Francesco, Gary R., List: I agree that Peirce explicitly characterized the blank Phemic Sheet as both a Seme and a Pheme. It is a Seme in the sense that it serves as a substitute for its Object, "the Truth," for the purpose of diagramming Propositions. It is a Pheme in the sense that it represents the aggregate of all Propositions that the Graphist and Interpreter *already *take to be true, and anything scribed on it is likewise a Proposition. This reflects the fact that Seme/Pheme/Delome is a division of Signs according to the *relation *with the Final *Interpretant*, and thus has no bearing whatsoever on the *nature *of the Dynamic *Object*.
I also agree that "The mortality of man" is a Seme that serves as the *grammatical *subject of the sentence, "The mortality of man should induce everyone to be careful with EGs," and that the *logical *subject when the latter is expressed in accordance with modern predicate logic is the quantified variable. I will add that the latter *also *satisfies Peirce's definition of a Seme--it serves as a substitute for its (indefinite) Object. Moreover, an alternative and equally valid analysis would throw *everything possible* into the logical subject, treating most of the words in the original sentence as Semes and leaving only a continuous predicate as the indecomposable form of relation that marries them into a Proposition (Pheme). Finally, I agree that Peirce sought to construct his entire philosophy in a way that would *not *be vulnerable to "destruction" by removal of a single "weak link." While he clearly held that all of the *positive *sciences depend on Mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions" and "is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions" (CP 4.239-240; 1902), those other sciences--including Phenomenology and Semeiotic--involve not only Retroductively formulating and Deductively explicating their principles, but also Inductively evaluating them. As such, any and all of their results are "eminently fallible" (CP 2.227; c. 1897); and a conclusion drawn from a false premiss--even within a logically valid Argument--is liable to be false, as well. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 6:33 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Francesco, list, > > Francesco concluded: > > FB: Note [. . .] that in being both ("at one") a Seme and a Pheme, the > Sheet of Assertion is both a first and a second. Thus there is something > that admits of trans-categorial attributions, but this hardly involves a > collapse of the system. > > > Francesco, thank you for this thoughtful contribution to what has been at > times a contentious discussion. While I've no idea if it will satisfy all > parties in the discussion, I found it most helpful; or, better, it most > certainly satisfied me. > > Your concluding sentence ("Thus there is something that admits of > trans-categorial attributions, but this hardly involves a collapse of the > system.") also brought to mind this famous passage (recalling that Peirce > considered logic as semeiotic--including critical logic--to be a science > within cenoscopic philosophy): > > Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far > as to proceed only from tangible premisses which can be subjected to > careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its > arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not > form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but may be ever so > slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected (CP > 5.265). > > > However, it now occurs to me that this passage might be used in support of > either side in the recent debate. > > Best, > > Gary R > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 3:05 AM Francesco Bellucci < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Dear All, >> >> let me add the following remarks, starting from a passage in the >> "Prolegomena": >> >> "The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which thereby >> becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one, >> being a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and >> at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted be tween >> the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion, shall be >> a sheet, called the Phemic Sheet upon which [graphs can be scribed and >> erased]" ("Prolegomena", pp. 525–526) >> >> Note, first, that this is the published version of the paper, not a >> rejected draft of it. >> >> In the second place, Peirce is here saying – if I interpret him correctly >> – that the Sheet of Assertion is both a Seme and a Pheme. It is a Seme "of >> the truth"i, i.e. of the universe of discourse ("universe of reality") and >> a Pheme of that which utterer and interpreter take for granted in their >> discussion about that universe. As a Pheme, it is a proposition (like "all >> we know is true", or "there exists a universe of discourse and all we know >> about it is true", etc.). As a Seme, it is the universe of discourse to >> which all graphs scribed upon it refer. Now the question is, is the >> universe of discourse in logic a subject or a predicate? >> >> Recall that a Seme was defined in an earlier passage of the same >> published version "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute >> for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign". In >> that context, Peirce also said that the term "The mortality of man" is a >> Seme. If the subject of a sentence in ordinary language cannot be a Seme, >> what should we think of the sentence "The mortality of man should induce >> everyone to be careful with EGs"? In this sentence, that which Peirce says >> is a Seme is the grammatical subject. Of course, when formalized through >> FOL that "grammatical" subject will become a predicate, while the "logical" >> subject would be a quantified variable ("there is an x such that x is the >> mortality of man and for every y, x should induce y to be careful with >> EGs"). This Peirce was certainly aware of. But this does not prevent "the >> mortality of man" from being the subject of an ordinary sentence, and thus >> some Semes are subjects. >> >> Note, in the third place, that in being both ("at one") a Seme and a >> Pheme, the Sheet of Assertion is both a first and a second. Thus there is >> something that admits of trans-categorial attributions, but this hardly >> involves a collapse of the system. >> >> Best, >> Francesco >> >
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