Gary F, List, Gary F wrote:
GF: ". . . [that Peirce's point in two late] quotes is that observation of the phaneron requires some “mental preparation” which appears to consist of *a priori* logical analysis, and seems closely related to the logic of mathematics. This appears to contradict your [GR's] position that “phaneroscopy” employs no logic. I have never suggested that a phenomenologist observing the phenomenon should not have developed keen "mental preparation" for those acts of observation. And I have clearly stated in other threads that I think that the logic of mathematics is, in fact, extremely important in phenomenology. As Peirce suggested in several places, the logic of mathematics (including the simplest mathematics, valency theory, and the reduction thesis) hints at the possibility of monads, dyads, and triads appearing in the phaneron. That is to say, that phenomenologists ought to be expecting for -adicity in their phaneroscopic observations. For Peirce the consequence of this "mental preparation" was his positing Three Universal Categories. But as he suggested (and Andre de Tienne argues), there is much more work to be done in Phenomenology. GF: The proposal to distinguish other sciences (in your case, Trichotomic and Iconoscopy) from phaneroscopy, rather than lumping them all together under Peirce’s term “Phaneroscopy,” struck me as an alternative terminological option, so I mentioned it as such, along with a cursory explanation of why I personally haven’t chosen that option. I didn’t realize that for you it’s a much more substantive issue, one that clearly matters more to you than it does to me. I stand corrected on that point. I thought I'd been perfectly clear on this, not only recently but over the past *many* years. I have in fact explicitly stated that I thought that phaneroscopy (considered as the pure observational part of phenomenology) was patently insufficient for adequately developing a phenomenology out of that "science-egg" which Peirce merely adumbrated, or, at best, outlined (including matters related to methodology). GF: But again, I’m only trying to clarify what Peirce himself said about phaneroscopy in 1905-6. I’m not trying to present an original or controversial “interpretation” of what Peirce said, but anyone who wants to do that in this thread is welcome to do so, as far as I’m concerned. This seems to me to be somewhat disingenuous, as if your explicating Peirce's 1905-6 comments on phaneroscopy represents the Peircean view, and that other views would, rather, represent a "controversial 'interpretation' of what Peirce said. How about *the alternative view of Peirce *that phaneroscopy/phenomenology as he had developed it was yet but a science-egg needing further development. Putting forth possible avenues for development of Peirce's phenomenogy is quite different from offering a mere "controversial 'interpretation'." "Original" it may be, but only in the sense of offering possibly fruitful abductions. in any event, what Andre and I are offering are not 'interpretations', but possible approaches to developing Peirce's Phenomenology further. GF: ". . .this sequence of Peirce texts I’m posting leads directly to a couple of texts from early 1906, which Peirce himself flagged as representing a major shift in his thinking about Existential Graphs and their connection with his brand of pragmatism. In order to appreciate that shift, we need to be more familiar with terms like “phaneron,” “medad” etc., and with some basic features of EGs, than most of us are. "Existential Graphs" and "Pragmatism" represent features (aspects or facets) of Logic as Semeiotic--respectively, Critical Logic, and Methodeutic (Theoretical Rhetoric). Although they may retrospectively be related to notions like "phaneron" (in Phenomenology) and "medad" (in the logic of mathematics), EGs and Pragmatism are clearly *not* facets of Phenomenology. GF: In short, if you’re still interested in this thread, I’m interested in hearing what you have to say about the Peirce texts I’m posting. I had hoped for a* very* different thread on Phenomenology. Of course you are free to proceed as you wish. But, while I'll continue to read the texts that you'll be posting, since I don't see that my central interests are likely going to be addressed as anything more than "controversial 'interpretations'," I'm going to drop out of actively participating in this thread. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 8:20 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list, > > One reason I started this thread was to work out, by close study of > Peirce’s texts, how his phaneroscopy is *different* from my own approach > to phenomenology. I started posting it because I thought others might be > interested in a close look at Peirce’s treatment of the subject, and my > commentary on the quotes I’ve posted is not intended to say anything > controversial. I used the subject line “Phaneroscopy and logic” because, > first, I’m assuming that Peirce is writing about phaneroscopy in the two > quotes I’ve shared from EP2 — since he is explicitly talking about > “observation of the phaneron” — and, second, because his main point in both > quotes is that observation of the phaneron requires some “mental > preparation” which appears to consist of *a priori* logical analysis, and > seems closely related to the logic of mathematics. This appears to > contradict your position that “phaneroscopy” employs no logic. > > The proposal to distinguish other sciences (in your case, Trichotomic and > Iconoscopy) from phaneroscopy, rather than lumping them all together under > Peirce’s term “Phaneroscopy,” struck me as an alternative terminological > option, so I mentioned it as such, along with a cursory explanation of why > I personally haven’t chosen