Gary R., List: Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons the fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant? I am sincerely baffled by this suggestion. Here is what I said.
JAS: a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns). I am describing what the Sign does, not what the Object does. I am not at all somehow removing the Sign from its genuine triadic relation with the Object and Interpretant. Peirce himself differentiated the two Objects and three Interpretants when he wrote, "the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908). As for Sign vs. Representamen, Peirce actually *did* say contradictory things in 1903 (when he gave the sunflower example) and 1905, because *he changed his mind* sometime during the interval between them--he decided that he no longer needed to use "Representamen," because "Sign" ended up suiting his original purpose after all. I now agree with that decision. Notice that "Representamen" does not appear in the 1908 quote above, or anywhere else in those crucial December letters to Lady Welby. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, list, > > Thanks.This was quite helpful. > > But there remains the awkward fact of the Peirce formulation that the > Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant Sign. Does he give up this > formulation in the 20th century? If not, whether you call it > "Representamen" or "Sign," there seems to me the problem that it would > appear in your formulation that the IO takes the place of the second moment > of that triadic formulation. > > According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental > Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP > 2:273). > > > Of course you now would appear to reject that triadic formulation. Since I > very much like your reformulation, I'll have to think long and hard on this. > > Still, if, as Peirce says, there are "Representamens that are not Signs" > (like sunflowers turning toward the sun in Peirce's famous example), then > there would seem yet to be a distinction to be made between Sign and > Representamen. Yet in your note addressed to me and just now to Gary F you > say the Sign and Representamen are "effectively synonymous." So, it appears > to me that Peirce is perhaps saying contradictory things when one looks > from one quotation to another on this not inconsequential matter of > terminology. It seems to me more than a matter of terminology. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* > > On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> GR: But would you explain why the Representamen is not included in your >> formulation whatsoever? >> >> >> In this context, how would you distinguish the Representamen from the >> Sign? >> >> According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental >> Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP >> 2:273). If you favor these definitions, such that a Sign is only a certain >> kind of Representamen, then simply substitute "Representamen" for "Sign" in >> my formulation. >> >> However, according to Peirce in 1905, "I use 'sign' in the widest sense >> of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a >> very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition ... >> I formerly preferred the word *representamen*. But there was no need of >> this horrid long word" (SS 193). I have come to agree with that assessment. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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