Jeff, List: In your example, *semiosis *does not occur unless and until the Sign *actually *determines an Interpretant. Suppose that a human sees the ripples on the water and thinks, "The wind is blowing from the north." How can an Index (Existent) produce such a thought-Sign (Necessitant) as its Dynamic Interpretant, unless it is functioning as a Token (Replica) of a Type? Or is the Dynamic Interpretant of the Index itself the human's (involuntary) *perceptual judgment*, which then has the subsequent thought-Sign as *its *Dynamic Interpretant? Perhaps you could elaborate on what you meant by "these richer sorts of relations of determination."
Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 4:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, Helmut, List, > > What Gary says certainly holds for the relation of determination between > dynamical objects and symbols. Is it also true for the relation of > determination between dynamical objects and indices? > > Peirce describes the relations of determination in the following way at CP > 4.531: > > an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest > limits, > as anything which, being determined by an object, determines an interpretation > to determination, through it, by the same object), leads to a proof that every > sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the > characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by > being really and in its individual existence connected with the > individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or > less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the > object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a > natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. > > Focusing on indices, how should this relation of determination be > classified? One place where Peirce answers that question is in "The Logic > of Mathematics, an attempt..." In saying that an index is "really and in > its individual existence connected with the individual object", he is > focusing attention on the relation between an indexical *sinsign *and an > individual existing object. > > Consider an example. When the wind blows across the lake, the ripples on > the water are an index of the direction of the wind. The ripples on the > water are an indexical sinsign even if these particular ripples have not > yet really been so interpreted--such as by the animals (e.g., birds, deer > and humans) who might later be on the shore looking across the surface of > the water. All that is required is that such a sign be *capable* of > interpretation in order to be a sign. > > Prior to being really so interpreted, I think the relation of > determination between the wind and the ripples can be classified as an > existential dyadic relation of diversity that is both materially and > formally ordered. What is more, it would appear to be a relation that is > productive because the wind creates the ripples. Such dyadic relations are > the paradigm of a cause and effect relation, because the wind is acting as > the causal agent and the ripples are the patient. > > On Peirce's account, what seems to be essential to the determination of > the indexical sinsign by an existing individual object is that the two > stand in an (1) existential dyadic relation (2) of correspondence (3) > where one is acting as agent and the other is patient. > > When this type of indexical sign is really interpreted by a living > organism, then we might need to understand the relations somewhat > differently. After all, the perception of the ripples typically involves > iconic qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns, as well as indexical legisigns > (etc.), that are being combined in accordance with general rules that have > the character of symbols. In these richer sorts of relations of > determination, the indexical character of the ripples on the water would > typically involve thought-signs on the part of the creatures who are > perceiving the wind and the water. > > It appears that others may disagree with this sort of interpretation of > the relation of determination that holds between a dynamical object that > has the character of an individual existing object and a sign that has the > character of a existing individual sinsign. Those who disagree may do so on > a number of different grounds, but I want to see if this is a plausible > interpretation of the relevant texts. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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