Gary F, Jon, List, Gary F wrote:
GF: According to the OED, to *posit* (transitive) is “To put forward or assume as fact or as a basis for argument, to presuppose; to postulate; to affirm the existence of.” To me that is quite different from proposing a hypothesis to be tested inductively. While the definition I would offer is slightly different: Posit: *noun* PHILOSOPHY 1. 1. a statement which is made on the assumption that it will prove to be true. 2. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/posit 3. I would agree that to posit something, even if, as Peirce did, after decades of working on a central idea like there being Three Universal Categories, is different from "proposing a hypothesis to be tested inductively." GR: For Peirce the consequence of this "mental preparation" was his positing Three Universal Categories. GF: I don’t see that as an accurate description of what Peirce does in the text we are looking at. He is not “positing” anything there; rather, as he says, what he does is to “recommend that the hypothesis of the indecomposable elements of the Phaneron being in their general constitution like the chemical atoms be taken up as a hypothesis with a view to its being subjected to the test of an inductive inquiry.” But what I wrote above generalized what Peirce had accomplished for *himself *not thinking in particular of the passage you were looking at in which he was guiding his reader through a process leading to their own possible positing of three categories. As you wrote: We all know, of course, that Peirce had arrived at his triad of Universal Categories long before 1905. But he is unwilling to apply this *a priori* triad to the elements of the phaneron without asking the reader to think it through for himself and thus to see *why *we should expect to find three indecomposable elements, no more and no less, in the phaneron. Let me take this opportunity to publicly apologize to you, Gary, for I had unfairly conflated my purposes in considering phenomenology with yours. A while back you had suggested that you might soon take up a thread on phenomenology and I eagerly anticipated participating in what I thought might be a wide-ranging discussion of many facets of the science. When you eventually did begin the thread you had decided on another approach, and you began the thread with this: GF: For this post I’ve chosen the following quote from Peirce, which I found in Ketner’s book *His Glassy Essence*, p. 327. Ketner identifies it as an “autobiographical scrap” found among the Max Fisch papers, F64:104 Of course you had every right and reasons of your own to begin however you wished. But, as I acknowledged off-list, I was surprised and, personally, disappointed that you had narrowed--as I saw it--the discussion of phenomenology in this way and from the "get go." Well, that was patently unfair of me. Yet, beyond that, I was downright perplexed when in another post in the thread you parenthetically wrote: GR: (Or, as has been suggested, we can give other names to parts of the process; but personally I’d rather not introduce even more terminology into an already jargon-filled discourse.) I rather assumed, although you hadn't named those who had given "other names to parts of the process," that you were referring to Andre de Tienne (Iconoscopy) and, perhaps, me (Trichotomic Category Theory) as both of these are intended to go beyond individual phaneroscopic observation. I had no right to assume that whatsoever. But I couldn't think of whatever "terminology" you might be referring to in this context. And further, again in my mind, that since you'd written "(Or, as has been suggested, we can give other names to parts of the process; but personally I’d rather not introduce even more terminology into an already jargon-filled discourse)" I interpreted this as suggesting that you had reduced those possible "parts of the process" to mere "jargon-filled" terminology. Of course you hadn't, as you explained: you simply had an entirely different purpose. As you wrote: Gary R apparently did not *intend* has statement to be an accurate description of what Peirce is doing in this text; indeed, as he says, he “had hoped for a* very* different thread on Phenomenology,” and his statement about “positing Three Universal Categories” really belongs to that *other* thread rather than this one. So I hope that will clear up any confusion on that matter, and perhaps Gary R will start a separate thread on “possible approaches to developing Peirce's Phenomenology further.” That pretty much sums it up. So, again, my apologies to a scholar whom anyone who has followed this list for some time knows I have nothing but the utmost respect for. It was my foolish "jumping to conclusions" which led me to post inappropriately combative messages in the thread. Finally, as does Jon--and I hope others--I look forward to turning to your addressing a significant shift in Peirce's thinking about EGs and their connection to his pragmaticism. