Hi Edwina,
You stated in the 'General Agreement' thread:
But Thirdness is complex with three types
[3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables information exchange with the
environment [via 3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1].
So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is
involved to enable direct contact with the local environmental
realities. The result - is an adapted insect.
I like the adaptive insect portion, but, honestly, I'd like you to
present word examples of what you mean by these complexes of types.
For example, please explain '3-1' or via '3-2'. Are these
predicates? That seems to be central to your argument. And, are
predicates in Thirdness?
Best, Mike
Edwina
On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike
Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
Hi Gary R, List,
I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp.
your current response. I have read your points multiple
times and tried to think clearly about what you said. I
find that I am in 'general agreement' with all that you
have written in this response. As a result, I changed
the subject line from 'Re: Order of Determination' to
reflect my view. We have found at least one overlap in
the Venn diagram.
What I especially like is your basing your points on
the universal categories. Thirdness is the mode of
habit, mediation, generality, continuity. Genuine
Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a
medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I
frequently use it, namely categorization of things for
knowledge representation, this is the same as saying we
find general types (Thirdness) of particulars
(Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared
qualities (Firstness). I frankly do not see why we need
to use language such as "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina
poses. I can not see where habit or any of the other
senses of Thirdness may occur without Secondness and
Firstness.
I also like your pointing to the use of prescission
to look at these questions. One observation I would make
is that there is a community of Peirce researchers who
see their investigations primarily through the lens of
signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself
in this group. That is well and good and in the sense of
sign use and making and representation may indeed be the
best perspective. But, for me, I see the universal
categories as the governing primitives. (I believe
Peirce did as well.) For example, in the pure sense of
the phaneron, the reality of Firstness, I presently
believe, is outside of the process of semiosis. Once we
try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we
make it actual, which places it as a monadic idea in
Secondness. (Not dissimilar from quantum effects.) We
can talk about it and describe it, but it remains
removed from the essence of Firstness. One can take
these viewpoints based on Peirce's own statements about
the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353) I guess put
another way, for me, the universal categories are the
adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not
semiosis, which is a process of representation. However,
of course, from the vantage of representation, semiosis
naturally holds sway.
Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my
perspective, you did an admirable job.
Mike
On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary
Richmond wrote:
Edwina, list,
Thanks for responding to my
post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken me a couple of
days to reply, but this weekend happened to be
especially busy.
In the spirit of trying to
see if it's possible to come to agreement on certain
recent points of contention, I'd like to begin my
response with a principle upon which we appear to be
in agreement. You quoted me, then commented.
3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce
uses the phrase "regulative hope" in consideration
of just those habits of thought and action which,
through hetero- and homo-correction (science as
critical commonsense writ large) tend toward a
belief wholly congruent with Reality, whatever you,
I, Jon, or any given community of inquirers might
think.
EDWINA: Agree.
Mike and John S suggested
that it might be a valuable strategy to see if through
dialogue here that there might be some significant
ideas or principles of Peircean semeiotics and
philosophy more generally with which we might come to
at least some agreement. While I'm not looking for
anything like "general agreement" on any point, I'd be
interested to see if there's anyone in the forum who disagrees that
this (stated perhaps too tersely above) is what Peirce
means by the _expression_ "regulative hope," that is, in
referring it to the sense of how inquiry taken up in
the scientific spirit brings us closer to a grasp of
the Real?
Now, on to the other points.
1] Gary R: Edwina,
all the things that you question, disagree, or
reject here will be found in Peirce. He
himself, for example, says that 'the subject
matter of normative science consists of the
relations of phenomena to ends'.
EDWINA: I'm not questioning
their being 'found' in Peirce. One can
cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce.
I'm questioning their pragmatic use within
an analysis.
I agree in a general
sense. But in this particular matter of the
quotation, 'the
subject matter of normative science consists
of the relations of phenomena to ends,' I
don't believe that there is any cherry picking
going on whatsoever The subject matter of the
other two branches of cenoscopic philosophy,
phenomenology and metaphysics, are different
from that of the normative sciences. One can
agree or disagree with with what Peirce saw as
the purpose of each of these three branches, but
at least in a pragmatic analysis of his
architectonic philosophy in consideration of
scientific inquiry, it is important, I believe,
to distinguish them. This is principally, I
believe, because
he develops his architectonic philosophy,
outlined in his Classification of Sciences, as
an aid to pragmatic inquiry, including what you
referred to above as "their pragmatic use within an
analysis."
2] Gary R: Similarly,
the 'ideal
end of semiosis is the development of habits
that would never be confounded by subsequent
experience - including, but not limited to,
true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean
notion concerning an asymptotic tendency of
scientific inquiry towards the Truth such that
Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian
whatsoever in my view as Reality in Peirce's
sense itself involves all three categories,
not just 3ns.
