John, List: The new thread title is alarmist hyperbole, and the post below--after offering the kind of non-apology apology <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-apology_apology> that is all too common in our society today--simply doubles down on the fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar that I have pointed out at least twice before. In fact, I already directly addressed most of the repeated comments this morning <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-03/msg00145.html>, so why not deal with the substance of those responses? As for the new summary at the very bottom ...
JFS: (1) A Seme is a widening of Rheme (Predicate) to include nonsymbolic percepts. A Seme is a widening of Term (subject or predicate) to include not only Symbols, but also Icons and Indices; in fact, it explicitly encompasses "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906). Peirce neither stated nor implied *any *limitation whatsoever on the *nature *of the Object that a Seme can represent. JFS: (2) But the word 'subject' is ambiguous because it could mean either a predicate (pure possibility) or a grammatical subject (something actual). There is no ambiguity when we focus on *the parts of a proposition*, since "every proposition contains a *Subject *and a *Predicate*" (CP 2.316, EP 2:279; 1903). The difference between them is *not *that a subject is "something actual," while a predicate is "pure possibility." Rather, each subject *denotes an Object*, which must already be known to an interpreter from previous Collateral Experience; while the predicate *signifies the Interpretant*, which is the only information that the proposition *itself *can convey--the *relation *among its subjects. JFS: (3) Allowing a Seme to refer to something actual would break the distinction between Firstness and Secondness. That would contradict Peirce's entire system of semeiotic. Nonsense. Again, according to Peirce's own definition, *anything *which serves for *any *purpose as a substitute for *any *object--including something actual--is a Seme. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 6:15 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Jon AS, Gary R, and List, > > I apologize if anyone was offended by the release of excerpts from > offline notes. My only excuse is that I sent it at 2:10 AM. The > next morning, I was surprised that I had hit SEND. > > The conclusion of that note is far more important than a debating > point. I wanted to warn anybody who was misled by the ambiguity > in the word 'subject'. The conclusion that a Seme could be a > subject is not just false, it is horribly false. It contradicts > and undermines Peirce's entire system of semeiotic. > > That would be a terrible claim for Peirce List to publicize. > To emphasize why that claim is false, I'm repeating the summary > of the reasoning that shows the contradiction. See below. > > John > ______________________________________________________________________ > > The derivation of the contradiction can be summarized in three points: > > 1. In CP 4.538, Peirce said that the triad Term, Proposition, Argument > had to be widened, and he proposed a new triad Seme, Pheme, Delome. > In 4.539, he discussed issues about percepts, which showed why the > category Seme needed to go beyond purely symbolic Terms. > > 2. But Jon claimed that Subject would be an appropriate widening. > He was misled by an ambiguity in the word 'subject': as a logical > term, it's a predicate, which is a Rheme, which is a Seme; but as > a grammatical subject, it would refer to something actual. > > 3. But that triad would contradict the foundation of Peirce's system. > A Seme is a First. It represents a pure possibility, such as a > Mark/Tone, Potisign, or Qualisign. But a grammatical subject in > language refers to something that exists. It's a Second, such > as a Token, Actisign, or Sinsign. To claim that a grammatical > subject could be a Seme would mix Firstness and Secondness, > and create a contradiction in the center of the system. > > The reason why Jon was misled is that the word 'subject' without > any qualifiers is ambiguous. A Term in Aristotle's syllogisms may > be used in either subject position or predicate position. As a > Term without an indexical word in front (a, some, any, every...), > it would be a predicate, which is a Seme. > > But a grammatical subject refers to something that exists (or is > assumed to exist) in the Universe of Discourse. That kind of > subject would be a Second. It would be a Pheme, not a Seme. > > That's all there is to the debate. But it touches on many abstract > issues about Peirce's logic and semeiotic. That complexity obscured > the threat to destroy the entire system. > > Summary: The only thing to remember is three brief points. > > (1) A Seme is a widening of Rheme (Predicate) to include nonsymbolic > percepts. (2) But the word 'subject' is ambiguous because it could > mean either a predicate (pure possibility) or a grammatical subject > (something actual). (3) Allowing a Seme to refer to something actual > would break the distinction between Firstness and Secondness. > > That would contradict Peirce's entire system of semeiotic. >
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