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}JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen.
I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate
between the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full
semiosic triad.
Edwina
On Sat 18/05/19 7:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign.
It is not my definition, it is Peirce's. If you do not believe me,
then just read through the Commens Dictionary entry [1], or Robert
Marty's compilation [2] of "76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S.
Peirce."
ET: My understanding of a Sign ... is that it is a morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws.
This is not Peirce's definition--i.e., not any of his many
definitions--it is yours. I have repeatedly acknowledged our
longstanding disagreement about this, and have repeatedly expressed a
desire not to rehash it; so why keep bringing it up?
ET: I disagree with your reductionism.
I disagree with your characterization, which is a tiresome
rhetorical ploy with no basis in anything that I have actually
advocated.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:32 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS list
1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical
things can be signs"? In your specific example of a rock, the rock
is not the Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily
construct a different scenario in which the rock is a Sign of
something else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it. I have
acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself
in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something else (Object)
to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between two other
correlates--it is not properly called a Sign"
I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. My
understanding of a Sign - and again, I stress that I mean the full
irreducible triad of O-R-I - is that it is a morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws. So, a Rock IS a Sign in
itself. No- not merely when it is used in a symbolic sense for 'the
site of buried treasure' - but, in itself, as a chemical compound of
raw data [sand, chemicals etc] which are the Object, and then as
mediatively formed by the laws which-form-rocks....into the
Interpretant which is that particular Rock.
2] And, you wrote: "Moreover, if the entire Universe is composed of
Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails
that the entire Universe constitutes one Sign. For more on that,
please see what I just posted in the other thread, including the fact
that Peirce explicitly stated, "the entire body of all thought is a
sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected"
I disagree with your reductionism. A 'common Sign' requires
connection; this can be by commonality of mediative laws; it can be
iconically [photocopy]; it can be indexically [plant vines] but - the
Universe is also diverse and many instantiations do NOT share
commonalities. What is common to the Universe is the process of
semiosis - generating morphological instances within laws. But the
results are diverse and open to chance and differentiation.
Edwina
Links:
------
[1] http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/sign
[2] http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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