Jeff, Edwina, List: JD: As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they are the first correlate of a further triadic relation.
I think that *consist *is the wrong word here, because it implies that some Signs are *nothing but* triadic relations. However, I acknowledge that some Signs clearly *involve *relations, and some of those relations are *triadic*. For example, Symbols involve Indices and Icons that are connected in some way, Propositions involve Semes married by continuous predicates, and Arguments involve Propositions married by leading principles; not to mention that the Universe as a Sign obviously involves triadic (and other) relations. However, the point of contention is whether *any *Sign *is *a triadic relation--i.e., a triad--rather than *always *being one correlate of a triadic relation. ET: ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants' ... No, only Legisigns/Types are Necessitants; Qualisigns/Tones are Possibles, and Sinsigns/Tokens are Existents. ET: Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'. No, the Object and Interpretant are *external* to the Sign, not *parts *of the Sign. The Sign, Object, and Interpretant are the three correlates of the triadic relation of *representing *or *mediating*. ET: We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in his outline of these ten classes. 2.254 No, there is nothing whatsoever in that entire passage (NDTR, CP 2.233-272, EP 2:289-299; 1903) that "contradicts" my claim; on the contrary, it explicitly *confirms *that a Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant--the First Correlate of a triadic relation, not *itself *a triad or triadic relation. CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A *Sign *is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290-291) Peirce proceeded to use "Sign," rather than "Representamen," throughout the entire remainder of the text. I do not see how he could have been any clearer, and I stand by my statement that he never--*not once*--used "Sign" for a triad. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 7:31 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since > the representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic > semiosic set of O-R-I. > > Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal > structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'. > > We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in > contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as > a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in > his outline of these then classes. 2.254 > > The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign > cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral part > of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert actuality > into the mediative process of Mind. > > Edwina > > On Sun 19/05/19 1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard [email protected] > sent: > > Jon S, Edwina, List, > > I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a genuinely > triadic relation with respect to its object and interpretant. Having said > that, some signs have the character of necessitants. These include > legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs that have these three > characteristics, do they have the internal structure of a triadic relation > connecting its parts? I think the answer is "yes". As such, some signs > consist of triadic relations--even if they are the first correlate of a > further triadic relation. > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > ------------------------------ > From: Jon Alan Schmidt > Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars > (was Continuity... > > Edwina, List: > > Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of > these terms. Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental > Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or > "Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905). He never--not > once--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a relation, while > a Sign is always a correlate. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am >> talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the >> Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between >> the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full semiosic triad. >> >> Edwina >> >
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