that option. I didn’t realize that for you it’s > a much more substantive issue, one that clearly matters more to you than it > does to me. I stand corrected on that point. But again, I’m only trying to > clarify what Peirce himself said about phaneroscopy in 1905-6. I’m not > trying to present an original or controversial “interpretation” of what > Peirce said, but anyone who wants to do that in this thread is welcome to > do so, as far as I’m concerned. > > I do have one other motivation for continuing this thread: this sequence > of Peirce texts I’m posting leads directly to a couple of texts from early > 1906, which Peirce himself flagged as representing a major shift in his > thinking about Existential Graphs and their connection with his brand of > pragmatism. In order to appreciate that shift, we need to be more familiar > with terms like “phaneron,” “medad” etc., and with some basic features of > EGs, than most of us are. I don’t expect that *everyone* on the list is > interested in what I’m calling a “major shift” in Peirce’s thinking, or in > phaneroscopy, but if anyone is, I can’t think of a better way to elucidate > it than by posting these Peirce texts (with whatever commentary seems > called for). > > In short, if you’re still interested in this thread, I’m interested in > hearing what you have to say about the Peirce texts I’m posting. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 26-Mar-19 17:24 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic > > > > Gary F, List, > > > > I would like to ask a question about the general purpose of your inquiry. > You wrote: > > > > GF: ". . .Peirce’s phaneroscopic observation leads us directly into > logical analysis — so directly that, in my view, logical analysis is in > practice *part* of phaneroscopy. (There are other versions of > *phenomenology* in which such analysis is not so directly involved — > which is why I have described Peirce’s brand of phenomenology as more > analytical than others.) If we ask how logic, or logic as semeiotic, can > *depend *on phaneroscopy as Peirce says it does, the only way we can > avoid circularity is to say that *logica docens* does depend on > phaneroscopy, but the latter makes use of a *logica utens* as part of its > process. (Or, as has been suggested, we can give other names to parts of > the process; but personally I’d rather not introduce even more terminology > into an already jargon-filled discourse.) > > > > > > First, when you write "we can give other names to parts of the process; > but personally I’d rather not introduce even more terminology into an > already jargon-filled discourse," what exactly are you referring to? It > sounds to me like you are perhaps pointing to Andre de Tienne's Iconoscopy > and, perhaps, my Trichotomic (Category Theory) as well. If so, what those > two speculative moves represent to de Tienne and me is not "even more > terminology into an already jargon-filled discourse" but, rather, a very > different way of conceiving Peirce's Phenomenology than it appears that you > are. Using a trikon, this might be diagrammed: > > > > Phaneroscopy (purely observational; employs no logic) > > |>Trichotomic (employs a logica utens) > > Iconoscopy (employs a logica utens) > > > > If you are to exclude these very different ways of conceiving a fully > developed Phenomenology (not just the science-egg that Peirce referred to) > from your considerations from the get go, then I, at least, would hardly > find it of any value to participate in your discussion.To leap to the > conclusion, if that is what you're doing, that to take up "Iconoscopy" and > "Trichotomic Category Theory" is merely to introduce "jargon- filled" > terminology severely limits your inquiry in my opinion, at least as much of > it as might include discussion with others on this list who see things > differently. > > > > (Btw, I'll be in Milford in a very few weeks for a conference around the > dedication of the Peirce monument at the Peirce grave site in that town, > and hope to ask Andre about his current thoughts regarding Iconoscopy; > since I have found some of Richard Adkin's thoughts as expressed in his > book,* Peirce's Phenomenology*, problematic, I hope to engage him in > Milford as well). > > > > Not everyone--including me--would agree with you that "logical analysis > is in practice *part* of phaneroscopy," and that is why de Tienne wrote > Iconoscopy, and subtitled it "Between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic." Of > course it all depends on how you define 'phanersocopy', as the whole of > Peirce science-egg, or as the first branch of it. > > > > GF: If we ask how logic, or logic as semeiotic, can *depend *on > phaneroscopy as Peirce says it does, the only way we can avoid circularity > is to say that *logica docens* does depend on phaneroscopy, but the > latter makes use of a *logica utens* as part of its process. > > > > So the use of a logica utens as "parts of the process" of phaneroscopy as > you put it, is not, it seems to me the position which de Tienne holds, and > it is certainly not the position I hold since, again, both of us see > phaneroscopy as but the first observational branch of the science. Writing > of the two branches of Phenomenology which he's so far considered, de > Tienne writes: "Since observation must be single-minded and pure, > description will be devoid of speculations of any sort, and will only be an > honest account of whatever was observed" (*Is Phaneroscopy,* etc.) It is > rather in that other (or possible two other branches) where a logica utens > is essential and plays a major role. One can employ analyses involving > logica docens in ways which I have called retrospective or reflective; but > that is a work of logic as semeiotic, not phenomenology. > > > > I ask