EDWINA:
Here, I question the view that 'the
development of habits that would never be
confounded by subsequent experience -
including but not limited to, true
beliefs'. I'm not questioning this
statement. I'm questioning the view that a
'final state' exists, where habits are no
longer open to the realities of 1ns and
2ns. Let me explain. I can, for example,
analyze the biological and chemical nature
of a lion - such that I can determine the
essentially true nature of it as a
biological species. And - this analysis
would not be 'confounded by subsequent
experience' of the lion species. It's a
'scientific truth'.
I agree that a
final state does not, cannot exist in Peirce
science exactly because it involves an
evolutionary philosophy. That's why I
suggested that the _expression_ 'final state'
refers to a regulative
principle, and so I earlier used the
term 'asymptotic' to suggest that while one
can, perhaps, get closer and closer to the
complete facts, principles, laws regarding the
truth of any reality into which one might
inquire, one can never definitively
or fully
arrive there (this is not to suggest that we
can't grasp many specific 'truths', such as
the real characteristics of an plant or animal
species--see below). Peirce's term 'final' is
misleading if one doesn't keep this in mind.
So, in my view Peirce's notion is not Hegelian
in the sense the 3ns is the be all and end
all. For as long is there is evolutionary
growth of any sort in the cosmos, all three
categories will be in effect.
In the case of
the true (real) nature of the lion as a
species, I fully agree that what we now know
represents scientific truth even should that
species evolve. Peirce suggests that there are
no doubt many of these "scientific truths,"
but that we can't be certain that any one in
particular will 'hold' in the future. But
there's no reason to doubt what we've no
reason to doubt as to what science has already
discovered.
ET: BUT -
just because I have analyzed the
scientifically valid nature of this
species - does NOT mean that its habits
are closed to adaptation and evolution.
They could - and probably will - evolve
and change. So, habit formation and truth
are not the same thing.
I agree that
"habit formation and truth are not the same
thing." What I suggested was that our human
striving to understand the nature of reality
together in a scientific way is the optimal
way to arrive at whatever truths we may ever
hope to achieve in whatever areas of inquiry
we may take up. We could, of course, be wrong
at any point in our inquiry, while the history
of science will show that this has been the
case any number of times. But, again, we
clearly make scientific discoveries or we
wouldn't see, for example, the development of
the technologies we've witnessed even in our
own lives--but our understandings remain
fallible especially as we continue our
inquiries.
4] Gary R:
It is Peirce who says that the
habit-taking tendency is the primordial
law of mind, I believe first in the essay
"The Law of Mind" (1892). Habits, 3ns, in
the involutional sense I recently
commented on as it appears in "The Logic
of Mathematics," involve the other two
categories quasi-necessarily.
EDWINA:
My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the
primordial laws of Mind . Indeed, the
formation of habits is vital. . .
However, I don't see that habits 'involve'
the other two categories
quasi-necessarily. That is, Thirdness
does not, in its own nature, require 1ns
or 2ns. . .
I am beginning
to see what you've been aiming at as regards
habits in your writing, for example:
ET
(continuing): . . .a universe made up only
of habits is obviously dead - in the sense
that all life has ended, all individuation
has ended, and the universe is one huge
crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw
this only as pure theoretical speculation
in the infinite [i.e., never] future.
And I see you as
actually resolving the whole question in
writing in the snippet above that for Peirce
this virtual
cessation of all life, growth, and evolution
is but "speculation in the infinite [i.e.,
never] future" (which is why I just used the
term 'virtual' and not 'actual').
ET: . . .
[Semiosis] exists as Mind - which
functions within all three
primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I
see all of them as equal and basic
primordial forces.
I wouldn't use
'exists' or 'forces' as you have here because
I associate both those terms with 2ns, but I
agree that semiosis involves all three of
Peirce's categories and further agree that
they are 'equal', 'basic' and 'priordial'. I
don't, however, see them in reality as ever
occurring apart from each other even while one
may (at least seemingly) dominate in any given
situation.
ET: As for
'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the
term, but what did he mean by it?
I personally think that Peirce was clear
enough by what he meant by entelechy in
writing:
. . . The entelechy
of the Universe of being, then, the
Universe qua fact,
will be that Universe in its aspect as a
sign, the “Truth” of being. The “Truth,”
the fact that is not abstracted but
complete, is the ultimate interpretant of
every sign.
I expect that you'll disagree
with much of what I've written above. But I believe
that besides that one clear point of agreement at the
top of this post as well as some apparent partial
agreement in a few other points, that, with further
inquiry, we might arrive at others.
Meanwhile, I very much look
forward to your response to this message should you
offer one. But, I think that for now I'll leave the
last word to you. Thank you again for your very
thoughtful response to my last post.
Best,
Gary
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
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