Gary F., List: GF: Are you saying that neither a Possible nor a Necessitant can function indexically?
I am saying that the Immediate Object only functions indexically for Designative Signs, not for Descriptive Signs or Copulative Signs. GF: A sign cannot refer to its DO exclusively by describing it, because the DO, being Second to the sign, belongs to the actual world, and “the actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description” (EP1:227, W5:164, CP 3.363). Again, I disagree. By definition, a Descriptive Sign is precisely one that *does* refer to its DO "exclusively by describing it"; and the DO only "belongs to the actual world" for Concretive Signs (where the DO is Existent), not Abstractive Signs (where the DO is Possible) or Collective Signs (where the DO is Necessitant). GF: I don’t see how an immediate object can be a “set of logical relations” when the dynamic object is that car the guy is pointing at. The DO of the entire exchange is not just the car in isolation, but the aggregate of all facts that are expressed, including the logical relations among the DOs of its constituent Signs. GF: By the way, if you’re generally in agreement with Bellucci’s account, I don’t see how you can strongly object to Stjernfelt’s view of the immediate object, because it’s virtually identical with Bellucci’s. I am generally in agreement with *much* of Bellucci's account, but definitely *not* with his treatment of the Immediate Object. As I have said on-List before, I strongly disagree with his attribution to Peirce of the view that *only* propositions have Immediate Objects, and also with his contention that a Sign "denotes its object and signifies its interpretant." Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions that *every* Sign has an Immediate Object, and my understanding is that what a Sign signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together constitute its Immediate Object; the Sign *determines* its Interpretant as the unity (Entelechy) of its denotation (Matter) and signification (Form). Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 11:00 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon (welcome back!), > > Responses inserted … > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 20-Jun-18 14:23 > > Gary F., List: > > Apologies for the long-delayed response, but I was traveling abroad on > vacation during the last two weeks and am still catching up on certain > things. Coincidentally (or providentially), I have now finally managed to > read through most of Francesco Bellucci's excellent book, *Peirce's > Speculative Grammar*, although I am still processing many of its valuable > insights. > > GF: It’s important to note that Stjernfelt’s definition of the immediate > object is a functional one--the immediate object plays an indexical role > within the functioning of a Dicisign ... > > According to Peirce, this is only true of *some* Immediate Objects--the > Existent ones for Signs that he classified as Designatives in the late 1908 > taxonomy. Immediate Objects can also be Possibles for Signs that are > Descriptives, or Necessitants for Signs that are Copulatives. > > GF now: I don’t follow you here. Are you saying that neither a Possible > nor a Necessitant can function indexically? They appear to be doing exactly > that in Peirce’s 1908 account: > > [[ If the Immediate Object is a Possible, that is, if the Dynamoid Object > is indicated (always more or less vaguely) by means of its Qualities, etc., > I call the Sign a *Descriptive*; if the Immediate *[*Object*]* is an > Occurrence, I call the Sign a *Designative*; and if the Immediate Object > is a Necessitant, I call the sign a *Copulant*; for in that case the > Object has to be so identified by the Interpreter that the Sign may > represent a necessitation. ]EP2:480] > > FS: That is, IO refers to the identity and the reference to the object - > not to any description of the object, because the task of description is > fulfilled by the no less than three concepts of interpretant (immediate, > dynamic, final, respectively). > > With all due respect to Stjernfelt, I strongly disagree; some Signs refer > to their Dynamic Objects primarily (if not exclusively) by describing them, > and such description constitutes the Immediate Object in those cases--i.e., > "the Object as represented in the sign" (EP 2:498; 1909). Moreover, > assigning "the task of description" to the Interpretant strikes me as > making the same mistake that Peirce called "a confusion of thought between > the reference of a sign to its *meaning*, the character which it > attributes to its object, and its appeal to an interpretant" (EP 2:305; > 1904). > > GF now: In that essay (“New Elements”), Peirce does not say that this > “confusion of thought” is a mistake; he says it is “the conception of the > relation of antecedent and consequent.” A sign cannot refer to its DO > *exclusively* by describing it, because the DO, being Second to the sign, > belongs to the actual world, and “the actual world cannot be distinguished > from a world of imagination by any description” (EP1:227, W5:164, CP > 3.363). However, as Stjernfelt explains with his example, a description can > be (and often is) ‘called to the aid’ of the IO to narrow down the identity > of the object it indicates. > > FS: To take an example: a guy points while exlaiming: “Look at that car > over there!” “Which of them?” “The red, not the blue one!” The initial > pointing gesture combined with the reference "over there" constitutes the > Immediate Object - but is subsequently supplied with descriptive material > in order to make precise the object of the pointing ... > > In my view, this analysis conflates two different (although related) > Sign-Replicas. The first statement is indeed Designative--its Immediate > Object is the combination of pointing and saying "over there," which > provides context-specific instructions for locating its Dynamic Object. > However, the second statement is Descriptive--its Immediate Object is the > redness of the specific car to which it purports to refer. Overall, the > entire exchange is Copulative, as must always be the case for Signs that > are Symbols--its Immediate Object is the set of logical relations that it > expresses. > > GF now: Well, I’m not sure I understand that view — it’s far more complex > than the indexical function Stjernfelt is referring to in his examole — but > I don’t see how an immediate object can be a “set of logical relations” > when the dynamic object is that car the guy is pointing at. > > By the way, if you’re generally in agreement with Bellucci’s account, I > don’t see how you can strongly object to Stjernfelt’s view of the immediate > object, because it’s virtually identical with Bellucci’s. > > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
