Gary, Jeffrey, list,
 
Uh, that is very complicated. Thank you. So I reduce what I was saying as follows:
 
In both the relations sign-object and sign-interpretant I have observed, that determination goes in the opposite direction than something else, respectively: Between sign and object it is denotation: The object is denoted, and the sign is determined. Between sign and interpretant it is interpretation: The sign is interpreted, and the interpretant is determined.
 
But to call this "going in opposite directions" "opposites" like "push and pull", or counterparts like "action-reaction" would be false analogies, because determination in both cases is only a partially limiting and not straightforwardly causal affair.
 
Is this more or less correct?
 
Best, Helmut
 
 
 
Mittwoch, 04. April 2018 um 23:45 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Helmut, list,
 
Well, there's been a great deal of discussion among semioticians over the years as to what exactly Peirce meant by "determines" in his saying that the object determines the sign which in turn determines the interpretant sign. When I say "discussion" I mean at times downright disagreement. While T.L.Short holds the view that Atkin and Mats Bergman (see below) seem to hold, Joe Ransdell appears to have been of another mind (there's a paper that, in part, contrasts their view, but I can't locate it at the moment). 
 
Yet I think that Bergman offers a clue as to why he, Atkin (and, as you might imagine, I) hold this non-causal meaning for semeiotic determination. He writes:
 
Before taking a closer look at collateral experience, it is necessary to say a few preliminary words about semiotic determination. This should not be confused with straightforward efficient causation; the determination in question is best grasped as a delimitation of the field of signification or semiosis, something which constrains the semiotic process (Joswick 1996, p. 98; Liszka 1996, p. 23). Put differently, the dynamical object does not determine the sign absolutely, so as to always produce a given interpretant or set of interpretants. However, the determination of the sign by the dynamical object does place limitations on how the sign can be grasped. I, for example, have an idea of George Bush which constitutes my immediate object of the president. It is a kind of composite picture, formed by numerous news broadcasts, articles, discussions, etc. It is obviously full of interpretative elements, my attempts to form as coherent picture of the man in question as possible. It is bound to be at least partly erroneous. I have never met George Bush, nor seen him in real life. Yet, there is a sense in which my sign ‘George Bush’ is determined by the real man. It is indicated by the fact that I am not able to interpret the sign in any way I like. I cannot, for example, genuinely take ‘George Bush’ to stand for ‘person who recently has come from Mars’, although it might prove to be an entertaining thought experiment. I will also modify my view of the president, if experience so dictates. Peirce claims that the basis of the objects dynamical, determinative power lies in the fact that the interpreter must have had his or her mind determined by collateral experience of the object, apart from his or her encounter with signs that represent, or claim to represent, the object in question. . . This impression is strengthened by the fact that Peirce emphasizes that collateral experience does not mean knowledge of signs. Mats Bergman https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/download/26855/23617
 
I think that part of the key here is in his writing that "the dynamical object does not determine the sign absolutely, so as to always produce a given interpretant or set of interpretants." 
 
But another part is that no dynamical object can be fully represented in any given sign, not even, say, in a biography (or autobiography) of George Bush. And this is why Atkin comments that, rather, semeiotic determination is "the placing of constraints or conditions on successful signification by the object," and even if the sign--say a satirical musical parody of George Bush's life--were meant to be somewhat fanciful. Something of Bush's character, well known details of his life, his presidency, etc. (known by most any member of the intended audience by a kind of collateral knowledge each might have) would need to be represented. I couldn't, for example, call the piece George Bush and parody Barack Obama: I am constrained--limited--in the creation of my sign (the musical parody) to references to an actual person, George Bush.
 
Best,
 
Gary
 
 
 
 
Best,
 
Gary
 
 
 
 
 
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690
 
On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 4:41 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Gary, list,
"Push-pull" is quite a crude metaphor, ok. But I don´t understand how "placing of constraints or conditions" and "using certain features (...) to generate and shape our understanding" is not causal.
Best, Helmut
 
04. April 2018 um 22:14 Uhr
"Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
 
Helmut, list,
 
Peirce's term "determination" as used in his semeiotics does not concern any causal or generative interaction, certainly no push/pull sort of thing. As the second quotation below puts it: "this determination is not determination in any causal sense." 
 
