Gary F, List,
If I confused matters by using the noun form in place of the verb form of the words, then my apologies. In "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within", Peirce draws a contrast between what is involved in a relation and what evolves from such a relation. Consider, for instance, the following passage: Let us not put the cart before the horse, nor the evolved actuality before the possibility as if the latter involved what it only evolves. CP 1.422 In the Century Dictionary, he distinguishes between the mathematical and the logical use of "involves." Here is a logical definition: Involve (df): to bring into a common relation or connection. Hence, to include as a necessary or logical consequence; imply; comprise. My understanding is that we determine what is involved in a relation generally or in some specific conception by analysis, and we determine what is evolved from a relation by synthetic processes. The mathematical definitions of involve and involution have to do with processes of multiplication which, as far as I can see, are species of determining what is logically involved in a relation. My hunch is that Peirce was generalizing from the mathematical meanings of these terms as they were being used in algebra and projective geometry (by Desargues) and applying them in the context of mathematical logic to both the relational algebras and the EG. From the use of these terms in mathematical logic, he then may have generalized further to a clarification of the proper use of the terms in philosophy. Hope that helps to clarify the meanings of "involve" and "involution." I should note that the list of Peirce's entries written for the Century Dictionary suggest that he didn't provide the definition for "evolve", but he did provide a definition for "evolution". Looking at the two definitions, they are quite close. As such, I suspect that Peirce may have written the definition of "evolve" or someone else may have written it based on Peirce's definition of evolution. Either way, here is a definition: Evolve: to unfold or develop by a process of natural, consecutive or logical growth from, or as if from, a germ, latent state or plan. It is worth pointing out that the entry makes a distinction between the transitive and intransitive use of the verb. The definition of the intransitive form of the verb seems to highlight something opening or disclosing itself (as if it were becoming developed under its own plan and/or power). --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 10:06:31 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Jeff, You’ve put a lot of questions on our plate here, and I’m still working on the first one: “Can the distinction you are drawing between the analytic and synechistic approaches also be expressed in terms of the evolution and involution of signs and their relations?” I don’t have a definite answer to that yet — just more questions! First I have to ask whether your intention is to use the terms “evolution” and “involution” as Peirce would use them in logic or semiotic (rather than in the biological context in which most usage of “evolution” occurs). I looked in both the Century Dictionary and Baldwin’s Dictionary without finding much about how Peirce (or anybody) would apply those terms to “signs and their relations.” The entries written by Peirce on both words are largely devoted to their use in mathematics, and that seems to be the context in which Peirce most often uses “involution”. His Baldwin entry on involution, http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Involution, does give some logical senses, but it’s not very clear to me how any of them would apply to Peirce’s speculative grammar. It occurred to me after reading your post that what I meant by analytic and synechistic was pretty close to synchronic and diachronic respectively — since synechism is about continuity and time is continuous, while analysis is about making distinctions that don’t necessarily take time into account. That doesn’t seem to align with your evolution/involution pairing, especially if those two are opposites in some sense; but it does raise the question of how time is involved (no pun intended!) in all this. Maybe I’m just introducing complications (another meaning of “involutions”!) into all this that can be avoided if you can supply working definitions of “evolution” and “involution” as you intend them to be used in the taxonomy of signs. Then we can go from there instead of sliding into the metaphysics and logic of time. Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> Sent: 26-Jun-18 12:37 To: 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Gary F, List, Can the distinction you are drawing between the analytic and synechistic approaches also be expressed in terms of the evolution and involution of signs and their relations? My assumption is that we are looking for a natural classification of the different objects and interpretants that are essential for semiosis. As such, my working assumption is that we should hope to arrive at agreement on the natural classification of objects and interpretants when studying the matter both by involution and evolution. Having said that, I agree with you that approaching the study of sign relations by involution tends to treat them as relatively static entities that we are "taking apart" via analysis, so to speak. When we look at the matter from the perspective of the evolution of the relations between objects, signs and interpretants, we are studying how things grow over time. As far as I can tell, one of the guiding ideas in the division of these natural classes is the modal character of the objects and interpretants--just as it is in the classification of signs. As such, the proper study of the evolution of signs must take into account the way generals govern the determination of what is possible with respect to the characteristics of