Erratum: of course in this passage I meant to write 'immediate object' and not 'interpretant'. It should read:
. . . either it is the case that (a) *every* sign has an immediate object or (b) *only* the dicisign has an immediate object. (There is a third possibility that hasn't been entertained here: (c) that *some* signs, including of course the dicisign, but *not all *signs, have immediate objects; I personally think that this seems unlikely.) *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Jun 23, 2018 at 2:28 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, list, > > I found your post quite useful in approaching the issue we've been > considering. While this seems to me a potentially valuable inquiry to > undertake here--and so I am sorry that Gary F apparently doesn't see it > that way--I can imagine that he might feel that this could become, rather > than an inquiry, a debate since, after all, either it is the case that (a) > *every* sign has an immediate interpretant or (b) *only* the dicisign has > an interpretant. (There is a third possibility that hasn't been entertained > here: (c) that *some* signs, including of course the dicisign, but *not > all *signs, have interpretants; I personally think that this seems > unlikely.) > > But returning to your post, you suggested that we might consider there > being a *possible immediate object* as opposed to an *actual* one (as in > the case of the proposition/dicisign). I'm not exactly sure what you meant > by that, but I'd like to explore the notion a bit further by considering > for a moment the rheme. I quoted this definition yesterday: > > > A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative > Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of > possible Object. Any rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it > is not interpreted as doing so (EP 2.292, 1903). > > 1. So, from this one understands that the Rheme is "a Sign of qualitative > Possibilty" for its Interpretant--it is understood as "representing such > and such a kind of *possible* Object" (emphasis added). As such it "will > afford some information." The question which immediately comes to my mind > is whether that "information" is of the kind which is conveyed by an > immediate object. > > I would add now a snippet from a 1904 letter to Lady Welby. > > A rheme is any sign that is not true nor false, like almost any single > word except ‘yes’ and ‘no’[. . .] A rheme is defined as a sign which is > represented in its signified interpretant *as if it were* a character or > mark (or as being so). > > > 2. So, a rheme is represented "*as if it were* a character. . (or as > being so)." [To simplify the discussion below slightly, rather than using > an example of a rheme as Peirce defines it, I am using merely a term, "a > mere fragment of a symbol" because it does not, as does a rheme, contain a > verb and therefore cannot function as a predicate. My example with be > 'book', a term, rather than ' -is a book', a rheme (but please feel free to > mentally add " -is a" to my term, *book*.] > > Finally, one last short quotation which explicitly contrasts the nature of > the rheme with that of the dicisign. > > 1904 [c.] | Draft of Nichols Review [C] | MS [R] 1476:6 > > Another case is where a sign fully interpreted in its definition, the very > creation of the new sign, not now bringing about an actual event, as with > the dicisign, but merely imparting to the definition a certain *capacity*, > or contingent power, that of being properly applied to designate whatever > the definitum may designate. A sign whose whole purport can be so > interpreted or conveyed is termed a *rheme*. > > 3. It appears, then, that the rheme, unlike the dicisign, has no *actual* > power, but only a kind of "capacity, or *contingent* power" (emphasis > added). > > Alright, then, let's look at my term/rheme, *book*. > > Considering the gloss of the Peirce quotation at 1., one might ask, (a) > What is the possible object that my term might represent? and, (b) what is > the information which it affords? The answer to (a) seems at first easy > enough: the possible object is some actual book, say my copy of > Stjernfeld's *Incomplete Nature*. But perhaps not *this* replica of > Stjernfeld's book, but the symbol itself. Or perhaps it's not an actual > book which is the object but, say, one merely conceived of or in the > process of being written. Even one which no longer exists even in > replicated copies (as some Ancient Greek books are lost). Most anything > book-wise seems possible. > > The answer to (b) seems to me at least as problematic: Is the *possible* > 'information' (yet uninterpreted) come from my collateral knowledge of what > books are? Their range of possible shapes and sizes, colors and > thicknesses? Their various purposes? That they contain words, ideas, > perhaps visual icons, etc. which together represent the creation of an > author (or authors)? Is this possible information the possible characters > which a book might have? Or is it some much more vague notion? > > But turning now to the gloss on 2. we're told that our rheme is > represented in its interpretant "*as if it were* a character" or, > perhaps, as *being* a character. What, one might ask, is the possible or > actual 'character' of a book? The possible character*s *mentioned in (b) > above? Or merely some vague character that all books might have with the > specifics to come? But this seems to me like the old challenge of thinking > of a