Here determination is considered in relation to the Object (all quotations are from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/)
 
Just as with the sign, not every characteristic of the object is relevant to signification: only certain features of an object enable a sign to signify it. For Peirce, the relationship between the object of a sign and the sign that represents it is one of determination: the object determines the sign. Peirce's notion of determination is by no means clear and it is open to interpretation, but for our purposes, it is perhaps best understood as the placing of constraints or conditions on successful signification by the object, rather than the object causing or generating the sign. The idea is that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must fall within if it is to represent that object. However, only certain characteristics of an object are relevant to this process of determination. 
 
Here as regards the Interpretant:
 
[J]ust as with the sign/object relation, Peirce believes the sign/interpretant relation to be one of determination: the sign determines an interpretant. Further, this determination is not determination in any causal sense, rather, the sign determines an interpretant by using certain features of the way the sign signifies its object to generate and shape our understanding. 
 
But as noted in the first quotation above, "Peirce's notion of determination is by no means clear and it is open to interpretation," and so the discussions above by Albert Atkin are not, I'm fairly certain, meant to be definitive (if that's even possible).
 
Best,
 
Gary
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690
 
On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 3:48 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
List,
Trying to make myself a concept of "determination", I am thinking: Is it a part of a dyadic interaction? And, if the three sign parts S,O,I have dyadic interactions, I guess these are results of a projective reduction, which is possible (Jon Awbrey), in contrast to a compositional (real) reduction (irreducible triad).
I try to imagine "determination as the "pull"-part of a "push-pull"- interaction. The sign pushes the object into existence: It denotes it, creates it as a subject´s aboutness. In return the object pulls, determines the sign.
The sign is brought into existence (pushed) by the interpretant via the interpretant´s interpretational capacity. If this capacity would not exist, then there would be no sign. In return the sign "pulls" at the interpretant: It takes advantage of this capacity of its: It determines it.
What about the interaction between interpretant and object? Maybe this is the part, in which the interpretant becomes a new sign?
Best, Helmut
 
 04. April 2018 um 21:06 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Jon S, list,
 
A question for the sake of clarity. 
 
Preceding your list of the 10 orders of determination you wrote: 
 
JAS: "In summary, I now believe that the complete order of determination--the logical sequence of the semiotic Correlates and their Relations, not necessarily their temporal sequence in a concrete instance of semiosis--is as follows" (emphasis added).
 
Then your list of these 10:
  1. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Object (Od) - Abstractive, Concretive, Collective.
  2. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object (Oi) - Descriptive, Designative, Copulative.
  3. Mode of Apprehension or Presentation of the Sign (S) - Tone, Token, Type.
  4. Nature of Reference (Od-S) - Icon, Index, Symbol.
  5. Purpose of the Final Interpretant (If) - Gratific, Actuous (to produce action), Temperative (to produce self-control).
  6. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Interpretant (Id) - Sympathetic (feeling), Percussive (exertion), Usual (another Sign).
  7. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant (Ii) - Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative.
  8. Nature of Intended Influence (S-If) - Seme (rheme/term), Pheme (dicisign/proposition), Delome (argument).
  9. Manner of Appeal (S-Id) - Suggestive (presented), Imperative (urged), Indicative (submitted).
  10. Nature of Assurance (S-Od-If) - Abducent (instinct), Inducent (experience), Deducent (form).
Also, specifically regarding the determination of the three Interpretants you wrote: 
 
 
JAS: "Hence the order of determination of the three Interpretants is If, Id, Ii; and since Peirce explicitly indicated that Od, Oi, and S precede these (EP 2:481; 1908), only the arrangement of the Relation trichotomies remains to be established."
 
Are you suggesting that there might perhaps be some sort of logical involution happening here (at numbers 5-7) in the sense of that term as employed in "The Logic of Mathematics" at CP 1.490 such that 7 involves 6 which involves 5)? For the determination of the three Interpretants in your "complete order of determination of the semiotic Correlates and their Relations"  seems not only not to be temporal (in the sense that you noted in the first snippet above, tempered a bit by the phrase "not necessarily"); nor can I make much sense of these three from the standpoint of "determination." Why are they ordered as they are in this sequence?
 
As you suggested that you yourself are, I too have become confused by what Peirce means by "determination," not only as regards the three Interpretants, but throughout the 10. Even what had once seemed clear enough and simple enough to me, viz., that the Od determines the Oi which in term determines the S which determines some I (I had thought firstly that this would likely be the Ii), makes we wonder if Peirce is using determination in the same sense throughout. It seems to me that he is not, but I would be hard pressed to explain, for example, how the determination of the Oi by the Od differs from that of the S by the Oi (of course we're concerned here in any event with  logical and not physical determination).
 