those things that are existent. If this is on track, then we should expect Peirce to be focusing on the differences between the conditions under which we actually identify objects today as compared to the way they would be identified if inquiry were carried forward, just as we should expect a division between the ways signs and their relations to objects are interpreted in the past and present in comparison to how they might come be interpreted if inquiry were carried forward. Getting a clearer understanding of the character of the continuity involved in the the homeostasis, growth and reproduction of signs relations does appear to be essential for arriving at a more adequate understanding of semiosis. Do you think we could gain some traction on these questions by clarifying the role of the principle of continuity in guiding these sorts of inquiries? In the last lecture of Reasoning and the Logic of Things (Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898), Peirce seems to make some progress in terms of clarifying the conception of continuity that is needed for inquiry in logic. How might we make use of this principle for the purposes of making a natural classification of objects, signs and interpretants and, in turn, use this classification for the sake of better explaining the physiology of semiotic processes? The key to the lock on the door to this problem appears to be understanding the character of synthesis generally and its role in such processes as (1) the composition of concepts, (2) synthetic judgments and (3) synthetic reasoning. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Tuesday, June 26, 2018 7:50:50 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Jeff, I see the question you’ve posed here as one manifestation of the necessary tension between analysis and synechism which drives Peircean semiotic. For the synechist, semiosis is a continuous process: any parts it has are of the same nature as itself. Yet for the analyst, it has three “separate” parts: object, sign, interpretant (in the order of determination); and the various possible relations between the parts (taking account of the mode of being of each part) enable us to distinguish between types of signs. If we think of determination as a continuous process that takes time, its continuity implies that the analysis can be applied at any time scale, and the relations between the structures at these different scales (or levels of analysis) will show a self-similarity. But if we do a logical (rather than temporal) analysis of the parts, which as products of analysis have already given up their continuity, then the relations between parts at different levels of analysis becomes problematic. For instance, when we analyze the sign’s determination of the interpretant to get different three types of interpretants, we can’t take for granted that they all have the same relation to the object that the Interpretant has to the Object at the first level of analysis. So my answer to your question is: It depends on whether you consider the matter analytically or synechistically. Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: 25-Jun-18 21:28 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List, Here is a question. Consider the following definition of the sign, which is consistent with what Peirce says in a number of places: A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. For starters, let us focus on the last sentence, which I have highlighted in bold and underline. If an interpretant functions as a sign in relation to some further interpretant, what is the implication of saying that there are three interpretants, the immediate, dynamical and final? Peirce says that in the process of cognition by agents who are relatively self-controlled, that the sign is thought playing the part of firstness, while the object is thought playing the role of secondness, while the interpretant is thought playing the part of thirdness. (CP 1.537) If this sounds odd to you, especially when thinking about the object, then consider the case where the object is something like a number, which is an idealized object formed by a process of hypostatic abstraction. In this kind of case of hypostatic abstraction, which is not by any means limited to mathematical objects, what was once a predicate comes to serve as the object for some further interpretant. Having made this point about the object, let's set it to the side and focus on the relation between signs and interpretants. In order to keep things straight, let's label things by saying that the object, sign and interpretant in the first case are each labelled level (1), and in the next stage where the interpretant is now serving as a sign in relation to some further interpretant, the sign, object and interpretant are at level (2). What is the implication of describing the interpretant (at level 1) that also functions as a sign (at level 2) in this way? The interpretant in level (1) is thought playing the part of thirdness (i.e., a genuine triad) with respect to the sign that it is serving to interpret, but that same interpretant/sign at level (2) has the character of firstness (i.e., a monadic character) with respect to its level (2) interpretant. Here is the question: what is the implication with respect to the character of the sign and interpretant at each level? That is, the interpretant at level (1) has three parts (immediate, dynamical and final) in its relation to the level (1) sign it interprets, but then it does not appear to have three parts when it is serving as a sign at level (2) in relation to some further level (2) interpretant. As a sign, it has the character of a thought playing the role of a first. Let me now restate the question: does the three part interpretant still have three parts when it is functioning as a sign, or does it have just one part? Yours, Jeff
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