Mike, list
Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting
on Gary R's post.
I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories.
I don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define
my perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This
matter can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the
conceptual, the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which
is, in my view, a purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images.
I'm focused on morphology, and view this transformation as taking
place within the semiosic triad and the three categories.
So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological
primitive form into a more complex form via the habit formations
[Thirdness]...But Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2,
3-1] and this enables information exchange with the environment [via
3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is
involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is involved to enable
direct contact with the local environmental realities. The result -
is an adapted insect.
Edwina
On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
Hi Gary R, List,
I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current
response. I have read your points multiple times and tried to think
clearly about what you said. I find that I am in 'general
agreement' with all that you have written in this response. As a
result, I changed the subject line from 'Re: Order of
Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one
overlap in the Venn diagram.
What I especially like is your basing your points on the
universal categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation,
generality, continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says
and you quote, be a medium "between a Second and its First." In
the sense I frequently use it, namely categorization of things
for knowledge representation, this is the same as saying we find
general types (Thirdness) of particulars (Secondness) by looking
at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness). I frankly
do not see why we need to use language such as
"quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see where
habit or any of the other senses of Thirdness may occur
without Secondness and Firstness.
I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look
at these questions. One observation I would make is that there
is a community of Peirce researchers who see their investigations
primarily through the lens of signs and semiosis. I believe
Edwina would place herself in this group. That is well and good
and in the sense of sign use and making and representation may
indeed be the best perspective. But, for me, I see the universal
categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as
well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the
reality of Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the
process of semiosis. Once we try to signify Firstness, a reification
of sorts, we make it actual, which places it as a monadic idea
in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from quantum effects.) We can
talk about it and describe it, but it remains removed from the
essence of Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based on
Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission.
(CP 1.353) I guess put another way, for me, the universal
categories are the adjudicators in how I try to think about
Peirce, not semiosis, which is a process of representation.
However, of course, from the vantage of representation,
semiosis naturally holds sway.
Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective,
you did an admirable job.
Mike On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Edwina, list,
Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina.
I'm sorry that it's taken me a couple of days to reply, but
this weekend happened to be especially busy.
In the spirit of trying to see if it's
possible to come to agreement on certain recent points of
contention, I'd like to begin my response with a principle
upon which we appear to be in agreement. You quoted me,
then commented.
3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce
uses the phrase "regulative hope" in consideration of
just those habits of thought and action which, through
hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense
writ large) tend toward a belief wholly congruent with
Reality, whatever you, I, Jon, or any given community of
inquirers might think. EDWINA: Agree.
Mike and John S suggested that it might
be a valuable strategy to see if through dialogue here that
there might be some significant ideas or principles of
Peircean semeiotics and philosophy more generally with
which we might come to at least some agreement. While I'm
not looking for anything like "general agreement" on any
point, I'd be interested to see if there's anyone in the
forum who disagrees that this (stated perhaps too tersely
above) is what Peirce means by the expression "regulative
hope," that is, in referring it to the sense of how inquiry
taken up in the scientific spirit brings us closer to a
grasp of the Real?
Now, on to the other points.
1] Gary R: Edwina,
all the things that you question, disagree, or
reject here will be found in Peirce. He himself,
for example, says that 'the subject
matter of normative science consists of the
relations of phenomena to ends'.
EDWINA: I'm not
questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One
can cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm
questioning their pragmatic use within an
analysis.
I agree in a general sense. But
in this particular matter of the quotation, 'the subject
matter of normative science consists of the
relations of phenomena to ends,' I don't believe
that there is any cherry picking going on whatsoever
The subject matter of the other two branches of
cenoscopic philosophy, phenomenology and metaphysics,
are different from that of the normative sciences. One
can agree or disagree with with what Peirce saw as the
purpose of each of these three branches, but at least
in a pragmatic analysis of his architectonic
philosophy in consideration of scientific inquiry, it
is important, I believe, to distinguish them. This is
principally, I believe, because he develops his
architectonic philosophy, outlined in his
Classification of Sciences, as an aid to pragmatic
inquiry, including what you referred to above as
"their pragmatic use within an analysis."
2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is
the development of habits that would never be
confounded by subsequent experience - including, but
not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly
Peircean notion concerning an asymptotic tendency of
scientific inquiry towards the Truth such that Truth
== Reality. It is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view
as Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves all three
categories, not just 3ns.
EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the
development of habits that would never be
confounded by subsequent experience - including
but not limited to, true beliefs'. I'm not
questioning this statement. I'm questioning the
view that a 'final state' exists, where habits
are no longer open to the realities of 1ns and
2ns. Let me explain. I can, for example,
analyze the biological and chemical nature of a
lion - such that I can determine the essentially
true nature of it as a biological species. And
- this analysis would not be 'confounded by
subsequent experience' of the lion species.