Am I still somehow conflating facets of this abstract list of the order of determination with determination in some "concrete instance of semiosis"? Perhaps I am.
 
But then, again, why this sequence of the 10? Your list at first blush makes sense to me, but for now creates more questions than answers in my mind.
 
I also continue to find terminological problems in the list, especially if it is ever to become more generally useful. Which semeiotic or other scientific community is your list meant to address? Peirce's endless re-neologizing becomes for me a significant problem in his late semeiotic, although he no doubt does this to clarify (at least for himself) certain subtle distinctions, only some of which can I yet fully appreciate (he'll also in places offer a term x, "or" term y--I'd suggest that to the end he was constantly experimenting, never fully settling on a 'final' or 'best' terminology).
 
Best,
 
Gary
 
 
 
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690
 
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
List:
 

If the trichotomy for the S-If Relation came before the one for the Immediate Interpretant, then a Seme could not be scribed with any Lines of Identity, and only a Delome could be scribed with more than one.  However, there are Semes with one Line of Identity and Phemes with multiple Lines of Identity; therefore, the trichotomy for the S-If Relation must come after the one for the Immediate Interpretant.  This is consistent with Short's a posteriori assessment, which also--along with Peirce's 1904 letter to Lady Welby (CP 8.338)--established that the S-Id division comes after the S-If division.

 

Icon/Index/Symbol for the Od-S Relation was the first trichotomy that Peirce identified.  The well-known 1903 classification indicates that it comes after the division based on the Sign itself--initially according to its Mode of Being, later its Mode of Apprehension or Presentation--and before the division based on the S-If Relation.  Hence the only unanswered question regarding where to situate it in the 1908 order of determination is whether it comes before, after, or in the midst of the three divisions based on the different Interpretants.

 

Although a Graph-Instance on the Phemic Sheet involves Icons and Indices, it is always fundamentally a Symbol--"a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so interpreted" (EP 2:307; 1904).  This means that the trichotomy for the Od-S Relation must come before the one for the Immediate Interpretant, since all three of the latter's Modes of Presentation are feasible.  If it also comes before the ones for the other two Interpretants, then both of the following statements must be true.

 

  • An Icon can only be a Sign whose Final Interpretant's purpose is Gratific, and whose Dynamic Interpretant is a feeling (Sympathetic).
  • Only a Symbol can be a Sign whose Final Interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control (Temperative), and whose Dynamic Interpretant is another Sign (Usual).

 

Once again, these seem fairly straightforward and plausible.  A pure Icon signifies characters without denoting an Object, so it can only be employed to produce a feeling, not an exertion or another Sign.  An Index tends to have a compulsive effect, rather than fostering a self-controlled semiotic response by the interpreting Quasi-mind.

 

Finally, the triadic Od-S-If Relation is divided according to "the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" as Instinct/Experience/Form (EP 2:490; 1908).  These correspond to the three types of Submitted Arguments (Indicative Delomes), as reflected in Peirce's earlier names of Abducent/Inducent/Deducent (R 339:424[285r]; 1906); so this trichotomy must come after the ones for both S-If and S-Id.

 

In summary, I now believe that the complete order of determination--the logical sequence of the semiotic Correlates and their Relations, not necessarily their temporal sequence in a concrete instance of semiosis--is as follows.

 

  1. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Object (Od) - Abstractive, Concretive, Collective.
  2. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object (Oi) - Descriptive, Designative, Copulative.
  3. Mode of Apprehension or Presentation of the Sign (S) - Tone, Token, Type.
  4. Nature of Reference (Od-S) - Icon, Index, Symbol.
  5. Purpose of the Final Interpretant (If) - Gratific, Actuous (to produce action), Temperative (to produce self-control).
  6. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Interpretant (Id) - Sympathetic (feeling), Percussive (exertion), Usual (another Sign).
  7. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant (Ii) - Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative.
  8. Nature of Intended Influence (S-If) - Seme (rheme/term), Pheme (dicisign/proposition), Delome (argument).
  9. Manner of Appeal (S-Id) - Suggestive (presented), Imperative (urged), Indicative (submitted).
  10. Nature of Assurance (S-Od-If) - Abducent (instinct), Inducent (experience), Deducent (form).

