Gary R, Jon, list, GR: That Peirce expresses the relation of the sign to the Interpretant and to the Object adjectivally is significant. Or, if one doesn't think it's significant, why not?
GF: Because Peirce does not express those relations adjectivally. One may get this impression from looking at the triangle diagram alone, but the text defining those sign types names them using nouns, just as it does with the first trichotomy. [[ CP 2.250. According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a Rheme, a Dicisign or Dicent Sign (that is, a proposition or quasi-proposition), or an Argument. A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. 251. A Dicent Sign is a Sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of actual existence. It cannot, therefore, be an Icon, which affords no ground for an interpretation of it as referring to actual existence. A Dicisign necessarily involves, as a part of it, a Rheme, to describe the fact which it is interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and while it is essential to the Dicisign, it by no means constitutes it. 252. An Argument is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of law. ]] From: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> Sent: 28-Mar-19 16:45 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was Ambiguities... Helmut, Jon, Gary F, For each and every of the 10 sign classes given at EP2:296, "Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations," for example, the central sign class in the triangle, Rhematic Indexical Legisign, the first term refers to the relation of the sign to its Interpretant, the second to the sign in its relation to the Object, and only the third to the Sign in itself. Peirce is explicit about this. "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that Object, or in its relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of fact, or a sign of reason. "According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign. "A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. "A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning "being only once," as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. "A Legisign is a law that is a sign. This law is usually established by men. Every conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it. EP2:291 In the diagram of the 10 Classes of Signs Peirce reverse the above order so that for each class the SIgn in itself is given last. We've taken this matter up several times on the list, for example, in consideration of Peirce's saying that there are no pure icons: so, some signs are 'iconic'. I would suggest that that is so for the 'indexical' signs as well. That Peirce expresses the relation of the sign to the Interpretant and to the Object adjectivally is significant. Or, if one doesn't think it's significant, why not? As I see it Helmut has a point from this purely theoretical standpoint (vs. the use of signs in, say, a proposition, or, the placement of signs in a particular Existential Graph). Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 3:56 PM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Helmut, No, Jon has it exactly right. Study the “Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations” (in EP2 or CP) and you’ll see. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Sent: 28-Mar-19 15:09 Jon, Auke, list, isnt it so, that in the context of sign classification a sign is either a quali-, sin-, or legisign, all of which may or may not have the adjective "rhematic"? So, in this context, "a rheme" is not regarded as a sign, but "rhematic" is regarded as an adjective, a trait of a sign resp. its interpretant relation? Leaving this context, but still to be in accord with it , I would propose saying, that a rheme or seme (I havent got the difference) "is" not a sign, but can function as a sign, if it is perceived, and then this sign "is" rhematic, but "is" a quali-, sin-, or legisign, but not "is a rheme"? Best, Helmut 28. März 2019 um 19:39 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Auke, List: AvB: I prefer terms like Rhematic in order to underscore that it always is about sign aspects ... No, it is not. Again, the trichtomies do not identify "sign aspects" or "aspects of signs"; there are zero instances of any such phrase in the eight volumes of CP and two volumes of EP. Peirce proposed the three trichotomies of 1903 and the ten trichotomies of 1906-1908 as alternative bases for identifying mutually exclusive classes of Signs. Every Sign theoretically belongs to exactly one of the ten classes of 1903, and would belong to exactly one of the 66 classes of 1906-1908 if anyone ever managed to sort them all out. Every Sign is either a Seme, a Proposition, or an Argument; and every Sign is either an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol. In accordance with the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), every Argument is a Symbol, and every Proposition is either an Index or a Symbol; while a Seme can be an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol. AvB: Although a rheme cannot perform an indexical function ... I am aware of no warrant for this statement whatsoever from Peirce's writings. If a Sign is a Rhematic Index (Indexical Seme), then by definition it is a Rheme (Seme) that can and does perform an indexical function. AvB: When we think of a composite sentence like "there is a cow". 'there' is the replica index and 'a cow' the symbolical, rhematic legisign of the compound forged by the copula. In this context, "there" is a pronoun, hence a Rhematic Indexical Legisign; i.e., a Rheme (Seme) that performs an indexical function. By itself, it is certainly not a Dicisign (Proposition), which is the only alternative classification for an Index. AvB: I don't see any harm in distinguishing an index as a possible, without actual indexical function and an index in actu. If a Sign is not performing any actual indexical function, how could it be properly classified as an Index at all? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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