triangle, not an equilateral, or isosceles, or acute, etc., but just a > triangle in general. > > - > > Finally, considering 3., what is the "capacity, or contingent power" of > our rheme, -is a book? That in a proposition or argument that it might come > to signify the 'character' or the characters discussed just above? This is > not at all clear to me. > > Finally, and most importantly, how does this all relate to your notion, > Jeff, that there may be possible immediate objects? I certainly--as do we > all--do indeed have a vague sense of the idea -is a *book*. But is that > sufficient for that sign, the rheme, to be said to have at an immediate > object, possible or actual? > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2018 at 1:16 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> >> >> Thus far in this ongoing discussion about the nature of immediate >> object, considerable attention has been paid to the question of what >> passages support one or another interpretation of Peirce's account and how >> those passages ought to be read. I'm wondering if we might make some >> progress by also considering the reasons that seemed to be guiding Peirce >> when he developed the distinctions between the two different kinds of >> objects and the three different kinds of interpretants. If we pay attention >> to the reasons that seemed to be controlling in the development of the >> distinctions, can an argument be given--for or against--one or another line >> of interpretation? Or, can an argument be given for or against one or >> another way of developing and interpreting these conceptions within the >> context of the semiotic theory? >> >> >> >> The aim of a theory of critical logic is to explain what is essential for >> abductive, deductive and inductive arguments to be valid. The aim of a >> speculative grammar is to explain what is essential for any kind of sign to >> have a significant character. Taking these two related aims in mind, why is >> the conception of the immediate object essential for the further >> development--by Peirce or by us--of a pragmatically oriented semiotic >> theory? Peirce is not the kind of philosopher who theorizes in a vacuum. >> Rather, he sees a need to develop hypothetical explanations that engage >> with other leading theorists on disputed questions. So, consider what he >> says in his review of Fraser's edition of the works of Berkeley: >> >> >> >> This realistic theory is thus a highly practical and common-sense >> position. Wherever universal agreement prevails, the realist will not be >> the one to disturb the general belief by idle and fictitious doubts. For >> according >> to him it is a consensus or common confession which constitutes reality. >> What he wants, therefore, is to see questions put to rest. And if a general >> belief, which is perfectly stable and immovable, can in any way be >> produced, though it be by the fagot and the rack, to talk of any error in >> such belief is utterly absurd. The realist will hold that the very same >> objects which are immediately present in our minds in experience really >> exist just as they are experienced out of the mind; that is, he will >> maintain a doctrine of immediate perception. He will not, therefore, sunder >> existence out of the mind and being in the mind as two wholly >> improportionable modes. When a thing is in such relation to the individual >> mind that that mind cognizes it, it is in the mind; and its being so in >> the mind will not in the least diminish its external existence. For he does >> not think of the mind as a receptacle, which if a thing is in, it ceases to >> be out of. To make a distinction between the true conception of a thing and >> the thing itself is, he will say, only to regard one and the same thing >> from two different points of view; for the *immediate object* of thought >> in a true judgment *is *the reality. The realist will, therefore, >> believe in the objectivity of all necessary conceptions, space, time, >> relation, cause, and the like. (bold and underlined are my emphasis) >> >> >> >> Peirce is responding here to a number of the main positions that were >> taken in the debates between the empiricists and rationalists—especially as >> those took shape in the arguments and positions of Kant and Hume. He claims >> that this formulation of realism may be more “definitely” expressed than >> has been done before. As such, he seems to think that this formulation >> involves some kind of clarification of what the dispute is really over. We >> should keep in mind that the position “involves a phenomenalism”, but it >> is one that is inspired considerable more by the arguments of Kant than >> those of Hume. Indeed, he says, “what Kant called his Copernican step was >> precisely >> the passage from the nominalistic to the realistic view of reality.” (CP, >> 8.15) As such, Peirce appears to be further developing this Copernican >> turn—or perhaps shifting it in a more pragmaticist direction. >> >> >> The key idea, I take it, is that this pragmatic theory of cognition is >> being shaped within a realist framework that endorses a doctrine of >> immediate perception. This framework conceives of what is in mind and what >> is out of mind in a manner that differs in important respects from the way >> that distinction was made by the likes of Hume and his followers. Drawing >> on these sorts of considerations, I tend to think the conception of the >> immediate object was well established within the debates of the modern and >> medieval philosophers, and that Peirce is simply refining that conception >> for the sake of offering what he thinks are better explanations of the >> differences between such things as (a) what it is for a thing to be within >> mind or without it, and (b) what it is for an assertion to be true and >> false. >> >> >> If we take this conception of the immediate object of thought and then >> generalize on it, where should we draw the line in terms of the kinds of >> signs that might have such immediate objects? Do all classes of signs >> have such objects, or do only those signs that have the character of a >> dicisign have such objects? Since we all seem to agree that propositions >> expressed symbolically have immediate objects, what follows from that? The >> inference I am tempted to draw is that any sign—even a rhematic iconic >> qualisign--that might be thought or expressed as part of a symbolic >> proposition has, in some sense, an immediate object--at least as a >> *possible* object if not as a existent or as a necessitant. >> >> >> My argument for this claim is that the meaning of an immediate perception >> of, say, a green cushion on a yellow chair seems to involve the following: >> (1) elements of firstness that are *connected in particular ways* in the >> percept, (2) a visual percept of a chair with a *definite spatial shape*, >> (3) a direct perception of the differences between the *connectives* >> involved in having a percept of a yellow chair with a green cushion versus >> that of a green chair with a yellow cushion, (4) a perception of the >> *opposition* between the two objects that involves (5) a *double >> awareness*. (see CP 7.625). >> >> >> So, what difference does it make—for the sake of what we trying to >> explain in this theory of cognition—in holding that the rhematic iconic >> qualisigns or the rhematic indexical sinsigns involved in the immediate >> perception of a green cushion on a yellow chair each have their immediate >> objects or in claiming that only the dicisign expressed in the perceptual >> judgment has such an object? For my part, I tend to think that is natural >> to *explain* the character of the immediate object that is involved in >> the perceptual judgment and the relation it has to the dynamical object and >> to the various signs and their interpretants by appealing to the immediate >> objects—possible if not actual--of the rhematic signs that are involved in >> such dicisigns. After all, within the context of this theory of semiotics, >> it is natural to conceive of rhematic signs as limited cases of dicisigns, >> just as it is natural to conceive of dicisigns as limiting cases of >> inferences. If these conceptions pick out natural and not arbitrary classes >> of things, then there is a continuous shading between the classes and not a >> sharp line. The lack of a sharp line leads me to think such explanations >> should be forthcoming. >> >> >> I may be wrong to think that such explanations will really serve to >> explain anything, but that, at least, is my interpretative conjecture about >> how we might interpret Peirce's position as well as my substantive >> conjecture about the nature of the immediate object. While this is a >> hypothesis that I currently find attractive, I do not at this point have >> compelling reasons to reject other competing explanations. >> >> >> Yours, >> >> >> Jeff >> >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Friday, June 22, 2018 3:52 PM >> *To:* Peirce-L; gary.richmond >> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object >> >> Gary F, Jon S, list >> >> Gary wrote: >> >> GF: Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign >> signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which >> taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in >> continuing this dialogue if we can base it on *Peirce’s* definition of >> the Immediate Object — not yours. >> >> I do not see anything idiosyncratic about Jon's definition of the IO. It >> is certainly mine; I've argued along the same lines as Jon in an earlier >> discussion with you on this matter. In fact, I believe that many if not >> most Peirce scholars would tend to agree with Jon that (1) there is no >> sign that can convey all the qualities and characters of the DO and, so (2) >> the IO conveys just those characters and qualities which *some* sign means >> to convey. >> >> This is the case even for the rheme: >> >> 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far >> as they are determined | EP 2:292 >> >> A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of >> qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and >> such a kind of possible Object. Any rheme, perhaps, will afford some >> information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. >> >> [—] Or we may say that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to >> represent its Object in its characters merely… >> >> >> GF; The problem I have with [Jon's definition] is that you take it as >> *definitive* of the IO that “every sign” has one — including rhematic >> signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers explicitly to the >> immediate object of any *rhematic* sign. As Bellucci says (even in the >> paragraph you quoted from him!) only *dicisigns* are said by Peirce to >> have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two objects by definition. >> >> But Peirce does say--and in several places where the context doesn't >> involve the dicising whatsoever--that *every *sign has an IO. In my >> understanding that must *necessarily* be so for the reason given just >> above, viz., that *any* and *every* sign must convey *something* of its >> DO, and it does so through the IO. So, yes, in the context of speaking of >> dicisigns Peirce does *emphasize* the two objects (and it seems likely >> that the IO plays a peculiar and distinctive role in that sign class), but >> it seems to me that few* insist *that only the "dicisign has two >> objects." >> >> GF: Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO ( >> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your >> serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s >> definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I >> need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the >> quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior >> “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding >> becomes the basis of your definition. >> >> And it seems to me that you are paying only attention to the quotes by >> Peirce and arguments by Bellucci which support your view, and that it's a >> problem when a novel understanding becomes the basis of your definition. >> >> GR: Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple >> occasions that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the >> “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from >> manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I >> haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those >> quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of >> the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in >> which he’s using it. >> >> Peirce says that every sign has an Immediate Object many more times than >> two (see some additional examples below). And how many times does Peirce >> say definitively that *only* the DIcisign has two objects? I'd suggest >> that *if* he does the, he does it possibly only once. >> >> GF: One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, >> those “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 *Syllabus* (and >> elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s >> statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). >> Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the >> Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). >> In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is >> to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives >> of these “signs.” >> >> We know that that Peirce wrote (confusingly in my opinion) that a sign >> is not a real thing, but that it must be embodied in, expressed as a real >> thing, namely, a replica "which is a sinsign" (EP 2.291). In EP 311 (which >> you refer to below), he states that "A sign is something that exists in >> replicas." So, as I see it, a Sign (say, two, 2, the vocalization, zwei, >> deux, etc.) is real, but only exists as some sinsign (replica). >> >> And if one is "principally" and "in particular" discussing, say, >> Propositions (Dicisigns), then those *will be* ones examples. But to >> extrapolate from this that such examples suggest that these are the >> *only* signs that have IO seems to me to be not warranted. >> >> GF: In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has *propositional* signs >> in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the >> same may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the >> Commens entry where that phrase occurs. >> >> This interpretation (perhaps correct enough in the particular passage >> discussed by you in KS) serves your argument. But to extrapolate from that >> that "For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” >> brought to my mind the response that for all we know, you may be wrong. >> >> GF: After all, Peirce was a logician, and logicians give most of their >> attention to propositions and arguments; Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is >> a branch of logic as semiotic, and his taxonomy (including the distinction >> between dynamic and immediate objects) is part of his speculative grammar. >> >> This generalization about logicians doesn't necessarily apply to Peirce >> who is, after all, the inventor of modern triadic semiotic. Propositions >> and arguments are principally the concern of those working in critical >> logic (critic, "logic as logic"). But I know I need not remind you that >> Peirce established two other branches of semiotic, speculative grammar and >> methodeutic. >> >> GF: [Peirce] quite naturally and often uses the terms “sign” and “symbol” >> as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians are traditionally >> concerned with. >> >> He does some times and he doesn't at other timess. Again, it depends on >> such matters as which of the branches of semeiotic he's working in. Also, >> some times his "short hand" can lead astray, and this is not uncommon in >> Peirce. For one famous example, Peirce sometimes uses "exist" or "existent" >> inter-changeably with 'real', and this has sometimes led to some >> consideration confusion in the literature. For example, in one of the >> quotations you offered above to the effect that "a sign is not a real >> thing," it seems likely that what Peirce actually means is that a sign is >> not in itself an "existent" *thing* (but that it *is* *real*), but >> *exists* only in replicas (see the passage stating this below, EP 311) >> >> GF: That’s one reason why it’s unwise to ignore the context in which >> Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is