 

As I have noted previously, each of the two internal Correlates (Oi and Ii), as well as the Sign itself, is divided according to its phaneroscopic nature; each of the two external Correlates (Od and Id) is divided according to its ontological nature; and the one final Correlate (If) is divided according to its normative nature.  Evidently the boundaries between Peirce's three branches of philosophy are not so sharp as to keep them completely separate, at least when it comes to Sign classification.

Regards,
 
Jon S.
 
 
On Sun, Apr 1, 2018 at 3:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
List:
 

Although it might seem reasonable to think that the order of determination of the three Interpretants would be from possibility (Ii) to actuality (Id) to habit or tendency (If), Peirce explicitly stated otherwise when discussing the feasible combinations of the divisions for the Immediate Object and the Sign itself.

 

CSP:  In general, it is of the essence of a Real Tendency that no Actual Occurrence can of itself determine it in any way … But an Actual Occurrence always determines the Possibility of its character … It is, if possible, still more obvious that Possibility can never determine Actuality … (EP 2:480; 1908)

 

The same principle that guides Sign classification when moving from one trichotomy to the next applies here--the actual cannot determine the habitual, and the possible cannot determine the actual.  Hence the sequence of Interpretants should be reversed (If, Id, Ii); and if this is correct, then both of the following statements must be true in accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy.

 

  • A Sign whose Final Interpretant's purpose is Gratific can only determine a feeling as its Dynamic Interpretant (Sympathetic).
  • Only a Sign whose Final Interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control (Temperative) can determine another Sign as its Dynamic Interpretant (Usual).

 

These seem fairly straightforward and plausible; essentially, the kind of effect that the Sign is destined to produce (If) governs which kinds of actual effects its Replicas can have on interpreting Quasi-minds (Id), just like a law of nature as a Real general--an inveterate habit--governs the behavior of existing Things.  All Signs have a Dynamic Interpretant that includes feeling, but only some also "evoke some kind of effort," whether mental or physical; and only some of those produce another Sign-Replica (EP 2:409 and cf. CP 5.475-476; both 1907).  Furthermore, both of the following statements must also be true.

 

  • A Sign that determines a feeling as its Dynamic Interpretant (Sympathetic) can only present its Immediate Interpretant as Hypothetic.
  • Only a Sign that determines another Sign as its Dynamic Interpretant (Usual) can present its Immediate Interpretant as Relative.

 

Evaluation in this case hinges on clarifying Peirce's 1908 division according to the Immediate Interpretant into Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative, which he offered "with great hesitation" (CP 8.369, EP 2:489), although it appeared in his Logic Notebook as early as 1906 (R 339:423-424[284r-285r]).  He presumably derived the terms themselves from three types of propositions (CP 2.271; 1903).

 

  • Hypothetical - "any proposition compounded of propositions" such that it is "either conditional, copulative, or disjunctive."
  • Categorical - any proposition "not concerned with the identity of more than one individual."
  • Relative - any proposition "concerned with the identity of more than one individual."

 

For hypothetical propositions, it seems likely that Peirce primarily had conditionals in mind because of their modal nature.

 

CSP:  The quantified subject of a hypothetical proposition is a possibility, or possible case, or possible state of things. In its primitive sense, that which is possible is a hypothesis which in a given state of information is not known, and cannot certainly be inferred, to be false. (CP 2.347; c. 1895)

 

Categorical propositions are routinely employed in first-order predicate logic.

 

CSP:  A categorical proposition is one whose immediate parts are terms … The subject of a categorical proposition is that concerning which something is said, the predicate is that which is said of it … Categorical propositions are said to be divided according to their Quantity, into the universal, the particular, the indefinite, and the singular. (CP 4.40-42; 1893)

 

Peirce considered hypothetical propositions to be logically equivalent to categorical propositions--e.g., "if A then B" in propositional calculus corresponds to "all A is B" in predicate calculus--and relative propositions are basically just complex categorical propositions.  However, the three types are readily distinguishable in the Existential Graphs by the number of Lines of Identity that they require--none for a hypothetical proposition, exactly one for a categorical proposition, and more than one for a relative proposition (R 481:10; no date).  This seems like an important clue, since Peirce described the Phemic Sheet as follows (CP 4.550-553; 1906).