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 7:45 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > According to the OED, to *posit* (transitive) is “To put forward or > assume as fact or as a basis for argument, to presuppose; to postulate; to > affirm the existence of.” To me that is quite different from proposing a > hypothesis to be tested inductively. In the text below, he first considers > the possibility that all elements of the Phaneron should be triads. > (Notice, by the way, that he calls this a “subjective possibility,” a term > that will play a key role in the ‘turning point’ text which this thread is > leading up to.) He then applies *a priori* reasoning, specifically a *reductio > ad absurdum*, to add the possibility of Secundans and Primans to the > hypothesis, and finally to eliminate the possibility of an > *indecomposable* Tetrad. Only then is ready to begin testing the > hypothesis by “actual examination of the contents of the Phaneron.” > > We all know, of course, that Peirce had arrived at his triad of Universal > Categories long before 1905. But he is unwilling to apply this *a priori* > triad to the elements of the phaneron without asking the reader to think it > through for himself and thus to see *why* we should expect to find three > indecomposable elements, no more and no less, in the phaneron. So he is > giving us a guided tour through a reasoning process that leads to that > conclusion; and that process may differ in a number of ways from the > process that led Peirce to that conclusion many years before. > > Today I intended to continue with the text verbatim, but I may summarize > it instead and move on to the next text in which the concept of valency > plays a central role. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 27-Mar-19 16:25 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic > > > > Gary R., Gary F., List: > > > > GR: For Peirce the consequence of this "mental preparation" was his > positing Three Universal Categories. > > > > GF: I don’t see that as an accurate description of what Peirce does in > the text we are looking at. He is not “positing” anything there; rather, as > he says, what he does is to “recommend that the hypothesis of the > indecomposable elements of the Phaneron being in their general constitution > like the chemical atoms be taken up as a hypothesis with a view to its > being subjected to the test of an inductive inquiry.” > > > > What is the difference between positing the three Categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) > and recommending the hypothesis that there are three indecomposable > elements of the Phaneron (Priman/Secundan/Tertian)? It seems to me that > those are just two different ways of saying the same thing, but maybe I am > missing something, as admittedly tends to be the case when Peirce's > Phenomenology is the topic of discussion. However, as you might imagine, I > am looking forward to seeing the "texts from early 1906, which Peirce > himself flagged as representing a major shift in his thinking about > Existential Graphs and their connection with his brand of pragmatism." > > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > > > On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 2:13 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, Gary R, > > Continuing from where we left off (EP2:364), Peirce is still doing the > abductive work of framing a hypothesis to be inductively tested by > observation of the phaneron. This time I’ll continue his text up to the > point where he says the work of observation can begin (EP2:366). After that > I’ll try to address some of Gary R’s objections to my comments on this > text. I do *not* recommend skipping or skimming over Peirce’s text to get > to my comments, which are really nothing more than footnotes to what Peirce > is saying here about phaneroscopy. > > [[ So far as our study has now gone, then, it appears possible that all > elements > of the Phaneron should be triads. But an obvious principle which is as > purely *a priori* as a principle well can be, since it is involved in the > very idea of the Phaneron as containing constituents of which some are > logically unanalyzable and others analyzable, promptly reduces that > subjective possibility to an absurdity. I mean the principle that whatever > is logically involved in an ingredient of the Phaneron is itself an > ingredient of the Phaneron; for it is in the mind even though it be only > implicitly so. Suppose then a Triad to be in the Phaneron. It connects > three objects, *A, B, C*, however indefinite *A, B*, and *C* may be. > There must, then, be one of the three, at least, say *C*, which > establishes a relation between the other two, *A* and *B*. The result is > that *A* and *B* are in a dyadic relation, and *C* may be ignored, even > if it cannot be supposed absent. Now this dyadic relation between *A* and > *B*, without reference to any third, involves a Secundan. In like manner, > in order that there may be a Secundan, so that *A* and *B* are in some > sense opposed, and neither is swallowed up in the other,—or even if only > one of them had such an independent standing, it must be capable of being > regarded as more or less determinate and positive in itself, and so > involves Primanity. This Primanity supposes a Priman element; so that the > suggestion that no elements should be Primans is absurd, as is the > suggestion that no elements should be Secundans. > > This same principle may be applied in the same way to any Tetradic > constituent of the Phaneron. But if we expect it to lead to an analogous > conclusion we shall find ourselves out of that dead reckoning. Suppose a > Tetrad in the Phaneron. Now just as the being of a Tertian consists > precisely in its connecting the members of a triplet, so that two of them > are united in the third, so the Quartanness of the tetrad will consist in > its connecting the members of a quaternion, say *A, B, C, D*, and in > nothing else. That is precisely its form. As the triad involves dyads, so > likewise does the tetrad. Let *A, B* be the objects of such a dyad. The > tetrad is more than a mere dyad for those objects. I mean that it not only > makes one of them determine the other in some regard, after the manner of > dyads, or,—to use the word which we are in the habit of