Gary F., List: GF: The key point is that percepts can be considered either as signs or as objects of signs, depending on the purpose of one’s analysis.
I agree. I think of Percepts as Semes whose Objects are external to the interpreting Quasi-mind, and Perceptual Judgments as Propositions whose Objects are those very Percepts. As I discussed at length in the "Continuity of Semeiosis Revisted" thread, such *discrete *Signs are creations of thought for the purpose of describing (and analyzing) the *real *and *continuous *"inferential process" of semeiosis, which is an ongoing Argument. Moreover, as Edwina pointed out, anything that serves as the Object of a Sign must partake of the *nature *of a Sign itself, because it is only to that extent that another Sign can represent it (cf. CP 1.538; 1903). GF: As Peirce put it in a letter to James, “Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so for phenomenology” (CP 8.300; 1904 Oct 3). We might say that percepts are not signs for cenoscopy or for semiotics either ... You might say that, but I would not. In fact, we discussed that quote on-List several months ago. As I noted back then, chronologically it falls in between two seemingly contradictory statements by Peirce about a Percept--in 1903, it "does not stand for anything" (CP 7.619); but in 1906, it "is a Seme" (CP 4.539-540)--while at roughly the same time, he wrote elsewhere quite explicitly, "But percepts are themselves signs, whether veracious or not" (EP 2:328; late 1904). For me, the resolution is to recognize that a Percept does not *profess *to stand for anything--it is a mere snapshot from the "flow of images" that constitutes experience as it is "forced upon us," which in itself "has no parts" but from which we prescind predicates and abstract subjects (NEM 3:917; 1904 Nov 21), enabling us to formulate a Perceptual Judgment *about *it. GF: I gather your views are different, and you also consider yours to be compatible with Peirce’s, but I’m content to chalk that up to the vagueness of both our views rather than debate which one is better. That is fine, although I would add the vagueness of Peirce's *own *views on these matters--or at least, the vagueness of his *expressed *views--as another factor that allows for different adaptations of his thought. The key, as John Sowa pointed out, is to recognize and acknowledge the difference between restating his views where they are quite clear, interpreting his views where they are less clear, and developing our own views where they deviate from his. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, May 27, 2019 at 8:58 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > First, thanks for filling in the gaps in R 637! I’ll be copying that into > my own ‘chronological edition’ of Peirce’s late works. > > Just a few quick notes about “Direct vs. Indirect Experience.” The key > point is that percepts can be considered either as signs or as objects of > signs, depending on the purpose of one’s analysis. As Peirce put it in a > letter to James, “Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so > for phenomenology” (CP 8.300). We might say that percepts are not signs for > cenoscopy or for semiotics either; but I think the point is clearer when > formulated in terms of the “meaning cycle” as expressed in *Turning Signs*: > percepts are where practice meets perception, so that perceptual judgments > are the *beginning* of cognition. My diagram of this, based on Robert > Rosen’s “modeling relation”, is at > http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#meancyc. > > My practice/-ception distinction is analogous, if not identical, to > Peirce’s distinction between Theory and Practice in “Kaina Stoicheia” > (EP2:304, quoted in http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#inhab), and my > distinction between science and religion ( > http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/cns.htm#scirel) is along the same lines, > science being theoretical and religion practical or pragmatic. I am not > ascribing these views of mine to Peirce, but I do find them quite > compatible with Peirce’s, enough that I can use Peirce quotes to explain > some aspects of them. I gather your views are different, and you also > consider yours to be compatible with Peirce’s, but I’m content to chalk > that up to the vagueness of both our views rather than debate which one is > better. > > I have to end here, as I have a fair bit of manual labor ahead of me > today. Maybe I’ll get back to you and Jeff tomorrow. > > Gary f >
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