 

  • "… the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram."
  • The means by which "two parties [Graphist and Interpreter] collaborate in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon this so as to develop a Delome."
  • "… the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one …"
  • "… a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion …"

 

In other words, the Phemic Sheet represents the Commens, which is precisely what the Communicational Interpretant determines (EP 2:478; 1906).  When a Sign-Replica is scribed as a Graph-Instance on it (cf. CP 4.536; 1906), the Immediate Interpretant is presented as Hypothetic if there are no Lines of Identity, as Categorical if there is just one, and as Relative if there are two or more.

 

The Phemic Sheet is strictly a logical Quasi-mind; it can only be determined to another Sign as the Dynamic Interpretant of a previous Sign (Usual).  Since all three Modes of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant are still feasible, that trichotomy must indeed come after the one for the Mode of Being of the Dynamic Interpretant. 

​​
Hence the order of determination of the three Interpretants is If, Id, Ii; and since Peirce explicitly indicated that Od, Oi, and S precede these (EP 2:481; 1908), only the arrangement of the Relation trichotomies remains to be established.

 

Regards,
 
Jon S.
 
 
On Sat, Mar 31, 2018 at 2:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
List:
 

I am taking a (probably brief) break here from my ongoing metaphysical musings to tackle an unsettled aspect of Peirce's semeiotic; specifically, his speculative grammar  In a 1908 letter to Victoria Lady Welby, he spelled out the rule that governs which Sign classifications are viable in accordance with the "order of determination," the logical sequence of divisions; but he then proceeded to specify it only for the six Correlates, not for their four Relations.

 

CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective  Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes; and if, as I strongly opine (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies of signs of the same order of importance, instead of making 59,049 classes, these will only come to 66. (EP 2:481)

 

Unfortunately, once again, Peirce did not use his most common terms for the three Interpretants--Immediate, Dynamic, and Final.  However, once again, Effective almost certainly corresponds to the Dynamic Interpretant as the feeling, exertion, or further Sign to which the Sign actually determines an interpreting Quasi-mind.  In this case, the secondary literature reflects varying opinions regarding the other two Interpretants--do Destinate and Explicit correspond to Immediate and Final, respectively, or the other way around?  I have been advocating the first option for some time now, mainly because it accords with the following definitions.

 

  • Immediate Interpretant (Ii) - the range of possible feelings/actions/thoughts that the Sign may produce.
  • Dynamic Interpretant (Id) - any actual feeling/action/thought that the Sign does produce.
  • Final Interpretant (If) - the habit of feeling/action/thought that the Sign would produce.

 

In Peirce's semiotic terminology, determination is not strictly synonymous with causation, as the notion of determinism would imply.  Instead, its meaning is more along the lines of constraint, delimitation, or simply making something more determinate.  The actual is a subset of the possible, and the habitual only comes about by reiteration--either of the possible in the Inner World, or of the actual in the Outer World (CP 5.487, EP 2:413; 1907).  Hence if these definitions and sequence are correct, it seems that the order of determination conveniently matches their temporal succession in any concrete instance of semiosis (Ii, Id, If).

 

As for the Relation trichotomies, both a 1904 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby (CP 8.338) and a careful a posteriori assessment by T. L. Short in his 2007 book, Peirce's Theory of Signs (pp. 248-256), indicate that the division into Presented/Urged/Submitted (later Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative) comes after the division into Rheme/Dicisign/Argument (later Seme/Pheme/Delome).  However, Peirce unwaveringly associated the latter with the Sign's Relation to its Final Interpretant (S-If), which entails that S-If determines S-Id.  In the past, I have proposed switching these assignments, since it seems more consistent to arrange the Relation trichotomies in the same sequence as their corresponding Correlate trichotomies; but as I have always acknowledged, this would be a clear deviation from Peirce.

 

Could it be that instead the Final Interpretant determines the Dynamic Interpretant, which determines the Immediate Interpretant?  This would entail that the Destinate and Explicit Interpretants are the Final and Immediate Interpretants, respectively.  After all, the terminology itself suggests such a correspondence--the Immediate Interpretant is "explicit" in the sense of being "revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536; 1906), because it is "represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.434, EP 2:482; 1908); and Peirce often associated that which is "destined" with that which is "final," even doing so specifically with respect to habits of conduct and the ideal outcome of inquiry as the "final opinion."

 

CSP:  Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of which … does not depend upon any accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be destined; so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end … (CP 5.430, EP 2:342; 1905)

 

CSP:  I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)

 

The next step will be to explore some implications of this alternative.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman


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