The point is, that the Peircean semiosic framework is generative;
that is, it doesn't simply tell us that 'this' means 'that' - which
is the Saussurian communicative framework. Instead, the Peircean
frame, by inserting the representamen/sign as mediation - which is
NOT the same as 'transmission' - but as mediation, creates a
generative framework.
Therefore, as an example, the representamen located in a plant, in
its function of mediative Mind, takes data from an external Object
[such as water, chemicals] and using the laws located in that
representamen, transforms that raw data into its own Interpretant,
the morphological form of leaves and flowers and seeds.
This morphological form, the full triadic sign, functions as an
Object to some other form. So, the leaves and flowers and seeds of
the plant become food [Interpretants] etc for some other
actuality...and so on.
But at no time is the triad reducible; all three parts function
interactively [O-R-I].
Edwina
On Sun 19/05/19 8:31 AM , Edwina Taborsky [email protected] sent:
ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since the
representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
semiosic set of O-R-I.
Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the
triad as a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of
relations in his outline of these then classes. 2.254
The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral
part of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert
actuality into the mediative process of Mind.
Edwina
On Sun 19/05/19 1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
[email protected] sent:
Jon S, Edwina, List,
I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a
genuinely triadic relation with respect to its object and
interpretant. Having said that, some signs have the character of
necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs
that have these three characteristics, do they have the internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic
relations--even if they are the first correlate of a further triadic
relation.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation
wars (was Continuity... Edwina, List:
Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage
of these terms. Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903),
or "Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905). He
never--not once--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a
relation, while a Sign is always a correlate.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen.
I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate
between the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full
semiosic triad.
Edwina
Links:
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http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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