Jon S, list, Thanks.This was quite helpful.
But there remains the awkward fact of the Peirce formulation that the Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant Sign. Does he give up this formulation in the 20th century? If not, whether you call it "Representamen" or "Sign," there seems to me the problem that it would appear in your formulation that the IO takes the place of the second moment of that triadic formulation. According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP 2:273). Of course you now would appear to reject that triadic formulation. Since I very much like your reformulation, I'll have to think long and hard on this. Still, if, as Peirce says, there are "Representamens that are not Signs" (like sunflowers turning toward the sun in Peirce's famous example), then there would seem yet to be a distinction to be made between Sign and Representamen. Yet in your note addressed to me and just now to Gary F you say the Sign and Representamen are "effectively synonymous." So, it appears to me that Peirce is perhaps saying contradictory things when one looks from one quotation to another on this not inconsequential matter of terminology. It seems to me more than a matter of terminology. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > GR: But would you explain why the Representamen is not included in your > formulation whatsoever? > > > In this context, how would you distinguish the Representamen from the Sign? > > According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental > Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP > 2:273). If you favor these definitions, such that a Sign is only a certain > kind of Representamen, then simply substitute "Representamen" for "Sign" in > my formulation. > > However, according to Peirce in 1905, "I use 'sign' in the widest sense of > the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very > broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition ... I > formerly preferred the word *representamen*. But there was no need of > this horrid long word" (SS 193). I have come to agree with that assessment. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon S, Gary F, list, >> >> I've just discarded the greater part of a draft of a response to Gary F >> which I was formulating as you, Jon, say much better than I would have, and >> you include more pertinent analysis than I was considering in this matter. >> So for now I will only note that I fully concur with your analysis. >> >> Gary F wrote: >> >> Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote (from >> the *Syllabus*) which I think could throw some light on the distinction >> between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s definition of the >> *rheme*: >> >> [[ A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of >> qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and >> such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some >> information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]] >> >> That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because >> dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” *are* >> interpreted >> as affording information, while rhemes are *not*. The crucial point here >> is that in order to convey information, a sign must have an *actual* object, >> i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension as well as intension. >> The reason that a rheme is *not* interpreted as affording information is >> that it is not interpreted as directing attention to an actual object, as a >> dicisign is, by definition. >> >> You completely ignore here that Peirce writes that a Rheme will perhaps >> "afford some information." Again, as I, Jon S and, I think, Jeff have >> argued *contra* your assertion above (that "a sign must have an *actual* >> object"), Rhemes may offer *possible* information about the DO which >> later *may be* interpreted. Rhemes much less frequently than not, it >> seems to me, are parts of dicisigns >> . >> (In reading one of Edwina's recent posts, I thought that for biosemiosis >> that the Rheme is probably never >> found apart from a dicisign >> .) >> >> Still, at least for Anthroposemiotics, the information which they* might* >> afford as rheme is real enough and will possibly--even probably--be of >> considerable significance when the rheme or term finds its place in a >> proposition. Indeed, because of the rheme's vague connotations (if that's >> the right word) the pertinent information that it contains will *not* >> be clear until it is included in a proposition. But that doesn't mean that >> there is *no* information in the Rheme whatsover, and a close reading of >> the snippet we're discussing strongly suggests that there *is* >> information perhaps *to be* interpreted later. >> >> In my view, the reason that the rheme is not *interpreted* as affording >> information is principally because that information is vague until it is >> contextualized (typically for Anthroposemiotics, in a proposition). My >> example of the quite varied *possible* information that the rheme '-is a >> book' holds suggests that vagueness, I believe. To assert, as you have, >> that it offers *no* information, is not supported by the Peirce quote. >> >> And while I earlier had some little doubts concerning the language you >> used, Jon, to express this basic description of a Sign (one question >> remains: see below), I have come to a greater appreciation of your >> expression of what a Sign does. >> >> JAS: ". . . a Sign *denotes* its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), *signifies* >> some >> of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, >> constitute its Immediate Object--and *determines* its Interpretants to >> represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)." >> >> >> That little remaining doubt: Peirce says that the Object (within the >> sign, the Immediate Object) *determines* the Representamen which, in >> turn, *determines* the Interpretant. In the quotation above you omit the >> Representamen in your analysis. This would seem to conflate the IO and the >> R (which may be the case as in consideration of triadic semiosis we are not >> discussing three units any more than we are in a discussion of the flow of >> Time such that we absolutely separate Past/Present/Future). But would you >> explain why the Representamen is not included in your formulation >> whatsoever? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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