Gary R., List:

Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the Sign
itself as a triad of IO-R-II?  This goes back to the fact that Peirce never
distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in the specific way that
such a model entails.  I still affirm that the IO and II are internal to
the Sign, while the DO and DI are external to it; and below I quoted
Peirce's statement that the two Objects determine the Sign, which
determines the three Interpretants; so I suspect that this indeed boils
down to "a terminological matter."

Does that clarify things?  If not, maybe I have just been staring at the
pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours consecutively.
:-)

Jon S.

On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Jon S, list,
>
>
> Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by this,
> and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter. Still, Peirce
> says in many, many places that what happens *within* the sign is this
> tripartite process: The IO *determines* the Sign which *determines* some
> Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject this internal structure
> (or am I wrong about that too?)
>
> In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure in your
> thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you, etc." prologue to
> an response? :-)
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons the
>> fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the Sign for
>> its Interpretant?  I am sincerely baffled by this suggestion.  Here is what
>> I said.
>>
>> JAS:  a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of
>> that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together,
>> constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to
>> represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns).
>>
>>
>> I am describing what the Sign does, not what the Object does.  I am not
>> at all somehow removing the Sign from its genuine triadic relation with the
>> Object and Interpretant.  Peirce himself differentiated the two Objects and
>> three Interpretants when he wrote, "the Dynamoid Object determines the
>> Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the
>> Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
>> determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908).
>>
>> As for Sign vs. Representamen, Peirce actually *did* say contradictory
>> things in 1903 (when he gave the sunflower example) and 1905, because *he
>> changed his mind* sometime during the interval between them--he decided
>> that he no longer needed to use "Representamen," because "Sign" ended up
>> suiting his original purpose after all.  I now agree with that decision.
>> Notice that "Representamen" does not appear in the 1908 quote above, or
>> anywhere else in those crucial December letters to Lady Welby.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon S, list,
>>>
>>> Thanks.This was quite helpful.
>>>
>>> But there remains the awkward fact of the Peirce formulation that the
>>> Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant Sign. Does he give up this
>>> formulation in the 20th century? If not, whether you call it
>>> "Representamen" or "Sign," there seems to me the problem that it would
>>> appear in your formulation that the IO takes the place of the second moment
>>> of that triadic formulation.
>>>
>>> According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental
>>> Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP
>>> 2:273).
>>>
>>>
>>> Of course you now would appear to reject that triadic formulation. Since
>>> I very much like your reformulation, I'll have to think long and hard on
>>> this.
>>>
>>> Still, if, as Peirce says, there are "Representamens that are not Signs"
>>> (like sunflowers turning toward the sun in Peirce's famous example), then
>>> there would seem yet to be a distinction to be made between Sign and
>>> Representamen. Yet in your note addressed to me and just now to Gary F you
>>> say the Sign and Representamen are "effectively synonymous." So, it appears
>>> to me that Peirce is perhaps saying contradictory things when one looks
>>> from one quotation to another on this not inconsequential matter of
>>> terminology. It seems to me more than a matter of terminology.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *718 482-5690*
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Gary R., List:
>>>>
>>>> GR:  But would you explain why the Representamen is not included in
>>>> your formulation whatsoever?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In this context, how would you distinguish the Representamen from the
>>>> Sign?
>>>>
>>>> According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental
>>>> Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP
>>>> 2:273).  If you favor these definitions, such that a Sign is only a certain
>>>> kind of Representamen, then simply substitute "Representamen" for "Sign" in
>>>> my formulation.
>>>>
>>>> However, according to Peirce in 1905, "I use 'sign' in the widest sense
>>>> of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a
>>>> very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition ...
>>>> I formerly preferred the word *representamen*. But there was no need
>>>> of this horrid long word" (SS 193).  I have come to agree with that
>>>> assessment.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>
>>>
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