these questions because, as you know, I have a keen interest in > Peirce's Phenomenology and would like to contribute to the discussion. Your > comments in this, your second post on the topic, make me feel that you have > a very different purpose in mind than soliciting discussion with others who > may disagree with your interpretation of Peirce's phenomenology. So, again, > please clarify, if you would, your purpose in introducing a thread with the > Subject 'Phaneroscopy and Logic'. For I see no logic in Phaneroscopy at all > *unless* it is being used as the name of Peirce's *first cenoscopic > science taken in toto* (Beverly Kent, 1987, offers these alternative > terms Peirce used for the science: Phaneroscopy; Phenomenology; Empirics; > High Philosophy; Phanerochemy; Protoscopy). The use of a logica utens > occurs *after* the initial Phaneroscopic observations in my opinion and, > I believe, de Tienne's. > > > > As he writes in "Is Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?" > > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf > > > > De Tienne: Phaneroscopists. . . strive to replicate merely the body of > descriptive propositions without attempting to inscribe it in another > discourse (or argument). In so doing, they have the double advantage of > keeping their description iconically faithful to what they observe > single-mindedly (assertions are not single-minded), and of being able to > claim that what they observe and describe can be equally observed and > described by any other phaneroscopist. Peirce is confident that everybody > will find the same general elements in the phaneron as his; and if > phaneroscopists do not have to insist on the universality of those > elements, it is precisely because everybody’s individual experience is a > replica of the same general experience, and each individual description > will be a replica of the same general description attached to the general > Phaneron. > > > > A contradictor might object that the propositions of phaneroscopy are > affirmations, and thus assertions. But it is not so: phaneroscopic > propositions are not categorical; they do not state that something is the > case, but that something seems to be the case. It happens that “we cannot > doubt that that really seems which seems to seem” (CP 7.36n13, c.1907). > Phaneroscopic propositions cannot be doubted — but only by the > phaneroscopists! They are unable to express a doubt since they cannot make > assertions. They can only record the seeming honestly. > > > > So, De Tienne concludes on a note which I earlier iterated in another > thread. > > > > Can a phaneroscopist doubt the seeming that appears to a colleague of his? > No, he cannot either, both because his colleague is equally honest and > single-minded, and because the latter cannot doubt what seems to himself. > This is why Peirce contends that “all those reflections about possible > doubts originate rather with the logician when it is a question of > appealing to phenomenology than in any emphatic assertions of the > phenomenologist himself” (NEM IV: 196). Logicians make assertions, so they > may doubt the phaneroscopist’s propositions, but only as logicians, not as > phaneroscopists. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 10:55 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, > > First I’d like to thank Jon A.S. and Francesco Bellucci for their posts in > another thread which help to clear up a basic misconception about Peirce’s > application of his categories to his semiotic analysis. To further my aim > of getting “back to basics” in this thread, I’ll try to state one key point > in more general terms: > > Each of the ten trichotomies in Peirce’s late classification of signs can > be (and usually is) arranged in order of increasing complexity. Within each > trichotomy, the simplest sign type is “first” *in relation to the other > two*. Thus *Seme* is first in the trichotomy Seme/Pheme/Delome. But that > is the *only* sense in which “A Seme is a First” (as John S. put it). > Only one trichotomy of signs — Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign (as Peirce called > them in 1903) — is made according to the “mode of being” or ontological > nature of the sign itself as possible/actual/necessary. All the other > trichotomies classify signs according to their various relations to the > other correlates within the basic triadic relation > Sign-Object-Interpretant. Within the Seme/Pheme/Delome trichotomy, which > (as Jon said) is made according to the sign’s relation to its interpretant, > the Seme is certainly *not* First in an ontological sense as claimed by > John S. > > This feature of Peirce’s trichotomic analyses should be borne in mind as > we look further into his development of the “valency” analogy. The next > Peirce text I’m selecting from here was “probably written in December 1905” > according to EP2, where it is Selection 26, “The Basis of Pragmaticism in > Phaneroscopy.” I have highlighted certain key terms by using *bold* type; > the *italics* are Peirce’s (i.e. they mark words he underlined in the > manuscript). > > [[ I propose to use the word *Phaneron* as a proper name to denote the > total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any > other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of > its cognitive value. This is pretty vague: I intentionally leave it so. I > will only point out that I do *not* limit the reference to an > instantaneous state of consciousness; for the clause “in any way whatever” > takes in memory and all habitual cognition. The reader will probably wonder > why I did not content myself with some expression already in use. The > reason is that the absence of any contiguous associations with the new word > will render it sharper and clearer than