It's a 'scientific truth'.
I agree that a final state does not, cannot exist
in Peirce science exactly because it involves an
evolutionary philosophy. That's why I suggested
that the expression 'final state' refers to a
regulative principle, and so I earlier used the
term 'asymptotic' to suggest that while one can,
perhaps, get closer and closer to the complete
facts, principles, laws regarding the truth of any
reality into which one might inquire, one can never
definitively or fully arrive there (this is not to
suggest that we can't grasp many specific 'truths',
such as the real characteristics of an plant or
animal species--see below). Peirce's term 'final'
is misleading if one doesn't keep this in mind. So,
in my view Peirce's notion is not Hegelian in the
sense the 3ns is the be all and end all. For as
long is there is evolutionary growth of any sort in
the cosmos, all three categories will be in
effect.
In the case of the true (real) nature of the lion
as a species, I fully agree that what we now know
represents scientific truth even should that
species evolve. Peirce suggests that there are no
doubt many of these "scientific truths," but that
we can't be certain that any one in particular will
'hold' in the future. But there's no reason to doubt
what we've no reason to doubt as to what science has
already discovered.
ET: BUT - just because I have analyzed the
scientifically valid nature of this species -
does NOT mean that its habits are closed to
adaptation and evolution. They could - and
probably will - evolve and change. So, habit
formation and truth are not the same thing.
I agree that "habit formation and truth are not
the same thing." What I suggested was that our
human striving to understand the nature of reality
together in a scientific way is the optimal way to
arrive at whatever truths we may ever hope to
achieve in whatever areas of inquiry we may take
up. We could, of course, be wrong at any point in
our inquiry, while the history of science will show
that this has been the case any number of times.
But, again, we clearly make scientific discoveries
or we wouldn't see, for example, the development of
the technologies we've witnessed even in our own
lives--but our understandings remain fallible
especially as we continue our inquiries.
4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the
habit-taking tendency is the primordial law of
mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of
Mind" (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional
sense I recently commented on as it appears in
"The Logic of Mathematics," involve the other
two categories quasi-necessarily.
EDWINA: My view is that habit-taking is ONE
of the primordial laws of Mind . Indeed, the
formation of habits is vital. . . However, I
don't see that habits 'involve' the other two
categories quasi-necessarily. That is,
Thirdness does not, in its own nature, require
1ns or 2ns. . .
Here I will have to partially disagree.
Although one can abstract (prescind) 1ns and 2ns
from 3ns, it is of the very nature of the
categories that in the phaneron and in reality
that they are all present, that in particular
that 3ns involves (cf 'involutional' as Peirce
uses it) 2ns and 1ns.
1903 | Harvard
Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture III | CP
5.66
Category the Third is the Idea of that which
is such as it is as being a Third, or Medium,
between a Second and its First. That is to
say, it is Representation as an element of
the Phenomenon. You agree that
this is so apparently only for semiosis: ET (continuing
from above): . . .but semiosis certainly,
absolutely, does. . .
I am beginning to see what you've been aiming at
as regards habits in your writing, for example:
ET (continuing): . . .a universe made up only
of habits is obviously dead - in the sense that
all life has ended, all individuation has ended,
and the universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33].
Peirce himself saw this only as pure theoretical
speculation in the infinite [i.e., never]
future.
And I see you as actually resolving the whole
question in writing in the snippet above that for
Peirce this virtual cessation of all life, growth,
and evolution is but "speculation in the infinite
[i.e., never] future" (which is why I just used the
term 'virtual' and not 'actual').
ET: . . . [Semiosis] exists as Mind - which
functions within all three primordial modes:
1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as equal
and basic primordial forces.
I wouldn't use 'exists' or 'forces' as you have
here because I associate both those terms with 2ns,
but I agree that semiosis involves all three of
Peirce's categories and further agree that they are
'equal', 'basic' and 'priordial'. I don't, however,
see them in reality as ever occurring apart from
each other even while one may (at least seemingly)
dominate in any given situation.
ET: As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used
the term, but what did he mean by it?
I personally think
that Peirce was clear enough by what he meant by
entelechy in writing:
1904 [c.] | New
Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP
2:304
. . . The entelechy of the Universe of being,
then, the Universe qua fact,
will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the
“Truth” of being. The “Truth,” the fact that is
not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate
interpretant of every sign.
I expect that
you'll disagree with much of what I've written above. But I
believe that besides that one clear point of agreement at
the top of this post as well as some apparent partial
agreement in a few other points, that, with further
inquiry, we might arrive at others.