using only in > reference to the more characteristic kinds of dyads, but which I will > extend for the nonce to all dyads, in order to call up my idea in the > reader's mind,—the tetrad not only makes *A* to “act” upon *B* (or *B* > upon *A*), but, like a triad, indeed as involving Tertianity (just as we > have seen that a triad involves Secundanity), it puts together *A* and *B*, > so that they make up a third object,— to continue my method of expression > by stretching the extension of terms, I might say, so that they “create” a > third, namely the pair, understood as involving all that the tetrad implies > concerning these two prescinded from *C* and *D*. Moreover the tetrad > involves a dyad, one of whose objects is this pair of *A* and *B*, while > the other is either *C* or *D*, say *C*. Here again the tetrad makes the > dyad more than a mere dyad, since it unites *C* to the pair of *A* and *B*, > and makes them create a new object, *their* pair. And finally it unites > this last pair to *D*. Thus, the entire function of the tetrad is > performed by a series of Triads; and consequently, there can be no > unanalyzable tetrad, nothing to be called a *quartan* element of the > Phaneron. Plainly, the same process will exclude *quintanity, sextanity, > septanity*, and all higher forms of indecomposable elements from the > Phaneron. > > To many a reader this reasoning will appear obscure and inconclusive. This > effect is due to the argument's turning upon such a complex of prescissive > abstractions; for an abstract concept is essentially indefinite. Now the > reader would not have been a reader of this paper unless he had had the > intellectual virtue of striving to give definite interpretations to > concepts. But it often happens that this virtue being coupled with a > particular natural turn of mind, breeds an intellectual vice, the bad habit > of dropping all lines of study which largely introduce indefinite concepts, > so that those who contract this habit never gain a proper training in > handling such concepts. This is by no means the only difficulty of > mathematics, which incessantly employs them, but it is perhaps the chief > reason why we find among particularly able professional men, and even among > thinkers, so many who are completely shut off from mathematics. But those > whom this demonstration fails to reach may find themselves convinced by the > facts of observation when we come to consider them. > > Some will ask whether, if every tetrad can be built up out of triads, it > must not be equally true that every triad can be built up out of dyads. The > reason has already been stated, namely, that nothing can be built up out of > other things without combining those other things, and combination is > itself manifestly a triad. But those who do not see the force of this > reason had better try to build up a chemical triad, that is, a connected > group with three free bonds, out of chemical dyads, while observing the law > of valency. > > Much might be profitably added to this preliminary *a priori* study; but > even with the greatest compression I shall cover too many of the valuable > pages of the *Monist*. We must hasten, then, to try how well or ill our *a > priori* conclusions are supported by the actual examination of the > contents of the Phaneron. Let us begin at once. ]] > > This is where we will pick up the thread next time. In response to my > previous post, Gary R objected to my comments about the scope of the term > “Phaneroscopy.” He proposed > > [[ a very different way of conceiving Peirce's Phenomenology than it > appears that you are. Using a trikon, this might be diagrammed: > > Phaneroscopy (purely observational; employs no logic) > > |>Trichotomic (employs a logica utens) > > Iconoscopy (employs a logica utens) ]] > > My reply was that the Peirce text I’ve been posting is all about the > logical analysis that *precedes* observation of the phaneron, which “appears > to contradict your [Gary R’s] position that ‘phaneroscopy’ employs no > logic.” Gary R’s reply to that was: “I have never suggested that a > phenomenologist observing the phenomenon should not have developed keen > "mental preparation" for those acts of observation. And I have clearly > stated in other threads that I think that the logic of mathematics is, in > fact, extremely important in phenomenology. … For Peirce the consequence of > this "mental preparation" was his positing Three Universal Categories.” I > don’t see that as an accurate description of what Peirce does in the text > we are looking at. He is not “positing” anything there; rather, as he says, > what he does is to “recommend that the hypothesis of the indecomposable > elements of the Phaneron being in their general constitution like the > chemical atoms be taken up as a hypothesis with a view to its being > subjected to the test of an inductive inquiry.” > > Anyway, Gary R apparently did not *intend* has statement to be an > accurate description of what Peirce is doing in this text; indeed, as he > says, he “had hoped for a* very* different thread on Phenomenology,” and > his statement about “positing Three Universal Categories” really belongs to > that *other* thread rather than this one. So I hope that will clear up > any confusion on that matter, and perhaps Gary R will start a separate > thread on “possible approaches to developing Peirce's Phenomenology > further.” In the meantime I’ll welcome any questions about the priman, > Secundan and Tertian elements of the phaneron, prescissive abstraction, or > any of the other concepts Peirce is working with above. > > Gary f. > >
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