any well-worn coin could be. > > I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron (which > will be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to discover > what different *forms of indecomposable elements* it contains. On account > of the general interest of this inquiry, I propose to push it further than > the question of pragmaticism requires; but I shall be forced to compress my > matter excessively. It will be a work of observation. But in order that a > work of observation should bring in any considerable harvest, there must > always be a *preparation of thought*, a consideration, as definite as may > be, of what it is possible that observation should disclose. That is a > principle familiar to every observer. Even if one is destined to be quite > surprised, the preparation will be of mighty aid. > > As such preparation for our survey, then, let us consider what forms of > indecomposable elements it is possible that we should find. The expression > “indecomposable element” sounds pleonastic; but it is not so, since I mean > by it something which *not only is elementary, since it seems so*, and > seeming is the only being a constituent of the Phaneron has, as such, but > is moreover *incapable of being separated by logical analysis into parts*, > whether they be substantial, essential, relative, or any other kind of > parts. Thus, a cow inattentively regarded may perhaps be an element of the > Phaneron; but whether it can be so or not, it is certain that it can be > analyzed logically into many parts of different kinds that are not in it as > a constituent of the Phaneron, since they were not in mind in the same way > as the cow was, nor in any way in which the cow, as an appearance in the > Phaneron, could be said to be formed of these parts. We are to consider > what *forms* are possible, rather than what *kinds* are possible, because > it is universally admitted, in all sorts of inquiries, that the most > important divisions are divisions according to form, and not according to > qualities of *matter*, in case division according to form is possible at > all. Indeed, this necessarily results from the very idea of the distinction > between *form* and *matter*. If we content ourselves with the usual > statement of this idea, the consequence is quite obvious. A doubt may, > however, arise whether any distinction of form is possible among > indecomposable elements. But since a possibility is proved as soon as a > single actual instance is found, it will suffice to remark that *although > the chemical atoms were until quite recently conceived to be, each of them, > quite indecomposable and homogeneous, yet they have for half a century been > known to differ from one another, not indeed in internal form, but in > external form.* Carbon, for example, is a tetrad, combining only in the > form [CH4] (marsh gas), that is, with four bonds with monads (such as is > H) or their equivalent; boron is a triad, forming by the action of > magnesium on boracic anhydride, [H3B], and never combining with any other > valency; glucinum [the old name for beryllium] is a dyad, forming [GCl2], > as the vapor-density of this salt, corroborated by many other tests, > conclusively shows, and it, too, always has the same valency; lithium forms > LiH and LiI and Li3N, and is invariably a monad: and finally helion, > neon, argon, krypton, and xenon are medads, not entering into atomic > combination at all. We conclude, then, that there is a fair antecedent > reason to suspect that the Phaneron's indecomposable elements may likewise > have analogous differences of external form. Should we find this > possibility to be actualized, it will, beyond all dispute, furnish us with > by far the most important of all divisions of such elements. ]] > > A *tetrad* (valency 4) is called so because it forms four bonds with > *monads*, i.e. with atoms that form only single bonds with anything else. > A *triad* (valency 3) forms three bonds with monads, and a *dyad* > (valency 2) forms two bonds with monads. Peirce is proposing that this > division of the chemical elements according to their *external form* > (i.e. their mode of combination with other atoms) can serve as a > hypothetical model for a division of indecomposable elements of the > phaneron. This is the preparation which (we hope) “will be of mighty aid” > for the *observation of the phaneron* which is the inductive stage of the > science of phaneroscopy. > > In practice, the key to such observation of the phaneron is the *control > of attention*. “Thus, a cow inattentively regarded may perhaps be an > element of the Phaneron,” but since it can be analyzed in many ways, it is > certainly not an *indecomposable* element. This shows that Peirce’s > phaneroscopic observation leads us directly into logical analysis — so > directly that, in my view, logical analysis is in practice *part* of > phaneroscopy. (There are other versions of *phenomenology* in which such > analysis is not so directly involved — which is why I have described > Peirce’s brand of phenomenology as more analytical than others.) If we ask > how logic, or logic as semeiotic, can *depend* on phaneroscopy as Peirce > says it does, the only way we can avoid circularity is to say that *logica > docens* does depend on phaneroscopy, but the latter makes use of a *logica > utens* as part of its process. (Or, as has been suggested, we can give > other names to parts of the process; but personally I’d rather not > introduce even more terminology into an already jargon-filled discourse.) > > There are probably other questions raised by the excerpt above, or by my > commentary, so I’ll stop here for today to see if anyone wants to raise > them before we continue. > > Gary f. > >
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