List, John, Jon, Jon wrote: "The new thread title is alarmist hyperbole."
I strongly agree that the Subject line of this thread, "The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic," is alarmist in the extreme, and would be even if it weren't mildly absurd, as if Jon's arguing against John's understanding of an *aspect* of *Theoretical Grammar* might "destroy" the whole of Peirce's semeiotic. What a powerful thinker--or is it, destructive intellectual force?--Jon must be for John to conclude that his argumentation on this single point might be capable of destroying the whole of Peirce's semieotic"! John wrote: "The conclusion that a Seme could be a subject is not just false, it is horribly false. It contradicts and undermines Peirce's entire system of semeiotic." That seems to me to be an overstatement to say the least. John says that Jon's view, well argued in my opinion, is "horribly false." Is it possible that rather than arriving at that interpretation that one might conclude that John may be cleaving to his own view of this aspect of Peirce's semeiotic grammar, insisting that he cannot be in error in this matter of the Seme, and that for all intents and purposes that it is 'settled' because he says it is? And, further, that this alternative view of Jon's is "dangerous" and potentially even "destructive"? Is it possible that John believes that Peirce's principle of fallibilism doesn't apply to his own thinking; and, further, that his overwrought Subject line may indeed tend to "block the way of inquiry"? I recently wrote: "let us each make our cases as best we can--let each argument and line of argumentation speak for itself--and let the readers of the forum make up their own minds as to who has been most persuasive in their argumentation." At this point, on the substantive issue, I have tentatively concluded that, while I have for decades considered John to be one of the strongest living logicians (and continue to do so, and have said so publicly and privately on a number of occasions, and even recently), I find Jon's argumentation more persuasive than John's *in this case*. Indeed, I take Jon's view to be a logical advance in this matter of the Seme. Does that mean that I'm complicit in a dangerous move towards the destruction of Peirce's semeiotic? I sincerely doubt it. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > John, List: > > The new thread title is alarmist hyperbole, and the post below--after > offering the kind of non-apology apology > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-apology_apology> that is all too > common in our society today--simply doubles down on the fundamental > misunderstanding of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar that I have pointed > out at least twice before. In fact, I already directly addressed most of > the repeated comments this morning > <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-03/msg00145.html>, so why > not deal with the substance of those responses? As for the new summary at > the very bottom ... > > JFS: (1) A Seme is a widening of Rheme (Predicate) to include nonsymbolic > percepts. > > > A Seme is a widening of Term (subject or predicate) to include not only > Symbols, but also Icons and Indices; in fact, it explicitly encompasses > "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of > which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906). > Peirce neither stated nor implied *any *limitation whatsoever on the *nature > *of the Object that a Seme can represent. > > JFS: (2) But the word 'subject' is ambiguous because it could mean either > a predicate (pure possibility) or a grammatical subject (something actual). > > > There is no ambiguity when we focus on *the parts of a proposition*, > since "every proposition contains a *Subject *and a *Predicate*" (CP > 2.316, EP 2:279; 1903). The difference between them is *not *that a > subject is "something actual," while a predicate is "pure possibility." > Rather, each subject *denotes an Object*, which must already be known to > an interpreter from previous Collateral Experience; while the predicate > *signifies > the Interpretant*, which is the only information that the proposition *itself > *can convey--the *relation *among its subjects. > > JFS: (3) Allowing a Seme to refer to something actual would break the > distinction between Firstness and Secondness. That would contradict > Peirce's entire system of semeiotic. > > > Nonsense. Again, according to Peirce's own definition, *anything *which > serves for *any *purpose as a substitute for *any *object--including > something actual--is a Seme. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 6:15 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon AS, Gary R, and List, >> >> I apologize if anyone was offended by the release of excerpts from >> offline notes. My only excuse is that I sent it at 2:10 AM. The >> next morning, I was surprised that I had hit SEND. >> >> The conclusion of that note is far more important than a debating >> point. I wanted to warn anybody who was misled by the ambiguity >> in the word 'subject'. The conclusion that a Seme could be a >> subject is not just false, it is horribly false. It contradicts >> and undermines Peirce's entire system of semeiotic. >> >> That would be a terrible claim for Peirce List to publicize. >> To emphasize why that claim is false, I'm repeating the summary >> of the reasoning that shows the contradiction. See below. >> >> John >> ______________________________________________________________________ >> >> The derivation of the contradiction can be summarized in three points: >> >> 1. In CP 4.538, Peirce said that the triad Term, Proposition, Argument >> had to be widened, and he proposed a new triad Seme, Pheme, Delome. >> In 4.539, he discussed issues about percepts, which showed why the >> category Seme needed to go beyond purely symbolic Terms. >> >> 2. But Jon claimed that Subject would be an appropriate widening. >> He was misled by an ambiguity in the word 'subject': as a logical >> term, it's a predicate, which is a Rheme, which is a Seme; but as >> a grammatical subject, it would refer to something actual. >> >> 3. But that triad would contradict the foundation of Peirce's system. >> A Seme is a First. It represents a pure possibility, such as a >> Mark/Tone, Potisign, or Qualisign. But a grammatical subject in >> language refers to something that exists. It's a Second, such >> as a Token, Actisign, or Sinsign. To claim that a grammatical >> subject could be a Seme would mix Firstness and Secondness, >> and create a contradiction in the center of the system. >> >> The reason why Jon was misled is that the word 'subject' without >> any qualifiers is ambiguous. A Term in Aristotle's syllogisms may >> be used in either subject position or predicate position. As a >> Term without an indexical word in front (a, some, any, every...), >> it would be a predicate, which is a Seme. >> >> But a grammatical subject refers to something that exists (or is >> assumed to exist) in the Universe of Discourse. That kind of >> subject would be a Second. It would be a Pheme, not a Seme. >> >> That's all there is to the debate. But it touches on many abstract >> issues about Peirce's logic and semeiotic. That complexity obscured >> the threat to destroy the entire system. >> >> Summary: The only thing to remember is three brief points. >> >> (1) A Seme is a widening of Rheme (Predicate) to include nonsymbolic >> percepts. (2) But the word 'subject' is ambiguous because it could >> mean either a predicate (pure possibility) or a grammatical subject >> (something actual). (3) Allowing a Seme to refer to something actual >> would break the distinction between Firstness and Secondness. >> >> That would contradict Peirce's entire system of semeiotic. >> >
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