (which I just read) is also worth reflecting on, especially in consideration of the recent discussion of the so-called "semiotic threshold." At the moment I would place that threshold a bit higher, I think; but I've only recently begun thinking about this issue with any intensity. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, Helmut, List, > > > What Gary says certainly holds for the relation of determination between > dynamical objects and symbols. Is it also true for the relation of > determination between dynamical objects and indices? > > > Peirce describes the relations of determination in the following way at CP > 4.531: > > > an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest > limits, > as anything which, being determined by an object, determines an interpretation > to determination, through it, by the same object), leads to a proof that every > sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the > characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by > being really and in its individual existence connected with the > individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or > less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the > object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a > natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. > > > Focusing on indices, how should this relation of determination be > classified? One place where Peirce answers that question is in "The Logic > of Mathematics, an attempt..." In saying that an index is "really and in > its individual existence connected with the individual object", he is > focusing attention on the relation between an indexical *sinsign *and an > individual existing object. > > > > Consider an example. When the wind blows across the lake, the ripples on > the water are an index of the direction of the wind. The ripples on the > water are an indexical sinsign even if these particular ripples have not > yet really been so interpreted--such as by the animals (e.g., birds, deer > and humans) who might later be on the shore looking across the surface of > the water. All that is required is that such a sign be *capable* of > interpretation in order to be a sign. > > > Prior to being really so interpreted, I think the relation of > determination between the wind and the ripples can be classified as an > existential dyadic relation of diversity that is both materially and > formally ordered. What is more, it would appear to be a relation that is > productive because the wind creates the ripples. Such dyadic relations are > the paradigm of a cause and effect relation, because the wind is acting as > the causal agent and the ripples are the patient. > > > On Peirce's account, what seems to be essential to the determination of > the indexical sinsign by an existing individual object is that the two > stand in an (1) existential dyadic relation (2) of correspondence (3) > where one is acting as agent and the other is patient. > > > When this type of indexical sign is really interpreted by a living > organism, then we might need to understand the relations somewhat > differently. After all, the perception of the ripples typically involves > iconic qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns, as well as indexical legisigns > (etc.), that are being combined in accordance with general rules that have > the character of symbols. In these richer sorts of relations of > determination, the indexical character of the ripples on the water would > typically involve thought-signs on the part of the creatures who are > perceiving the wind and the water. > > > It appears that others may disagree with this sort of interpretation of > the relation of determination that holds between a dynamical object that > has the character of an individual existing object and a sign that has the > character of a existing individual sinsign. Those who disagree may do so on > a number of different grounds, but I want to see if this is a plausible > interpretation of the relevant texts. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Wednesday, April 4, 2018 1:14 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination > > Helmut, list, > > Peirce's term "determination" as used in his semeiotics does not concern > any causal or generative interaction, certainly no push/pull sort of thing. > As the second quotation below puts it: "this determination is not > determination in any causal sense." > > Here *determination* is considered in relation to the Object (all > quotations are from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/) > > Just as with the sign, not every characteristic of the object is relevant > to signification: only certain features of an object enable a sign to > signify it. For Peirce, the relationship between the object of a sign and > the sign that represents it is one of determination: the object determines > the sign. Peirce's notion of determination is by no means clear and it is > open to interpretation, but for our purposes, it is perhaps best understood > as the *placing of constraints* or conditions on successful signification > by the object, rather than the object *causing* or *generating *the sign. > The idea is that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must > fall within if it is to represent that object. However, only certain > characteristics of an object are relevant to this process of determination. > > > Here as regards the Interpretant: > > [J]ust as with the sign/object relation, Peirce believes the > sign/interpretant relation to be one of determination: the sign determines > an interpretant. Further, this determination is not determination in any > causal sense, rather, the sign determines an interpretant by using certain > features of the way the sign signifies its object to generate and shape our > understanding. > > > But as noted in the first quotation above, "Peirce's notion of > determination is by no means clear and it is open to interpretation," and > so the discussions above by Albert Atkin are not, I'm fairly certain, meant > to be definitive (if that's even possible). > > Best, > > Gary > > > >
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