Gary R., Gary F., List:

GR:  For Peirce the consequence of this "mental preparation" was his
positing Three Universal Categories.


GF:  I don’t see that as an accurate description of what Peirce does in the
text we are looking at. He is not “positing” anything there; rather, as he
says, what he does is to “recommend that the hypothesis of the
indecomposable elements of the Phaneron being in their general constitution
like the chemical atoms be taken up as a hypothesis with a view to its
being subjected to the test of an inductive inquiry.”


What is the difference between positing the three Categories (1ns/2ns/3ns)
and recommending the hypothesis that there are three indecomposable
elements of the Phaneron (Priman/Secundan/Tertian)?  It seems to me that
those are just two different ways of saying the same thing, but maybe I am
missing something, as admittedly tends to be the case when Peirce's
Phenomenology is the topic of discussion.  However, as you might imagine, I
am looking forward to seeing the "texts from early 1906, which Peirce
himself flagged as representing a major shift in his thinking about
Existential Graphs and their connection with his brand of pragmatism."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 2:13 PM <[email protected]> wrote:

> List, Gary R,
>
> Continuing from where we left off (EP2:364), Peirce is still doing the
> abductive work of framing a hypothesis to be inductively tested by
> observation of the phaneron. This time I’ll continue his text up to the
> point where he says the work of observation can begin (EP2:366). After that
> I’ll try to address some of Gary R’s objections to my comments on this
> text. I do *not* recommend skipping or skimming over Peirce’s text to get
> to my comments, which are really nothing more than footnotes to what Peirce
> is saying here about phaneroscopy.
>
> [[ So far as our study has now gone, then, it appears possible that all
> eiements of the Phaneron should be triads. But an obvious principle which
> is as purely *a priori* as a principle well can be, since it is involved
> in the very idea of the Phaneron as containing constituents of which some
> are logically unanalyzable and others analyzable, promptly reduces that
> subjective possibility to an absurdity. I mean the principle that whatever
> is logically involved in an ingredient of the Phaneron is itself an
> ingredient of the Phaneron; for it is in the mind even though it be only
> implicitly so. Suppose then a Triad to be in the Phaneron. It connects
> three objects, *A, B, C*, however indefinite *A, B*, and *C* may be.
> There must, then, be one of the three, at least, say *C*, which
> establishes a relation between the other two, *A* and *B*. The result is
> that *A* and *B* are in a dyadic relation, and *C* may be ignored, even
> if it cannot be supposed absent. Now this dyadic relation between *A* and
> *B*, without reference to any third, involves a Secundan. In like manner,
> in order that there may be a Secundan, so that *A* and *B* are in some
> sense opposed, and neither is swallowed up in the other,—or even if only
> one of them had such an independent standing, it must be capable of being
> regarded as more or less determinate and positive in itself, and so
> involves Primanity. This Primanity supposes a Priman element; so that the
> suggestion that no elements should be Primans is absurd, as is the
> suggestion that no elements should be Secundans.
>
> This same principle may be applied in the same way to any Tetradic
> constituent of the Phaneron. But if we expect it to lead to an analogous
> conclusion we shall find ourselves out of that dead reckoning. Suppose a
> Tetrad in the Phaneron. Now just as the being of a Tertian consists
> precisely in its connecting the members of a triplet, so that two of them
> are united in the third, so the Quartanness of the tetrad will consist in
> its connecting the members of a quaternion, say *A, B, C, D*, and in
> nothing else. That is precisely its form. As the triad involves dyads, so
> likewise does the tetrad. Let *A, B* be the objects of such a dyad. The
> tetrad is more than a mere dyad for those objects. I mean that it not only
> makes one of them determine the other in some regard, after the manner of
> dyads, or,—to use the word which we are in the habit of using only in
> reference to the more characteristic kinds of dyads, but which I will
> extend for the nonce to all dyads, in order to call up my idea in the
> reader's mind,—the tetrad not only makes *A* to “act” upon *B* (or *B*
> upon *A*), but, like a triad, indeed as involving Tertianity (just as we
> have seen that a triad involves Secundanity), it puts together *A* and *B*,
> so that they make up a third object,— to continue my method of expression
> by stretching the extension of terms, I might say, so that they “create” a
> third, namely the pair, understood as involving all that the tetrad implies
> concerning these two prescinded from *C* and *D*. Moreover the tetrad