no need to cite an “occasion >> where Peirce stated explicitly that *only* propositions have IOs.” >> >> One will certainly agree that is is wise not to ignore the context of >> Peirce's use of "sign." But when one starts to select just certain >> contexts, ignoring other, well, that's a problem in my view. >> >> And while you've asked Jon to cite occasions where Peirce stated >> explicitly that "all signs have immediate objects" (which he has, but which >> quotations haven't satisfied you, apparently), I think that if you can't >> offer a citation of Peirce explicitly stating that *only* Dicisigns have >> IOs, that is at least *as* problematic. >> >> GF: It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce *does *say about IOs >> is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or other dicisigns). >> You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you can. >> >> I do not agree with your claim that "everything Peirce *does *say about >> IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions." It seems strange >> to me to read that. Here are some counter-examples. >> >> 1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | MS [R] 1334:53 >> >> …there are two aspects of the object: >> The object as acting on the sign. That is called the >> *real object *The object as represented in the sign, or the *immediate >> object*. >> >> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.536 >> >> … we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as >> the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the >> Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is >> the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to >> its Representation. >> >> I don't recall either of these passages being within a context which >> focuses on the Dicisign exclusively. See also discussions of the Immediate >> vs the Dynamic Object in, for example, Peirce's letters to Lady Welby (EP >> 2:477, 2:482). Here I am certain there is no discussion of the proposition >> or dicisign. >> >> GR: Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division >> of objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of >> the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of >> *symbols*, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither >> rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. These two innovations are not >> unrelated. For one thing, they allow Peirce (and Stjernfelt and Bellucci) >> to say that not only propositions but dicisigns or “quasi-propositions” >> must have immediate objects, because the doubleness of object is built into >> the *definition* of the dicisign as well as the proposition. >> >> I do not see that the fact that propositions and other dicisigns have two >> objects (*even* if explicitly in the definition of the dicisign) >> precludes other signs from having immediate objects. I think you and >> Bellucci may have made too much of that singular "definition." >> >> GF: Another connection becomes apparent when we consider that Peirce’s >> division of signs *according to their immediate objects* produces the >> trichotomy vague/actual/general. This appears in the Logic Notebook for >> July 7, 1905: “In its relation to its Immediate Object, it is Vagosign if >> it represents that Obj[ect) as possible, [it is] Actisign [if it represents >> that Object as] existent, [it is] General [if it represents that Object as] >> law” (R 339 DDR 247r). But this is prefigured in KS, where Peirce says >> (EP2:311) that “the distinctions of *vague* and *distinct*, *general* >> and *individual* are propositional distinctions.” Now, in KS Peirce >> ignores the dynamic/immediate object distinction (as well as the the >> proposition/dicisign distinction); but taking that into account, he is >> saying that the distinctions pertaining to the sign’s relation to its >> immediate object “are propositional distinctions.” That’s enough for me, >> and since you are quite familiar with KS, I don’t see why it wouldn’t be >> enough for you. >> >> Gary, I think that you and Bellucci are concentrating on the specificity >> of a context while ignoring other contexts. Other contexts contradict this >> *exclusive >> *reading (which, btw, as I see it is not at all "Fregean" as you wrote >> in an earlier post--on what do you base *that*?) >> >> GF: All of the above is to question your claim that “every sign,” >> presumably including at least the ten types defined in the *Syllabus* (if >> not the notorious 66), “has an immediate object.” If you’re going to stick >> to that claim, and base your *definition* of the IO on it, then I’m not >> interested in prolonging discussion on the matter. >> >> And if you are to insist that your (and Bellucci's) interpretation is the >> *only >> correct *one and that a position held my many other scholars--namely, >> that *every* sign has two objects), then I don't see why Jon would be >> interested in prolonging a discussion with you in this matter. Nor, for >> that matter, would I. >> >> GF: I’d prefer to focus on what Peirce actually says about immediate >> objects, in the contexts where he says these things, rather than argue for >> or against an abstract schema of sign taxonomy. Just my personal >> preference, of course. >> >> You are claiming that *your* interpretation (cherry picking the context >> which supports your view), namely, that only propositions/dicisigns have >> immediate objects, is "what Peirce actually says about immediate objects," >> and that Jon has been arguing in the context of "an abstract schema of sign >> taxonomy" (which I do not see that he has been doing) is ipso facto wrong >> and not worth considering as clearly not Peirce's view. I find that not >> helpful in forwarding this particular inquiry. But perhaps you are settled >> in your opinion and don't wish to carry the inquiry further. