Edwina, list, IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis!
I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me, the term of 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure capable and active in explaining human cognition and human societal organization. Terminology can't do that. What Peirce and others have done in inquiries into the normative science of logic as semeiotic is most certainly not the whole of anthroposemiotics by a long shot. But in so far as theoretical research into semeiotic grammar, critic, and methodeutic is the work of men and women attempting to discover logical structures and relations within a science of discovery, their work is properly just that--theoretical. When good work is done in that normative science, it may supply data and examples to some sciences, principles and, perhaps, methods, to others. Is theoretical semeiotics (in science of discovery) the whole of anthroposemiosis? Of course not. But, in my opinion, the research properly begins there, is discovered in human thought processes, and is found to be generalizable even into the biological, social, and cultural realms. But one has to start somewhere, and Peirce centered his own semeiotic research in normative science where he did the lion's share of his work. In addition, h considered the develop of optimal terminology in each science and each branch of each a matter of the greatest importance and, perhaps, especially in theoretical science. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> Virus-free. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> <#m_-3061554988905794376_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 8:58 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R - thanks for your post, but I think that my concern about the > tendency on this list: > > ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an > isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based > around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict > terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic > point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze and explain > the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the real world > > IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis! > > I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict > terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me, the term of > 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure capable and active in > explaining human cognition and human societal organization. Terminology > can't do that. What is required is an analytic frame that examines the > dynamic, yes, dynamic, nature of human cognition and human societal > organization. And these endless discussions of 'who is right' about 'what > X term means' can't provide us with such an analysis. > > As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic > framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis - and > terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal. > > My focus is not simply on biosemiotics but on human cognition and human > societal organization - and I consider Peircean semiosis to be an excellent > analytic agent for such an examination - but find that this list is either > silent on such topics or, the few who do post, confine themselves to > back-and-forth arguments over who is right about terminology. > > Edwina > > > > > > On Mon 18/02/19 3:20 AM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: > > Jon, Edwina, list, > > Jon wrote: > > I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word; and if researchers > today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs to be useful for > their purposes, then far be it from me to block the way of inquiry. > > > No need to apologize. As I've repeatedly said, your inquiry into Peirce's > late taxonomy of signs has been helpful to me and, I believe, of > potentially considerable value to those doing research especially into the > grammatical branch of logic as semeiotic. Granted, "abandoned" may > perhaps have been "too strong a word" to describe Peirce's position apropos > the late classification of signs in considering the 1903 classification. > Yet when one is working, as you have been, within that late taxonomy based > on Peirce's developed notion of their being two objects and three > interpretants, it is understandable that an emphasis on the later one would > take precedence over that earlier classification. > > Continuing, Edwina quoted me: > > GR: I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short for > example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he finds > himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly state that > along with his corrected view[. . .] Peirce is constantly experimenting; > but, in my opinion, one needn't take an experiment late in his life as > necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier and the principles > derived from them. > > > Then commented: > > ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop an > isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework based > around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict > terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the basic > point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze and explain > the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the real > world. > > > I would not characterize the great effort by Peirce and others (including > John S, Jon S, Gary F, and Jeff D and others on this list, and myriad > others involved in Peirce studies for the past 6 or 7 decades) made in logic > as semeiotic as an attempt "to develop an isolate framework" for > semeiotic. Indeed, Peirce did the vast majority of his work in what we > sometimes refer to as 'anthroposemiotic', that is, that logica docens which > strictly is logic as semeiotic (his pragmaticism is included here). > > While logicians and others may argue as to what semeiotic definitions are > important, ought to be emphasized, their proper relations to other > definitions, etc., it seems to me that logicians tend to find what you call > "strict terminological definitions" not only important, but quite essential > for certain types of inquiry. > > It is understandable that as a biosemiotician that you would be especially > concerned with semeiotics in "its capacity to analyze and explain the > dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of the real world." > And, > in truth, it is my opinion that the discoveries of the normative science of > logic as semiotics ought more and more (according to "the principle of > principles") be applied to pragmaticism, metaphysics, and most all the > special sciences, including biosemiotics. I would only suggest--really a > kind of truism--that there are many kinds of semiotic inquiry, and that, > for example, the logic of semeiotic (semiotic grammar, critic, and > methodeutic/rhetoric) as the principal discovery science (pure research > science) ought to be allowed free reign in its inquiries, and even if these > naturally and necessarily principally deal with anthroposemiotics. In sum: > there are in fact many possible inquiries and applications of Peircean > semeiotics, but the first of these is properly in theoretical science. > > Perhaps, Edwina, you are frustrated by the tendency on this list to > concentrate from time to time on anthroposemiotics which, truly, can at > times seem all too abstract even to me! But this has not always been the > case. Consider, for example, the slow read here (and concurrently on the > Biosemiotics list) of Frederik Stjernfelt's, Natural Propositions. The > Actuality of Peirce’s Doctrine of Dicisigns, a year or so long ago. > Earlier slow reads also concerned topics other than logica docens. > > I have repeatedly urged folk here to take up on the list threads on other > topics than the first two branches of the normative science of logic as > semeiotic (semeiotic grammar and critical logic). But this hasn't