> involves a dyad, one of whose objects is this pair of *A* and *B*, while
> the other is either *C* or *D*, say *C*. Here again the tetrad makes the
> dyad more than a mere dyad, since it unites *C* to the pair of *A* and *B*,
> and makes them create a new object, *their* pair. And finally it unites
> this last pair to *D*. Thus, the entire function of the tetrad is
> performed by a series of Triads; and consequently, there can be no
> unanalyzable tetrad, nothing to be called a *quartan* element of the
> Phaneron. Plainly, the same process will exclude *quintanity, sextanity,
> septanity*, and all higher forms of indecomposable elements from the
> Phaneron.
>
> To many a reader this reasoning will appear obscure and inconclusive. This
> effect is due to the argument's turning upon such a complex of prescissive
> abstractions; for an abstract concept is essentially indefinite. Now the
> reader would not have been a reader of this paper unless he had had the
> intellectual virtue of striving to give definite interpretations to
> concepts. But it often happens that this virtue being coupled with a
> particular natural turn of mind, breeds an intellectual vice, the bad habit
> of dropping all lines of study which largely introduce indefinite concepts,
> so that those who contract this habit never gain a proper training in
> handling such concepts. This is by no means the only difficulty of
> mathematics, which incessantly employs them, but it is perhaps the chief
> reason why we find among particularly able professional men, and even among
> thinkers, so many who are completely shut off from mathematics. But those
> whom this demonstration fails to reach may find themselves convinced by the
> facts of observation when we come to consider them.
>
> Some will ask whether, if every tetrad can be built up out of triads, it
> must not be equally true that every triad can be built up out of dyads. The
> reason has already been stated, namely, that nothing can be built up out of
> other things without combining those other things, and combination is
> itself manifestly a triad. But those who do not see the force of this
> reason had better try to build up a chemical triad, that is, a connected
> group with three free bonds, out of chemical dyads, while observing the law
> of valency.
>
> Much might be profitably added to this preliminary *a priori* study; but
> even with the greatest compression I shall cover too many of the valuable
> pages of the *Monist*. We must hasten, then, to try how well or ill our *a
> priori* conclusions are supported by the actual examination of the
> contents of the Phaneron. Let us begin at once.  ]]
>
> This is where we will pick up the thread next time. In response to my
> previous post, Gary R objected to my comments about the scope of the term
> “Phaneroscopy.” He proposed
>
> [[  a very different way of conceiving Peirce's Phenomenology than it
> appears that you are. Using a trikon, this might be diagrammed:
>
> Phaneroscopy (purely observational; employs no logic)
>
> |>Trichotomic (employs a logica utens)
>
> Iconoscopy (employs a logica utens) ]]
>
> My reply was that the Peirce text I’ve been posting is all about the
> logical analysis that *precedes* observation of the phaneron, which “appears
> to contradict your [Gary R’s] position that ‘phaneroscopy’ employs no
> logic.” Gary R’s reply to that was: “I have never suggested that a
> phenomenologist observing the phenomenon should not have developed keen
> "mental preparation" for those acts of observation. And I have clearly
> stated in other threads that I think that the logic of mathematics is, in
> fact, extremely important in phenomenology. … For Peirce the consequence of
> this "mental preparation" was his positing Three Universal Categories.” I
> don’t see that as an accurate description of what Peirce does in the text
> we are looking at. He is not “positing” anything there; rather, as he says,
> what he does is to “recommend that the hypothesis of the indecomposable
> elements of the Phaneron being in their general constitution like the
> chemical atoms be taken up as a hypothesis with a view to its being
> subjected to the test of an inductive inquiry.”
>
> Anyway, Gary R apparently did not *intend* has statement to be an
> accurate description of what Peirce is doing in this text; indeed, as he
> says, he “had hoped for a* very* different thread on Phenomenology,” and
> his statement about “positing Three Universal Categories” really belongs to
> that *other* thread rather than this one. So I hope that will clear up
> any confusion on that matter, and perhaps Gary R will start a separate
> thread on “possible approaches to developing Peirce's Phenomenology
> further.” In the meantime I’ll welcome any questions about the priman,
> Secundan and Tertian elements of the phaneron, prescissive abstraction, or
> any of the other concepts Peirce is working with above.
>
> Gary f.
>
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