Meanwhile, I very much look forward to
your response to this message should you offer one. But, I
think that for now I'll leave the last word to you. Thank
you again for your very thoughtful response to my last
post.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City
University of New York 718 482-5690
On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina
Taborsky wrote:
Gary R - see my responses below:
On Sat 07/04/18 1:06 PM , Gary
Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [2] sent:
Edwina, Jon, list,
1] Gary R: Edwina, all the
things that you question, disagree, or reject here
will be found in Peirce. He himself, for example,
says that 'the subject matter of
normative science consists of the relations of
phenomena to ends'.
EDWINA: I'm not
questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can
cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm
questioning their pragmatic use within an
analysis.
-----------------------------------------------------
2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of
semiosis is the development of habits that would
never be confounded by subsequent experience -
including, but not limited to, true beliefs' is a
decidedly Peircean notion concerning an
asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry
towards the Truth such that Truth == Reality.
It is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view as
Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves all
three categories, not just 3ns.
EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the
development of habits that would never be
confounded by subsequent experience -
including but not limited to, true beliefs'.
I'm not questioning this statement. I'm
questioning the view that a 'final state'
exists, where habits are no longer open to
the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let me explain.
I can, for example, analyze the biological and
chemical nature of a lion - such that I can
determine the essentially true nature of it
as a biological species. And - this analysis
would not be 'confounded by subsequent
experience' of the lion species. It's a
'scientific truth'.
BUT - just because I have analyzed the
scientifically valid nature of this species -
does NOT mean that its habits are closed to
adaptation and evolution. They could - and
probably will - evolve and change. So, habit
formation and truth are not the same thing.
--------------------------------------------
3] Gary R: Similarly
Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in
consideration of just those habits of thought
and action which, through hetero- and
homo-correction (science as critical commonsense
writ large) tend toward a belief wholly
congruent with Reality, whatever you, I, Jon, or
any given community of inquirers might think.
EDWINA: Agree.
------------------------
4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the
habit-taking tendency is the primordial law
of mind, I believe first in the essay "The
Law of Mind" (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the
involutional sense I recently commented on as
it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics,"
involve the other two categories
quasi-necessarily.
EDWINA: My view is that habit-taking is ONE
of the primordial laws of Mind . Indeed, the
formation of habits is vital. Peirce himself
said that without it - mass would at one
instant weigh a pound and at the next
instant, weigh a ton' [memory quote].
However, I don't see that habits 'involve' the
other two categories quasi-necessarily. That
is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature,
require 1ns or 2ns, but semiosis certainly,
absolutely, does - for a universe made up only
of habits is obviously dead - in the sense that
all life has ended, all individuation has ended,
and the universe is one huge crystal [see
6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only as pure
theoretical speculation in the infinite [i.e.,
never] future.
So, semiosis is, in my view, above all a
dynamic process of Mind-becoming-Matter.
There is no need for the 'sop to Cerberus of
bringing in a human observer. Therefore, it
is not a communication system, not an
'interpretation system' but an actual
pragmatic system of how matter exists in our
universe. It exists as Mind - which functions
within all three primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns,
3ns - and I see all of them as equal and
basic primordial forces.
--------------------------------------------------------
4] Gary R: Finally, it is Peirce
who calls the Sign an entelechy.
EDWINA; Again, we have to each of us clarify
what we mean by 'Sign'. I mean, by Sign, the
full irreducible triad of DO-[IO-R-II]. The
reason I insist on the relation of DO with
this triad is because no Sign can exist in
isolation; it is always within some
interaction.
However, others mean by Sign - what I refer
to only as the Repesentamen, the node of
mediation.
So- I think one has to be very specific
about this meaning.
As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used
the term, but what did he mean by it? After
all, his comparison of it with Thirdness does
not mean that there is an a priori agenda of
Mind-forming-Matter. As he says, Thirdness,
as habits, providing predictive constraints,
'is essentially of a general nature, and
cannot ever be completely fulfilled' 1.26.
Again, "this mode of being which consists,
mind my word, if you please, the mode of being
which consists in the fact that future facts of
Secondness will take on a determinate general
character, I call a Thirdness" 1.26.
Thirdness is general and not specific; it is
not 'a priori' and with a specific
potential/purpose [which is what is suggested
in some uses of the term 'entelechy'] but, as
general -its articulation within an individual
form of matter - is open to local stimuli.
That is, with the reality of both
Secondness, which is the local individual
'articulation' of Mind-as-Matter [and thus,
susceptible to local stimuli] and the
reality of Firstness, which is the reality
of chance deviations from the norm - then,
this general character of habits, is open
to adaptation and change. There is no
predetermined future identity of the
Universe or of how Mind-as-Matter will
function.
Edwina
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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