much > happened. For example, it seems to me that the tendency recently of some, > perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to bypass phenomenology as > first cenoscopic science and to leap to its relation to logic as semeiotic > (notably, critical logic, esp. as expressed in EGs) is unfortunate and, I'd > say, counter-productive. Will we ever discuss phenomenology as such? > Will we ever get back to discussing pragmaticism as such? > > Nonetheless, one does not want to block the way of inquiry of those who > are especially interested in anthroposemiosis through inquiries into > philosophical (semeiotic) grammar and critical logic (logic as logic, which > includes discussions of EGs). One is always free to introduce a thread here > on any topic, but of late this has rarely happened. Perhaps we need a new > 'slow read'? Any suggestions? > > Best, > > Gary (writing, in part, as list moderator) > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > On Sun, Feb 17, 2019 at 3:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R., Auke, List: >> >> I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word; and if researchers >> today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs to be useful for >> their purposes, then far be it from me to block the way of inquiry. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sat, Feb 16, 2019 at 11:11 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] >> > wrote: >> >>> Auke, Jon, List, >>> >>> >>> Your post, Auke, did indeed help clarify your earlier one for me. It >>> having done that, it makes me further doubt your hypothetical project of >>> diagramming phenomenon based on an Existential Graph model. >>> >>> >>> I most certainly think that "optimally iconic" (Stjernfelt) diagrams and >>> graphs (EGs being a prime example) are far preferable to those which are >>> merely "operational" (characteristically, discursive). See, for example: >>> https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11787181_6 There are good >>> reasons for this, notably that it is valuable to be able to observe, >>> modify, and otherwise experiment on graphs, and the more iconic a graph is, >>> the easier it is to do this. For logic, EGs would appear to be "optimally >>> iconic." >>> >>> >>> However, it seems to me that one remains squarely in the realm of logic >>> as semeiotic when one is working with EGs because, as now repeatedly noted: >>> " All that existential graphs can represent is propositions, on a >>> single sheet, and arguments on a succession of sheets, presented in >>> temporal succession." CSP >>> >>> >>> Consequently, I strongly doubt that EGs can be useful in phenomenology >>> qua phenomenology. >>> >>> >>> GR: EGs seem to me capable only of (a) helping to clarify those logical >>> moves by Peirce which served to reveal the connection between types of >>> propositions and the three categories [I would add now that this is >>> principally, if not exclusively, a logical matter], or (c) explicate the >>> findings of phenomenological research in graphic form [again, a project in >>> logic GR]. >>> >>> >>> Phenomenology/phaneroscopy is not concerned at all with propositions or >>> arguments. It asserts nothing, but merely observes what appears in the >>> phaneron. >>> >>> >>> Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of >>> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the >>> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or >>> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think involves >>> three kinds of elements (1903, Lowell Lectures, in Commens). >>> >>> >>> Nevertheless, both via our every day logic ( logica utens) as well as >>> by the 'principle of data' (earlier discussed), phenomenology can use logic >>> docens (i.e., logic as semeiotic, further down in the Classification of >>> Sciences than phenomenology) to further describe/explicate its findings. >>> >>> >>> So, I remain confused as to why you argue: >>> >>> >>> AvB: What I would argue for is that the most fruitful way to proceed is >>> to try to conceptually co-ordinate the different perspectives on each >>> other. The key to that is the process of semiosis expressed as a sign >>> process. >>> >>> >>> But, again (in what also, btw, sounds to me tautological) when you write >>> that "The key. . . is the process of semiosis expressed as a sign >>> process," then you're still considering semiotic and not phenomenology. >>> >>> >>> >>> Even while I remain open to the notion that some sort of 'sheet' may be >>> helpful, no doubt even necessary, in creating "optimally iconic" diagrams >>> appropriate to phenomenology, it seems to me that it cannot be a "sheet of >>> assertion" as described here: >>> >>> >>> A certain sheet, called the sheet of assertion, is appropriated to the >>> drawing upon it of such graphs that whatever may be at any time drawn upon >>> it, called the entire graph, shall be regarded as expressing an >>> assertion . . . CP 4.432 (c. 1903, in Commens, emphasis added). >>> >>> >>> Phenomenology doesn't assert anything whatsoever. From what you've >>> written so far, I do not see you meaning to diagram anything but "semiotic" >>> process. >>> >>> >>> I fervently believe that there are ways to diagram especially >>> trichotomic relations (and complexes of these) more iconically (my trikonic >>> diagrams are a first stab at that), but I'm now fairly certain that EGs >>> will not prove to be a useful model for those diagrams. Nonetheless, >>> creating more iconic diagrams of all sorts of phenomena and relations >>> ought, in my opinion, be much further explored including, of course, those >>> suitable to phenomenology. >>> >>> >>> Turning to another topic which I'll have to respond to in the thread in >>> which it appears, you quote Jon: >>> >>> >>> JAS: It further puzzles me that so many researchers still focus on the >>> three-trichotomy, ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903, since Peirce himself abandoned >>> it almost immediately--once he recognized the distinctions between the >>> different Objects and Interpretants of the same Sign. >>> >>> >>> And reply: >>> >>> >>> >>> AvB: I provided a locus in the Welby correspondence in which the small >>> classification is part of the Welby classification. Bernard Morand did a >>> great job in showing how the later trichotomies append on the former. >>> >>> >>> At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is no >>> good reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category, >>> ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903." See, for example: >>> >>> >>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249933979_On_diagrams_for_Peirces_10_28_and_66_classes_of_signs >>> >>> >>> Indeed, it is possible that such complexifications could prove to be an >>> obstacle in optimally disseminating Peirce's work more broadly. Having said >>> that, within the realm of Peirce scholarship, especially in >>> anthroposemiotics, such work that Jon has been engaged in may prove of some >>> considerable value. I am finding that I am grasping his project better than >>> I was at first, especially as Peirce's novel terminology (the kindest way >>> of putting it) becomes more and more familiar to me. Indeed, Jon's work is >>> helping me in that regard as he seems to have mastered it. >>> >>> >>> But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom >>> Short for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he >>> finds himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly state >>> that along with his corrected view (in years past I've offered several >>> examples of this). Peirce is constantly experimenting; but, in my opinion, >>> one needn't take an experiment late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" >>> those undertaken earlier and the principles derived from them. >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> 718 482-5690 >>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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