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 11:46 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign >>> signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which >>> taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in >>> continuing this dialogue if we can base it on *Peirce’s* definition of >>> the Immediate Object — not yours. The problem I have with yours is that you >>> take it as *definitive* of the IO that “every sign” has one — including >>> rhematic signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers >>> explicitly to the immediate object of any *rhematic* sign. As Bellucci >>> says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only *dicisigns* are >>> said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two >>> objects by definition. >>> >>> Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO ( >>> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was >>> your serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s >>> definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I >>> need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the >>> quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior >>> “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding >>> becomes the basis of your definition. >>> >>> Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions >>> that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple >>> occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from >>> manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I >>> haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those >>> quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of >>> the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in >>> which he’s using it. >>> >>> One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, those >>> “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 *Syllabus* (and >>> elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s >>> statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). >>> Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the >>> Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). >>> In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is >>> to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives >>> of these “signs.” For example (EP2:303-4): >>> >>> [[ The sentence “Roxana was the queen of Alexander” is a sign of Roxana >>> and of Alexander, and though there is a grammatical emphasis on the former, >>> logically the name “Alexander” is as much a *subject* as is the name >>> “Roxana”; and the real persons Roxana and Alexander are *real objects* >>> of the sign. Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry >>> real objects. ]] >>> >>> In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has *propositional* signs >>> in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the >>> same may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the >>> Commens entry where that phrase occurs. After all, Peirce was a logician, >>> and logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments; >>> Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is a branch of logic as semiotic, and his >>> taxonomy (including the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) >>> is part of his speculative grammar. He quite naturally and often uses the >>> terms “sign” and “symbol” as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians >>> are traditionally concerned with. That’s one reason why it’s unwise to >>> ignore the context in which Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is >>> no need to cite an “occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that *only* >>> propositions have IOs.” It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce >>> *does >>> *say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or >>> other dicisigns). You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you >>> can. >>> >>> Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division of >>> objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of >>> the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of * >>> symbols*, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither >>> rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. These two innovations are not >>> unrelated. For one thing, they allow Peirce (and Stjernfelt and Bellucci) >>> to say that not only propositions but dicisigns or “quasi-propositions” >>> must have immediate objects, because the doubleness of object is built into >>> the *definition* of the dicisign as well as the proposition. >>> >>> Another connection becomes apparent when we consider that Peirce’s >>> division of signs *according to their immediate objects* produces the >>> trichotomy vague/actual/general. This appears in the Logic Notebook for >>> July 7, 1905: “In its relation to its Immediate Object, it is Vagosign if >>> it represents that Obj[ect) as possible, [it is] Actisign [if it represents >>> that Object as] existent, [it is] General [if it represents that Object as] >>> law” (R 339 DDR 247r). But this is prefigured in KS, where Peirce says >>> (EP2:311) that “the distinctions of *vague* and *distinct*, *general* >>> and *individual* are propositional distinctions.” Now, in KS Peirce >>> ignores the dynamic/immediate object distinction (as well as the the >>> proposition/dicisign distinction); but taking that into account, he is >>> saying that the distinctions pertaining to the sign’s relation to its >>> immediate object “are propositional distinctions.” That’s enough for me, >>> and since you are quite familiar with KS, I don’t see why it wouldn’t be >>> enough for you. >>> >>> All of the above is to question your claim that “every sign,” presumably >>> including at least the ten types defined in the *Syllabus* (if not the >>> notorious 66), “has an immediate object.” If you’re going to stick to that >>> claim, and base your *definition* of the IO on it, then I’m not >>> interested in prolonging discussion on the matter. I’d prefer to focus on >>> what Peirce actually says about immediate objects, in the contexts where he >>> says these things, rather than argue for or against an abstract schema of >>> sign taxonomy. Just my personal preference, of course. >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* 21-Jun-18 23:46 >>> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary F., List: >>> >>> GF: Are you denying that *indicating *is an indexical function? >>> >>> I am not convinced that Peirce intended "indicated" in that particular >>> context to be strictly understood as entailing indexical function, since >>> Qualities *cannot *indicate in that sense; after all, a Qualisign >>> cannot be an Index. Just a couple of days later, he instead wrote that >>> Descriptives "*determine *their Objects by stating the characters of >>> the latter" (EP 2:484; 1908, emphasis mine), which is what I had in mind >>> when I said earlier that a Descriptive Sign is precisely one that *does >>> *refer to its DO "exclusively by describing it." That is why it is >>> classified as a "Descriptive"! >>> >>> GF: Can you give me one or two examples of these facts that you are >>> referring to? >>> >>> There are two cars located in the direction that the guy is pointing, >>> relative >>> to his current position. One of them is red, and the other is blue. >>> The guy is calling someone else's attention to the red one. >>> >>> GF: OK, if the Peirce quotes amassed by Bellucci don’t loosen your hold >>> on the Fregean interpretation of the IO, I certainly can’t do better. >>> >>> I am not necessarily endorsing the Fregean interpretation of the IO; for >>> one thing, I do not know enough about Frege's views to judge them one way >>> or the other. I am just continuing to define the IO as I have been doing >>> for several months now--the partial combination of attributes of the DO by >>> which the Sign denotes it. >>> >>> GF: I would appreciate it, though, if you could cite one or two of the >>> “multiple occasions”, *other than early drafts of MS 318*, where Peirce >>> states explicitly that every sign has an Immediate Object. >>> >>> Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO ( >>> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). Two of the >>> quotes there state explicitly that "every sign" has an IO, only one of >>> which is from MS 318. Many of the others say something like "a sign has >>> two objects" or "there are two aspects of the Object," or simply define the >>> two Objects in a way that at least implies that both pertain to any Sign. >>> Can you cite even one occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that >>> *only* propositions have IOs? As I have pointed out before, Bellucci >>> bases this novel assertion on a single passage, which I believe he clearly >>> misinterprets. >>> >>> CSP: ... when we speak of the * object* of a sign ... we may mean the >>> *immediate >>> *object, the object as the sign represents it. For some signs >>> separately represent their objects. Every proposition does so. (R >>> 284:54-55) >>> >>> FB: The immediate object is the "object as the sign represents it," >>> that is to say, the object which *those signs which separately >>> represent an object* do in fact represent. The sentence "for some >>> signs separately represent their objects" is crucial here. Not all signs >>> separately represent an object: rhemes do not; only propositions and >>> proposition-like signs (dicisigns) do, because these signs have a part that >>> indicates the object of which the other part says something. Thus, only >>> signs of this sort can have an immediate object. For the immediate object >>> is the "object as the sign represents it," and only proposition-like signs >>> independently represent an object, and thus can be divided according to the >>> way they represent the immediate object. (p. 294) >>> >>> Bellucci's conclusion here simply does not follow; the fact that a Rheme >>> does not *separately* or *independently* represent its Object obviously >>> does not entail that it does not represent its Object *at all*, and >>> therefore *cannot* have an IO. On the contrary, *every* Sign >>> represents its Object--that is what it means for something to be a Sign in >>> the first place!--and the IO is simply "the Object as represented in the >>> sign" (EP 2:498; 1909). Furthermore, since only Arguments *separately* >>> represent their Interpretants, Bellucci's reasoning implies that only >>> Arguments can have Immediate Interpretants. Again, where did Peirce ever >>> impose such a limitation? >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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